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Abstract 
Child custody laws in Australia were significantly reformed on 1 July 2006 by the Family 
Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) ('FLASPRA') amendments 
to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('FLA'). This thesis examines the nature and impact of the 
amendment to the child voice provisions of ascertaining the child's ‘views’ provided in 
section 60CC(3)(a), rather than the consideration of a child’s ‘wishes’ as formerly required in 
section 68F(2)(a) FLA.  The amendment to consider the child’s view was intended by the 
legislature to broaden the scope of the requirement to listen to children by taking into account 
the child’s perceptions and feelings about the matter, moving beyond a simpler and more 
crude requirement to seek the child’s wish about who they would prefer to live with.  
Consideration of a child’s views in determining custody arrangements represents one of the 
factors related to the central concept of the best interests of the child, which must be 
considered by the court.  This requirement clearly is an important part of the judicial 
reasoning process in determining the outcomes in these cases and the change in the legislative 
framework from the court’s requirement that they must consider a child’s view – as opposed 
to their wishes – provides the central context explored by this thesis.   
 
The amendments produced several important questions for law and practice regarding the 
technical legal difference in the terminological change.  How is a view different from a wish?  
What are the opinions of Independent Children's Lawyers ('ICLs'), who are advocates for the 
child's best interests and Judges who decide litigated custody cases, about the change to the 
child voice provisions?  What does the experience of ICLs and Judges indicate about any 
change in their professional practice under the new child view regime? 
  
Research questions  
The research explores the significance of and the intended purpose of the 2006 FLA 
amendments of ascertaining a child's view instead of the pre-2006 requirement of a child's 
wish in parental disputes. An underlying question is whether parliament intended that the 
amendment would translate to a change in statutory meaning, which should in turn change 
the way ICLs and Judges practiced in these cases.  To explore these questions, this thesis 
conducted a tripartite inquiry into the impact of the 2006 FLA amendments which required 
the courts to consider a child’s view, as opposed to their wishes, in parental separation cases. 
The research is grounded in an analysis and comparison of the pre-2006 child wish regime 
and the post-2006 child view regime.  The three objectives of the thesis which underpin the 
research questions posed were: 
(1) to consider whether the FLASPRA amendment to the FLA section 60CC(3)(a) 
rendered the consideration of a child’s view different from a wish in a technical legal 
sense;  
(2) to explore the opinions of ICLs and Judges about what they consider their respective 
role is in ascertaining a child’s view compared with a child’s wish using a qualitative 
study; and  
(3) to explore the practices of ICLs and Judges in speaking to a child in the context of 
ascertaining a child’s view compared with a child’s wish using a qualitative study.   
 
Research methods and key findings.  
For research question 1, I conducted conventional, doctrinal legal research and analysis. This 
doctrinal legal synthesis and legal analysis critically explored the conceptual difference 
produced by the key legislative change and what the change in terminology was meant to 
produce in law, meaning and practice.  By conducting the legal synthesis and analysis 
conclusions were that: (1) a child's voice has been recognised since the enactment of the FLA; 
(2) the legislative intention of the wish to view amendment did anticipate a change in 
meaning, however most judicial decisions post-2006 showed that the consideration of a 
child's view was not conceptually different from the previous framework of consideration of 
a child's wish and the pre-2006 child wish authorities of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 
Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children's Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712, remain the authoritative 
cases for the post-2006 child views regime; and (3) the weight attached to what a child says 
has not differed from the pre-2006 consideration of a wish to that of the post-2006 
consideration of a child's view. 	
For research questions 2 and 3 I conducted a small scale purposive study of the opinions and 
practices of ICLs and Judges regarding the 2006 child view amendments.  The study 
surveyed 14 ICLs and 6 Judges, in three states: Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria.  
For research question 2, in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs, a view was not 
different from a wish in meaning.  Some respondents saw the changes as 'government 
claptrap' and others were 'not fussed' about the changes.  The majority opinion was that the 
consideration of a view did not amount to a broader investigation into the child's perceptions 
and feelings.  In contrast, the minority whose opinions saw a change said that considering a 
child's view could contextualise the circumstances of what was happening in the child's life. 
The minority's view does go to the heart of the symbolic changes intended in the legislation. 
Further, the best interests of the child factors and parental capacity remain the paramount 
consideration whether what a child has to say is called a wish or a view. 
 
For research question 3 the ICLs and Judges were asked if their practices had differed as a 
result of the 2006 FLA wish to view provision and if the 2006 FLA Division 12A Principles 
for conducting child-related proceedings amendments influenced how they practiced in 
listening to what a child had to say.  For most ICLs and Judges the way they practiced in 
ascertaining a child view did not translate into any changes from the pre-2006 regime and a 
child's voice (whether the law expressed the word as a view or a wish) was considered in 
accordance with the child's best interest and parental capacity.  Further, the majority of 
respondents said that the Division 12A less adversarial trial process depended on the 
personality of the Judge and the parents and, in any event, did not assist children in having 
their views heard, but it did allow the Judge greater flexibility in case managing the litigation 
process.  The practices of ascertaining a child's view differed between individual ICLs and 
Judges and between the states of New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria and also 
between country and city localities.  To explain the variations in the way ICLs and Judges 
practiced some respondents detailed that it was dictated by external factors such as the culture 
of practice in different states, lack of funding and geographical factors which impacted on the 
access to services.   
 
Conclusion.  
This thesis contributes to knowledge by analysing the meaning of the Family Law Act 
provision about obtaining a child’s views compared to a child’s wishes and its interpretation 
by the courts.  It also contributes to professional knowledge and practice by an innovative 
qualitative study which has yielded rich insights into professionals’ opinions and actual 
practice in relation to this important Family Law provision. 
 
The doctrinal research conclusions, supported by the qualitative study concluded that a view 
is not different from a wish in law, meaning, weight or in practice.  The doctrinal research 
conclusions were that although the legislature intended that in meaning a view was different 
to a wish, the majority of judicial decisions post-2006 did not support this.  The qualitative 
study also concluded that in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs a view was not 
different from a wish and the majority of Judges and ICLs did not change the way they 
practiced in ascertaining the child's voice, whether it was described as a wish or a view.   
 
The thesis makes recommendations for amendments to the FLA including the inserting of a 
definition of the word ‘view’ in the interpretation provisions of the FLA; the amendment of 
the section 60B objects provisions to include consideration of a child's view; the FLA section 
61DA (the presumption) and section 65DAA (time arrangement) provisions be amended to 
include a reference to consideration of the child’s view before a parenting order is made; and  
the inclusion in the FLR and FCCR details of minimum best practice guidelines regarding the 
ascertaining of a child's view by an ICL.  
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1.1 Overview 
 
One of the major contentious issues in Australian family law in recent decades has been the 
subject of how legislation and courts should determine child custody1 orders.  The 
provenance of the legislative reforms2 can be attributed to the efforts of interest groups3 
lobbying the government for changes resulting in parliamentary enquiries4 and extensive 
public consultation.  On 29 December 2003, following the release of the parliamentary report, 
Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event 
of family separation (2003) ('the Hull Report'),5 a media statement reported: 
A radical reshaping of Australia’s family law system and processes has been recommended by the 
House of Representatives Family and Community Affairs Committee, following an intensive six-
month inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation.6 
 
The changes to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('FLA') proposed by the Hull Report, were 
considered by the Government and the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs (‘HRSCLCA’).  The HRSCLCA prepared the Report on the 
Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill7 
('REDFLA').  The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee's report, Inquiry 
into the Provisions of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
																																								 																				
1 The word ‘custody’ is used to describe in the broader context the post separation care arrangements for children. See 1.6 
Notes on terminology in this thesis.  
2 Various parliamentary inquiries since the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) include: Commonwealth, Family 
Law in Australia: Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Family Law Act, Volumes 1 and 2, Parl Paper No 150 (1980) 
(known as the Ruddock Inquiry); Commonwealth, The Family Law Act, Aspects of its Operation and Interpretation, Report 
of Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act (1992); House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Every Picture Tells a 
Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation (2003); ('Every Picture 
Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation' ) (also known as 
the Hull Report); House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Parliament of Australia, 
Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (2005), (' Report on 
the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005').  The Commonwealth 
Government also commissioned a report on family violence following the 2006 amendments: Chisholm, R (2009) Family 
Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, Canberra, Attorney-General’s Department. 
3 Lobby groups included men's rights groups and women's rights groups. See discussion further in thesis regarding 
submissions to parliamentary inquiries. 
4 Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation, 
above n 2; Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 above n 
2. 
5 Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation 
(2003) above n 2. 
6 House of Family and Community Affairs Committee Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements, Chair Kay Hull MP and 
Deputy Chair Julie Irwin MP, ‘Radical reshaping of family law system’ (Press Release 29 December 2003). 
7 Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 above n 2. 
15	
	
20058 was also later tabled in parliament.  Various stakeholders provided submissions to 
those parliamentary enquiries including interest groups such as women's rights groups9 and 
men's rights groups.10  The men's rights groups claim to 'advocate on behalf of men and 
fathers who are the victims of discrimination and injustice in the Family Court'.11  A 
submission by the Men's Rights Agency stated that focusing on past parental child care 
constituted a discriminatory practice in that it did not take into account the working hours 
fathers performed to support their families.12  In contrast, advocates for women's groups 
contended that following separation, the courts should focus on the past history of the care for 
the child and the need to protect women and their children from violence before awarding 
child custody and visitation rights.13   
 
In the context of the FLA proposed amendments, men's and women's groups were particularly 
vocal and had divergent views about the proposed introduction of provisions concerning a 
presumption of shared parental responsibility, equal and substantial time arrangements, 
'family friendly' provisions and changing family violence provisions.14  
 
In addition to the arguments for change in the FLA promoted by men's and women's rights 
groups there was a recognition that 'children of any verbal age can and should be consulted in 
																																								 																				
8 Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee Hansard, Parliament of Australia, Reference: Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) 3 March 2006 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/hansard/senate/commttee/s9162.pdf>. 
9  Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee on Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2006, 26-34, 35-44 (Dr Elspeth McInnes, Convenor, National Council of 
Single Mothers and their Children and Jacqueline Taylor, Executive Officer, National Council of Single Mothers and their 
Children; Rosemary Budavari, Policy Officer, Women’s Legal Services Australia and Joanna Fletcher, Law Reform 
Coordinator, Women’s Legal Services Australia, on behalf of the National Association of Community Legal Centres. 
10  Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee on Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Bill 2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2006, 1-12, 45-51 (James Carter, Vice-President, Australian Capital 
Territory, Lone Fathers Association and Barry Williams, National President and Founder, Lone Fathers Association 
Australia; Wayne Butler, Executive Secretary, Shared Parenting Council of Australia). 
11 MG Flood, 'Separated fathers and the 'Fathers' Rights' Movement' (2012) 18 (2-3) Journal of Family Studies 231-241, 231. 
12 Men's Rights Agency, Submission No 124 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Parliament of Australia, Family 
Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, 3 March 2006, 124. 
13 Helen Rhoades, ‘Children's needs and 'gender wars': The paradox of parenting law reform’ (2010) 24 Australian Journal 
of Family Law 160-175, 162. See especially Evidence to Senate and Constitutional Committee on Family Law Amendment 
(Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2006, 35 (Joanna Fletcher, Law 
Reform Coordinator, Women’s Legal Services Australia, on behalf of the National Association of Community Legal 
Centres). 
14 See Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee on Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Bill 2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2006, 1-12, 45-51, 26-34, 35-44 (James Adams,  White Paper 
Committee Member, Fathers4Equality, James Carter, Vice-President, Australian Capital Territory, Lone Fathers Association 
and Barry Williams, National President and Founder, Lone Fathers Association Australia; Wayne Butler, Executive 
Secretary, Shared Parenting Council of Australia; Dr Elspeth McInnes, Convenor, National Council of Single Mothers and 
their Children and Jacqueline Taylor, Executive Officer, National Council of Single Mothers and their Children; Rosemary 
Budavari, Policy Officer, Women’s Legal Services Australia and Joanna Fletcher, Law Reform Coordinator, Women’s 
Legal Services Australia, on behalf of the National Association of Community Legal Centres). 
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important decisions about their lives'.15  REDFLA proposed that if a child's lawyer is 
appointed, the lawyer should seek the views of the child directly unless it was not appropriate 
to do so.16  REDFLA recommended that the amendments to the FLA should include a 
descriptive role of the child's lawyer and that the lawyer should be called the Independent 
Children's Lawyer ('ICL').17  However, some thought the FLA amendments should have 
provided more guidelines about how a child's voice is heard, that is questioning for example, 
the role of the Judge in communicating with children.18 
 
The key proposed change in the 2006 legislation.  
 
Determining what was in the best interest of the child was still paramount in the proposed 
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill.19  However the factors for 
determining the child’s best interests included a new two-tiered primary and additional best 
interest of the child classification and consideration of the child's "wishes" was to be replaced 
with consideration of the child's "views".20  Further, the amendment listed the child's view as 
an additional consideration, which meant that the consideration of the child's voice was not 
the first mentioned list of mandatory considerations (as per the pre-2006 provisions) but 
formed part of the second tier of mandatory considerations.  The primary considerations were 
a new list of considerations which mirrored the objects provisions of the FLA and the 
additional considerations reflected a similar list of factors to that of the previous section 
68F(2) FLA provisions.  In the context of why the change from consideration of a child's 
wishes to a child's views, the Explanatory Statement to the Draft Bill stated: 
 
‘Wishes’ means that children may feel that they need to make decisions about their future and that they 
do not necessarily want to do this, even though they want to be heard. By referring to ‘views’ in the 
Act, children may still be heard and their views taken into account, but they should not feel that they 
																																								 																				
15 Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation 
above 2, 97, [4.135]. 
16 Ibid, 170, [6.19]. 
17 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006, Schedule 5 Item 5 Division 10 of Part VII. 
18 Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, above n 2, 169, 
[6.15], citing Law Society of South Australia, Submission 28, 1.   
19 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth), s 60CA. 
20 "Views" and "wishes" in this context refer to the word used in the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth); Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth); and the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth) legislation. The words are first highlighted using quotation marks, however for the remainder of the 
thesis, no quotation marks will be used. 
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need to make a decision. This approach is consistent with the wording in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child at Article 12.21  
Some advocated that the use of the concept view was a better approach, on the basis that 
children should not have to choose between living with one or other of their parents.22  
National Legal Aid23 proposed that wishes and views should both be used in the legislation as 
some children 'do have definite wishes and want to express them'.  Other stakeholders said 
consideration of the child's view, turned on the circumstances, the age and maturity of the 
child and the 'focus of the legislation ... should be on the welfare of the children'.24   
 
The legislative changes and the questions raised for this thesis.   
 
This thesis examines the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 
(Cth) ('FLASPRA') amendment to the FLA regarding the child's views provision in section 
60CC(3)(a).  This provision sets out the requirement of the court to consider any views of the 
child as opposed to the requirement to consider a child’s wishes, as formerly required by 
section 68F(2)(a) of the FLA.  Section 60CC(3)(a) FLA represents one of the factors related 
to the central concept of the ‘best interests of the child’ which must be considered by the 
court and therefore as part of this endeavour the court is required to consider any views 
expressed by the child.25  This requirement clearly is an important part of the judicial 
reasoning process in determining these cases and the change in the legislative framework 
from the court’s requirement to consider a child’s views, as opposed to their wishes, hence 
provides the central context explored by this thesis.  
 
Under the FLA, section 60CA provides that when making a parenting order, the 'court must 
regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration' and following from this, 
section 60CB states that this applies to proceedings under Part VII of the FLA 'where the best 
interests of the child are the paramount consideration'.  Proceedings under Part VII include 
																																								 																				
21 Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, above n 2, 170, 
[6.22] citing the Explanatory Draft Statement. 
22 Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, above n 2, 3, 
Albury-Wodonga Community Legal Service, Submission 65, cited in Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into 
Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation above n 2, 169, [6.14]. 
23 Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, above n 2, 71, 
[6.23] citing National Legal Aid, Submission 24, 4.  
24 Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee on Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2006, L&C 57 (Mr Kennedy AM, Chair, Family Law Section, Family Law 
Council of Australia). 
25 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('FLA') s 60CD. 
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the making of parenting orders.  Section 60CC prescribes what the court must consider when 
determining what is in the best interests of the child.  Section 60CC(1) states that the courts 
must consider the factors set out in 60CC(2) and (3).  Section 60CC(2) provides the primary 
considerations of '(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of 
the child’s parents; and (b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm 
from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.'  Section 60CC(2A) 
provides that 'in applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give 
greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).' 
 
The additional considerations are listed in section 60CC(3).  In the context of the listening to 
children, section 60CC(3)(a) requires the court to take into account before making a parenting 
order 'any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level 
of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s 
views'.  The pre-2006 child wish provision also required that in considering the child's best 
interest the court must consider 'any wishes expressed by the child and any factors (such as 
the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight 
it should give to the child's wishes'.  The Explanatory Memorandum stated the change from 
wishes to views was important so as to 'capture a child’s perceptions and feelings' and was to 
be 'consistent with the wording of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.'26 
 
In determining a parenting order, if the child's view is an issue requiring judicial 
consideration, the courts must consider the child's view in the context of the child's best 
interest.  Section 60CD provides how the court can inform itself of the child's view (at section 
60CD(2)) by '(a) ... having regard to anything contained in a report given to the court under 
subsection 62G(2); or (b) by making an order under section 68L for the child’s interests in the 
proceedings to be independently represented by a lawyer; or (c) subject to the applicable 
Rules of Court, by such other means as the court thinks appropriate.'  In the context of how 
the report is to be provided to the court section 62G(3A) states that the report writer would 
ascertain the child's views and should include this in the report, however a person cannot 
compel the child to express their view (section 60CE).  Further, with the appointment of the 
																																								 																				
26 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 Subdivision BA – Best interests of the child, 14 [55]-[56]. 
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ICL, the ICL should ensure that if the child's views are expressed they should be 'fully put 
before the court'.27  
 
With the 2006 FLA amendments changing of the requirement of considering a child's view 
instead of a wish, the term view was not defined in the 2006 legislation. This created the 
fundamental technical legal and practical issue of how its meaning should be determined.  
While extrinsic materials including explanatory memoranda are not themselves primary legal 
sources, they are able to be consulted for the purpose of statutory interpretation under the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) section 15AB(2)(e).  The FLASPRA Explanatory 
Memorandum28 explains that the amendment was to be consistent with the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CROC’),29 and in particular, article 12 which 
provides:  
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.  
 
The FLASPRA Explanatory Memorandum also stated that the change from a child’s wishes to 
a child’s views had the following intention: 
  
The amendment recognises that a child may not necessarily want to express a ‘wish’ about which of his 
or her parents the child will live with or spend time with.  It is intended that ‘views’ will also capture a 
child’s perceptions and feelings, and will allow for any decision to be made in consultation with the 
child without the child having to make a decision or express a ‘wish’ as to which parent he or she is to 
live with or spend time with.  It is intended that references to a child’s ‘views’ will not exclude a child 
expressing his or her ‘wishes’.30 
 
																																								 																				
27 FLA s 68LA(5)(b). 
28 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 Subdivision BA – Best interests of the child, 14,[56]. 
29 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991. 
30 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 Subdivision BA – Best interests of the child, 14 [55]. 
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The amendment appeared to broaden the scope of the requirement to listen to children, by 
taking into account the child’s perceptions and feelings and having a more consultative 
approach with the child,31 hence moving beyond simply a requirement to seek the child’s 
wish about who they would prefer to live with.  In addition, it seemed to accommodate the 
fact that it may be traumatic to only ask (or even appear to compel) the child to express her or 
his wish about which parent she or he would prefer to live with.  At the same time it was 
made clear that the requirement to obtain the child’s views included the child’s ability to 
express their wishes about who they would prefer to live with.   
 
Yet, the amendments produced several important questions for law and practice. What was 
the intended purpose of the 2006 FLA amendments of ascertaining a child's view instead of 
the pre-2006 requirement of a child's wish? Was the legislative amendment intended to have 
special significance in meaning, and if so, what was that significance, and did the change 
translate to a change in practice in how a child's voice was heard by ICLs and Judges? This 
last question required an exploration of the outcomes of the change in practice.   
 
This thesis explored the intended outcomes proposed by the legislature of the wish to views 
amendments and if those legislative intentions were achieved.  This thesis considered 
whether there is a technical legal difference in the terminological change from wish to view, 
and perhaps even more importantly, the opinions ICLs and Judges held about the nature of 
the change.  Finally, the thesis explored the differences the change made in family law 
practice for ICLs and Judges.   
 
1.2 Contribution to knowledge 
 
The literature review of the research undertaken to date demonstrates the value in custody 
cases of (a) a dialogue with children; (b) the importance of the consideration of judicial 
meetings with children; and (c) the significance of the role of the ICLs as a best interests 
advocate for the child.  It has provided an invaluable comparison to situate the research 
conducted for this thesis.  As is shown in Part 1.4 literature review, significant research 
																																								 																				
31 See Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842, (21 August 2007) [174].  
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conducted by Fernando32 has explored judicial meetings with children; other research 
conducted by Kaspiew et al.,33 explored an ICLs involvement in parenting cases and how this 
impacts on outcomes for children and other work done by Parkinson and Cashmore34 
considered the perception of parents, children, lawyers and Judges regarding a child's 
involvement in post separation parenting matters.  However, no research has been undertaken 
to consider if a dialogue with children if described as a view is different from a wish, in law, 
meaning or in practice using both doctrinal research and qualitative studies. These gaps in the 
literature present the opportunity for this thesis to add to legal and professional knowledge. 
 
This thesis contributes to the legal and professional knowledge and practice in family law by:  
 
(1) determining through legal research and legal analysis that the legislative intention 
of the wish to view amendment did anticipate a change in meaning and that a view 
was meant to be different from a wish.  Some Judges in the post-2006 cases did 
expressly recognise the difference in the legislative provision.  However most judicial 
determinations did not recognise or incorporate the change and showed that the 
consideration of a child's view was not conceptually different from the previous 
framework of consideration of a child's wish.  Further, the pre-2006 child wish case 
authorities of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children’s 
Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 remain the current authorities post-2006 reforms.  
Also, the weight attached to what a child says has not differed from the pre-2006 
consideration of a wish to that of the post-2006 consideration of a child's view. 	
 
(2) generating the first qualitative research of Judges and ICLs to explore their 
opinions about their role in ascertaining the child's view as opposed to a child's wish.  
The qualitative findings reflected the findings of the legal synthesis and legal analysis, 
in that, in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs, a view was not different 
																																								 																				
32 Michelle Fernando, 'Conversations between Judges and Children: an Argument in Favour of Judicial Conferences in 
Contested Children's Matters' (2009) 23 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law 48-70; Michelle Fernando, 'What do 
Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' (2012) 26 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law 51-77; 
Michelle Fernando, 'Children's direct participation and the views of Australian judges' (2013) 92 Family Matters 41-47; 
Michelle Fernando, 'How can we best listen to Children in Family Law Proceedings?' (2013) 3 New Zealand Law Review 
387-407; Michelle Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' (2012) 2 (4) 
Family Law Review 213-224; Michelle Meilin Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law 
Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices. (PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2011).   
33 Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Deblaquiere J., and Horsfall B. (2014) Independent Children’s Lawyers 
Study, Final Report, (2nd ed) Canberra: Attorney General’s Department. 
34 Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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from a wish in meaning and that the consideration of a view did not amount to a 
broader investigation into the child's perceptions and feelings.  In contrast, the opinion 
of the minority of ICLs and Judges was that considering a view rather than a wish 
contextualises the circumstances of what was happening in the child's life.  The 
minority's view does go to the heart of the symbolic changes intended in the 
legislation. 
 
(3) generating the first qualitative research of ICLs’ and Judges’ practices within the 
framework of whether a child's view is different from a wish.  The findings of the 
qualitative study was that the practices of most Judges and ICLs did not change as a 
result of the amendments and therefore did not reflect the changes that were intended 
by the legislature.  For the minority of ICLs and Judges the changes to the legislation 
did bring a change in practice which permitted a more interactive and broader 
investigation into what a child had to say. 
 
The legal doctrinal research and the qualitative research both separately and in combination 
ensures the originality of the thesis.  This thesis contributes to knowledge by analysing the 
meaning of the Family Law Act provision about obtaining a child’s views compared to a 
child’s wishes and its interpretation by the courts, and by considering the outcomes of this 
change.  It also contributes to professional knowledge and practice by an innovative 
qualitative study which has yielded rich insights into professionals’ opinions and actual 
practice in relation to this important Family Law provision.  The research therefore fulfils the 
requirements of the SJD by making a notable contribution to professional knowledge and 
practice in family law. 
 
1.3 Tripartite inquiry - the three objectives of the thesis  
 
This thesis conducted a tripartite inquiry within a conceptual framework of the considerations 
of children’s rights and best interests.  The role that Judges and ICLs take in considering a 
child’s view is important in promoting a child’s right to be heard.  However, a child’s right to 
be authentically listened to is balanced against the need to ensure that the child is not exposed 
to parental conflict and an excessive amount of intervention from the legal profession 
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(whether that be ICLs or Judges). The objectives of the thesis, which underpin the research 
questions explored, are:  
1. To consider whether the FLASPRA amendment to the FLA section 60CC(3)(a) 
rendered the consideration of a child’s view different from a wish; 
2. To explore the opinions of ICLs and Judges about what they consider their respective 
role is in ascertaining a child’s view; 
3. To explore the practices of ICLs and Judges in speaking to a child in the context of 
ascertaining a child’s view. That is what they do and why it is they practice the way 
they do. 
 
Objective One: Doctrinal legal research and analysis of the nature and effect of 
the FLA child view provision 
 
This thesis presents doctrinal legal research to critically explore the nature and effect of the 
change in terminology of considering a child’s view35 instead of a child’s wish.  It 
investigates the conceptual difference produced by the key legislative change and what the 
change in terminology was meant to produce in practice.  The thesis synthesises the post-
2006 FLA legislative principles with reference to the objects of the FLA; and the 2006 
primary and additional considerations of the best interest of the child factors including 
whether the delegation of a child’s views as an additional consideration36 has made a 
difference to the outcomes of listening to children.  By analysing the legislative changes 
using orthodox principles of statutory interpretation and case law analysis, the thesis 
considered if the changes affected the technical and practical application of how Judges and 
ICLs listened to children and whether this change gave greater weight to how a child’s voice 
was heard by Judges and ICLs in child custody cases.  
 
When determining a parenting order, the court must consider as a paramount consideration 
what is in the best interest of the child.37  How a court determines this is based on primary 
and additional considerations.38  Judges can inform themselves of the views of a child 
																																								 																				
35 FLA s 60CC(3)(a). 
36 Ibid s 60CC. 
37 Ibid s 60CA. 
38 Ibid ss 60CC (1), (2) (3). 
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through evidence of a child expert, via their family report,39 by having the child represented 
by an ICL40 or by other means as they think appropriate.41  The role of an ICL is guided by 
provisions in the FLA.42  ICLs are appointed by the Courts;43 however Legal Aid 
Commissions around Australia undertake the selection process and the appointment of legal 
practitioners to the position of an ICL.  Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers44 
provide a framework within which ICLs work.  
 
This thesis considers the role of the Judges and ICLs with regards to the way they ascertain a 
child’s views.  Methodologically, this will be achieved by an analysis of the social and 
legislative context within which the changes occurred and of the ways children’s views have 
been presented to the family law courts with a specific emphasis on post-2006 cases.  This 
component of the research is detailed in Chapter 3. 
 
Objective Two: Qualitative research and analysis regarding the opinions of ICLs 
and Judges of the nature and effect of the FLA child view provision 
 
What a child has to say in custody orders is considered in light of the evidence, the child's 
age, maturity and capacity45 and the child's best interest.  However the 2006 amendment to 
the FLA changing a wish to a view was meant to provide a broader consideration of what was 
happening in the child's life.46  To meet objective two, a small-scale purposive qualitative 
research study was conducted with 14 ICLs and 6 Judges in family law courts in three 
Australian States: New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria.  The purpose of this was to 
explore the opinions of ICLs and Judges and capture insights in relation to: (a) whether they 
thought views were different from wishes in meaning; (b) what the role of the ICL and the 
role of the Judge was in relation to ascertaining a child’s views; and (c) whether in deciding 
custody orders the ICL and the Judge should speak directly to children. The qualitative study 
is presented in Chapter 4. 
																																								 																				
39 Ibid s 60CD(2)(a). 
40 Ibid s 60CD(2)(b). 
41 Ibid s 60CD(2)(b). 
42 Ibid Part VII, Independent representation of child’s interests Division 10. 
43 Family Court of Australia; Federal Circuit Court of Australia (formerly Federal Magistrates Courts). 
44 National Legal Aid. (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian 
and Federal Circuit Court of Australia). 
45 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402, ('Gillick').  See Dylan & Dylan [2007] 
FamCa 842 (21 August 2007) [247]. See also Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child, above n 34, 116. 
46 See Lisa Young, Adiva Sifris, Robyn Carroll, Geoff Monahan, Family Law in Australia, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th 
ed, 2016), 589. 
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Objective Three: Qualitative research and analysis regarding the practices of 
ICLs and Judges of the nature and effect of the FLA child view provision 
 
To meet objective three of this thesis the qualitative research explored the practices of the 
same 14 ICLs and 6 Judges by asking them what they did in their role (whether as an ICL or 
Judge) to listen to children in custody cases and if the way they performed their functions 
changed as a consequence of the 2006 FLA amendments.  To situate the exploration of their 
practices, their roles were explored in the context of whether the 2006 wish to view 
amendments changed the way they practiced47 and how the Division 12A Principles for 
conducting child-related proceedings provisions influenced their practices in ascertaining the 
child's view.   
 
The amendment from consideration of a child's wish to that of a child's view was meant to 
broaden how a child's voice was heard by capturing a child's perceptions and feelings.48  The 
independent representation of children, Division 10 provisions described the circumstances of 
the appointment of the ICL and provided a more descriptive clarification of the ICL's role.49  
The Explanatory Memorandum explained that the reason for the Division 10 amendments 
was to overcome the 'concerns about the minimal direction and guidance concerning the role 
of the child representative'.50  The 2006 FLA Division 12A child related proceedings 
amendments were introduced to: 
 
Provide legislative support for a less adversarial approach to be adopted in all child related proceedings 
...[it] relies on active management by judicial officers of matters and ensures that proceedings are 
managed in a way that considers the impact of the proceedings themselves (not just the outcome of the 
proceedings) on the child.  The intention is to ensure that the case management practices adopted by 
courts will promote the best interests of the child.51 
 
																																								 																				
47 The ICLs role was 'codified' in the 2006 FLA amendments in Division 10 Independent representation of child's interests.  
See Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006, Schedule 5 Representation of Child's Interests by 
Independent Children's Lawyer, Part 1, Item 5 Division 10 of Part VII. 
48 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 – After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14 [55]. 
49 Ibid Item 5, Division 10, of Part VII, 135-139, [64]-[70]. 
50 Ibid Item 5, Division 10, of Part VII, 136, [64]. 
51 Ibid Schedule 3 Amendments Relating to the Conduct of Child-Related Proceedings, Part X, Part 1 Amendments, 60, 
[327]. 
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The Division 12A provisions provide five guiding principles for courts conducting child 
related proceedings.  These principles guide child focus practices and detail that the courts 
must consider the needs of the child;52 encourage child focused parenting;53Judges must 
actively direct and manage the proceedings54 with little formality as possible;55and be 
mindful of safeguarding children from being subjected to family violence or abuse.56  The 
Division 10 and Division12A principles were used to guide the analysis of the qualitative 
study. The qualitative study of this research question is also presented in Chapter 4. 
 
The next part of Chapter 1 will provide a literature review of the doctrinal and empirical 
research previously undertaken in the area of listening to child's voice and a child's 
participation in custody cases.  The literature review situates the legal synthesis and analysis 
(Chapter 3) and the qualitative research (Chapter 4) conducted in this thesis.  The structure of 
the thesis is then outlined and the contribution to knowledge and findings are provided. 
 
1.4 Literature review  
 
To achieve the objectives stated, a literature review of doctrinal and empirical research was 
conducted on how a child's voice is heard in Australian child custody cases.  The literature 
review in this chapter will provide an overview of: Part A - the role of Judges communicating 
with children in custody cases; Part B - the role of the ICL in ascertaining a child's view; and 
Part C - the social science research conducted regarding the voice of the child in custody 
matters.  Chapter 3 will provide detail on the doctrinal legal research on the question of 
whether a view is different from a wish. 
 
Part A - The role of Australian family law Judges in listening to children. 
 
1.4.1 Judges communicating with children in family law cases 
  
																																								 																				
52 FLA s 69ZN(3) Principle 1. 
53 Ibid s 69ZN(6) Principle 4. 
54 Ibid s 69ZN(4) Principle 2. 
55 Ibid s 69ZN(7) Principle 5. 
56 Ibid s 69ZN(5) Principle 3.  Principle 4, s 69ZN(6) requires the court to encourage cooperative and child-focused 
parenting. 
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The role that Judges play in ascertaining a child's view through judicial interviews, has been 
the subject of notable research in recent years.57  Of significance was the research conducted 
by Michelle Fernando as part of her PhD thesis.58  Fernando is one of the leading researchers 
in this field.  Fernando has published her findings in law journals and she has been widely 
cited in academic texts and social science research.59  Fernando used qualitative and 
quantitative methods in her research and conducted interviews and surveys with family law 
Judges regarding judicial meetings with children.  Fernando’s research also recognised the 
importance of speaking to children and questioned why most Judges did not meet with 
children.  Fernando found that many Judges perceive they are not trained to speak to children 
or are worried about due process and procedural fairness.60 
 
Judges can speak to children directly to ascertain their views, however as Fernando found,61 
children rarely speak to Judges directly, nor is it encouraged.62  At the time of the 2006 FLA 
amendments, the Family Court of Australia’s Practice Direction 2 of 2006 (‘PD’) referred to 
Division 12A FLA child-related proceedings.  At 9.1 it stated: ‘There are opportunities for a 
child to be heard in a manner which is consistent with his/her views, developmental level and 
the circumstances.’  The voice of the child was presented through an expert such as a family 
consultant.  The PD at 9.2 also provided that the Judge may interview a child if appropriate 
and in the presence of other persons such as an expert or an ICL.  On 1 March 2009, the PD 2 
of 2006 was revoked and an amendment to the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) included the 
																																								 																				
57 See Fernando, 'Conversations between Judges and Children: an Argument in Favour of Judicial Conferences in Contested 
Children's Matters' above n 32; Fernando, 'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' above 
n 32; Fernando, 'Children's direct participation and the views of Australian judges' above n 32; Fernando, 'How can we best 
listen to Children in Family Law Proceedings?' above n 32; Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children 
in family law proceedings' above n 32; Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: 
Hearing Children’s Voices above n 32. See also L. Young, E. Ryrstedt and A Nicholson, The Child and the Judge: 
Reflections on the Voice of the Child in Australia, (2012) 3 Journal of Family Law and Practice 19.   
58 Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices above n 
32. 
59 See Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 33; Young, Ryrstedt and Nicholson, 
'The Child and the Judge: Reflections on the Voice of the Child in Australia' above n 57; Justice Peter Callinicos (2015) 
'Participation of Children and Young Persons within New Zealand Family Courts', National Judicial College of Australia; R 
Benjamin, 'Judges receiving evidence directly from children’ (2012) 2 Fam L Rev 99; Fernando, 'Conversations between 
Judges and Children: an Argument in Favour of Judicial Conferences in Contested Children's Matters' above n 32; Fernando, 
'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' above n 32; Fernando, 'Children's direct 
participation and the views of Australian judges' above n 32; Fernando, 'How can we best listen to Children in Family Law 
Proceedings?' above n 32; Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' above 
n 32. 
60 See also Callinicos (2015) 'Participation of Children and Young Persons within New Zealand Family Courts', above n 59; 
Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child, above n 34, 210. 
61 Fernando, 'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' above n 32, 51-52. See also 
Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices, above n 32. 
62 In the Marriage of Todd (No 1) (1976) 25 F.L.R 253, 257. 
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Less Adversarial Trial63directions.  In August 2010 the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) were 
amended and the rule relating to Judges talking to children64 was deleted.65  The way that a 
child’s views were expressed to the court remained through the forum of a family report66 or 
through the child’s interest being represented by an ICL67 or ‘subject to the applicable Rules 
of the Court, by such other means as the court thinks appropriate’.68  Fernando opined about 
the significance of this change in the context of judicial meetings with children and stated: 
 
Removing this rule, without consultation with experts in child welfare, researchers or representatives of 
children’s rights or children themselves, reflects an ostensibly prevailing culture of the Australian 
family law judiciary to avoid engagement with children and to discourage direct participation.69  
 
Fernando’s comments are reflected in decisions regarding judicial interviews in that it 
‘should be used sparingly and in many cases it would be preferable to arrange separate 
representation for the children or a welfare report.’70  However, despite the deletion of this 
rule, there remains no restrictions placed on Judges speaking with children,71 other than the 
notions of what Judges may perceive as procedural fairness to the parties or perhaps that they 
are not professionally trained to conduct interviews with children and young people.72  Justice 
Mullane in N and N [2000] FamCA 1350 (10 August 2000) explained that he had a practice 
of meeting with children to tell them the orders proposed and his reasons for making the 
orders.73   
 
His Honour said: 
 
It is better for him (the child) to receive that information from a third party rather than one of his 
parents, so as to ensure some objectivity.  It was a demonstration of the Court’s respect for the young 
																																								 																				
63 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 16.08 to 16.10, pt 16A.1, pt 16A.2. 
64 Ibid r 15.03. 
65 Family Law Amendment Rules 2010 (Cth). Deleted r 15.03. No rule replaced the ‘judicial interviewing a child’ provision. 
The explanatory statement said the removal was to ‘reflect that a Judge interviewing a child subject to proceedings is most 
unusual’. 
66 FLA s 60CD(2)(a). 
67 Ibid s 60CD(2)(b). 
68 Ibid s 60CD(2)(c). 
69 Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices, above n 
32, 13. 
70 In the Marriage of Ryan (1976) 27 FLR 327. 
71 N and N [2000] FamCA 1350 (10 August 2000). 
72 Richard Chisholm, ‘Children’s Participation in Family Court Litigation’ (1993) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 197, 
203. 
73 N and N [2000] FamCA 1350 (10 August 2000), [2]. 
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person in question and his rights to participate in proceedings concerning him for the Judge to see him 
personally.74 
 
His Honour further expressed that it is within the inherent power of the Court for the Judge in 
parenting proceedings to see the child the subject of the dispute.75  
 
Another case where the Judge spoke to the children directly was the international relocation 
case of ZN v YH and Children Representative (2002) 29 Fam LR 20. Nicholson CJ, 
interviewed three children aged 9, 12 and 14.  When deciding whether to talk to children 
directly, His Honour said: 
 
I thought that because of the age of the older children and because of the time that had passed since the 
counsellor’s report it might be helpful for them to have an opportunity to express their views to me.  I 
also had some concerns about whether the views of the children recorded by the counsellor represented 
their real views and whether they might, in any event, have changed with the passage of time.76 
 
In SLD v RWD [2006] FamCA 745 (3 August 2006) Guest J conducted a judicial interview 
with a 12-year-old child suffering Asperger’s disorder.  The Judge, before interviewing the 
child, had the consent of all parties. An ICL had been appointed and a family report was 
written. Guest J said:  
 
I have expressed the view that the question of deciding whether or not to conduct a Judicial Interview 
with children and its advisability may be recognised from the issues raised by the parties and the reports 
of expert witnesses such as those provided by court counsellors, psychologists and associated 
professionals. An examination of such documents by the judicial officer can identify whether or not it 
would be appropriate for him/her to interview children, the subject of proceedings before the court.77 
 
Guest J acknowledged that it is not usual practice to interview children:  
 
In the Judicial Interviews I have conducted thus far, I have done so in the presence of the Child 
Representative. The issue of whether or not to interview is discretionary, and I accept that it has been 
the practice of most judges not to do so. Of course there are reasons for caution, but circumstances may 
																																								 																				
74 Ibid [7]. 
75 Ibid [18]. 
76 ZN v YH and Children Representative (2002) 29 Fam LR 29, [105]. Also cited as ZN v YH and Children Representative 
[2002] FamCA 453; (2002) FLC 93-101.   
77 SLD v RWD [2006] FamCA 745 (3 August 2006) [4]. 
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exist for a judge of this court to give strong consideration to interview a child or children, depending 
upon such matters as their age and state of maturity.78 
 
Guest J said that the process of the Judge speaking to children should be open and transparent 
and the lawyer representing the child's interest can facilitate feedback to the parties of the 
judicial interview process.79  His Honour stated that the rules do not mention the 
inadmissibility of evidence of the interviews but he could use the resource of a family report 
and order that a transcript of the interview be placed on the court file.80  Guest J in C and C 
[2006] FamCA 701 stated that useful information was gleaned from the judicial interview of 
the child in this case over that of the report.81   
 
Another case involving a judicial interview was in the matter of Painter and Morley [2007] 
FamCA 283 (23 May 2007).  This involved 4 children aged between 10 and 15 years. 
Benjamin J spoke with the children even though a family report had been obtained and 
provided the children’s views.  His Honour spoke to the children in the presence of the ICL 
and family report writer.82  Benjamin J considered the views of the children and proposed 
orders that would give effect to the children’s views although they were not the orders sought 
by the mother or father.83  This exercise of judicial discretion gave weight to not only the best 
interests of the children, but was an opportunity that the Judge considered appropriate in 
speaking to children direct.   
 
Judicial meetings with children is 'inherent in the discretion of the courts' 84 and judges in 
countries such as New Zealand and Canada meet with children in custody cases.85  Fernando 
has proposed that the way to support judicial meetings with children in the Australian family 
law context is to adopt a best practice guidelines for Judges.86  The best practice model 
proposed does not detract from the role that family report writers have in ascertaining a 
																																								 																				
78 Ibid [6]. 
79 Ibid [8]. 
80 SLD v RWD, [2006] FamCA 745 (3 August 2006) [6]-[8]. 
81 C and C [2006] FamCA 701 (26 June 2006), [26]. (Guest J). See also [15], [17], [35]-[38] for a discussion on the judicial 
interview process. 
82 Painter and Morley [2007] FamCA 283 (23 May 2007) [139]-[141]. 
83 Ibid [175]. 
84 Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' above n 32 citing KS v DS 
[1999] FLC 92-860; [1999] FamCA 1221, [35] (Nicholson CJ); Explanatory Statement, Family Law Amendment Rules 2010 
(Cth), Sch 1 at [16]. 
85 Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings', above n 32, 213-214. 
86 Ibid 215. 
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child's view or the role of the ICL but rather provides another method of engaging with 
children.87 
 
The Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children proposed by Fernando is divided into 
parts.  The purpose of the guidelines is 'to give guidance to judges in deciding whether to 
meet with a child and in conducting meetings with children' 88 and are to give effect to the 
articles in the CROC.89  The Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children gives guidance 
to Judges on 'deciding whether to meet with children' who are the subject of family law 
proceedings90 and it is not to be used as a substitute for obtaining a family report.91  There are 
a number of factors inter alia to be considered including the consent of the child, the child's 
age and maturity and if it is in the child's best interests.  Guideline 5.1 92 proposes that during 
proceedings the Judge will determine the circumstances of the meeting with the child, 
including the venue, format and persons to be present.  The meeting is to be audio or audio 
visually recorded.  The Judge should not meet the child alone nor in the presence of the 
child's parents or their lawyers but rather the ICL or family consultant.  The Judge should 
also inform the child that they can withdraw their consent at any time.  Disclosure of what the 
child said in the judicial meeting is covered at Guideline 5.3.  The child will be informed that 
there may be times that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed (such as in the disclosure of 
child abuse).  Further if the determination of the matter does not turn on what the child said, 
disclosure may not be needed however if the decision is one which is influenced by what the 
child said, the Judge would tell the child that this would be disclosed.93 
 
To ensure natural justice for the parents, Guideline 5.2 recommends principles of reporting 
back to the parties in the proceedings.  This includes the family consultant preparing a report 
and being cross-examined by the parties and the Judge releasing all or part of the recording of 
the meeting.94  The Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children also provides directions 
																																								 																				
87 Ibid 218. 
88 Ibid 216. 
89 Ibid 217, Guideline 3. 
90 Ibid 218, Guidelines 4.1 to 4.8. 
91 Ibid 218, Guideline 4.6. 
92 Ibid 220 - 221, Guideline 5. 
93 Ibid 222, Guideline 5.3.2. 
94 Ibid 221, Guideline 5.2. 
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for the Judge to meet with the child at the conclusion of the hearing so as to inform the child 
of the decision.95 
 
The Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children proposed by Fernando offers well 
reasoned and practical suggestions on how Judges can communicate with the child during 
litigated parenting disputes.  Fernando's research is an extremely useful reference point for 
this thesis to confirm the importance of listening to children.  Fernando's research and her 
subsequent recommendations of Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children has provided 
a platform to assist Judges in conducting judicial meetings with children thus enabling the 
child's views to be captured and therefore the child's feelings and perceptions acknowledged.  
The Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children also acknowledges and addresses the 
apprehension of practitioners and Judges who view their lack of training and procedural 
fairness concerns as barriers to judicial interviews.  The findings in the qualitative study for 
this thesis, concurs with the findings of Fernando in that the Judge's role is not considered to 
be one of conducting judicial interviews.  However, this thesis is distinguished from 
Fernando's research, in that this research considers whether the FLASPRA amendment to the 
FLA section 60CC(3)(a) rendered the consideration of a child’s view different from a wish, in 
law, meaning and in the opinion and practice of Judges.  The findings of this research 
conclude that the legislative intention of the amendment was that views were different in 
meaning to that of a wish.  However, in opinion of the majority of Judges and in the practices 
of most Judges, consideration of a child's view did not amount to a broader investigation into 
a child's feelings and perceptions.  Fernando's Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children 
recommendations may assist with changing the way Judges consider the child's view. 
1.4.2 Judicial case management of child custody matters 
 
If judicial interviews are not common, less common in custody cases are the practices of 
children being a party to the matter96 and the family law courts permitting the practice of 
children giving evidence in custody cases.97  Although there are safeguards for children 
																																								 																				
95 Ibid Guideline 6. 
96 In the Marriage of Pagliarella (1993) 16 Fam LR 688.  The court held in this case that it was inappropriate for the child’s 
father to engage solicitors to represent the child, when the child’s interests were already being considered by a Child’s 
Representative.  
97 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149. See In the Marriage of Ahmad (1979) 5 Fam LR 15 ; In the 
Marriage of Borzak (1979) 5 Fam LR 571; In the Marriage of Cooper (1980) 6 Fam LR 288.  See also King v King [2008] 
FMCAfam 94 (13 February 2008). This was an application of the father to spend time with his 12-year-old child. At the 
hearing, an ICL was appointed and a family report had been written. The mother sought permission to call the child as a 
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giving evidence in some jurisdictions98 and a judicial bench book provides guidance to 
Judges,99 'the accepted view in most modern common-law based jurisdictions is that it is 
better to rely on trained experts to interview and relay the views of children and to interpret 
their wishes and feelings to the court [and] the very idea of children giving evidence in family 
proceedings is distasteful and can be harmful'.100  Monahan and Young argue that it was the 
intention of the 2006 amendments to the FLA to permit child participation 101 however 
Carmody J in Dylan102 said 'the parties control the degree of participation or exclusion of the 
child.'  
 
Although the 2006 FLA amendments did not change the scope of a child's direct participation 
in giving evidence or being a party to the proceedings, the Division 12A provisions did 
permit child related proceedings to be less formal and more considerate of the child's 
needs.103  The conduct of child custody cases described in the Division 12A introduced 
principles of a less adversarial trial process ('LAT').104  This provided Judges with the ability 
to 'actively direct, control and manage the proceedings105 but they were to do so with the 
child's needs at the forefront of their consideration'.106  The principles behind LAT are to 
assist the courts in achieving child focused outcomes107 and to provide a more educative role 
in assisting parents.108  Nonetheless the application of LAT in parenting cases is determined 
upon the willingness of the parties to opt into the process and the matter to be of a suitable 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
witness at the hearing and took the child out of school to do so.  The mother’s solicitor had spoken to the child before the 
hearing commenced. The mother did not contact the ICL and the mother’s solicitor had spoken to the child without 
consulting the ICL first.  The Federal Magistrate was critical of the mother’s solicitor conferring with the child ‘behind the 
back’ of the ICL. The Federal Magistrate refused the application to call the child as a witness and said that the child had 
already given her views to the report writer.  
98 See Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 9E Principles for dealing with a child witness; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YAB Special 
witnesses. 
99 The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Bench Book for Children Giving Evidence in Australian Courts, 
(2012). 
100 Justice Carmody in Murphy v Murphy [2007] FamCA 795 (20 July 2007), [179]. His Honour citing the reference in his 
judgement at [179] Parkinson, P and Cashmore, J, Interviewing children in chambers: the views of judicial officers, a report 
to the Family Court of Australia and Federal Magistrates Court, August 2006. 
101 Geoff Monahan & Lisa Young (eds), Children and the law in Australia, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008), 556. 
102 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [190] – [191]. 
103 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 3 - 
Amendments Relating To The Conduct Of Child-Related Proceedings Item 4, Subdivision B – Principles for conducting 
child-related proceedings, 341, 62. 
104 FLA ss 69ZN(1)-(7). 
105 Ibid s 69ZN(3). 
106 Ibid s 69ZN(4). 
107 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Child-related proceedings under Pt VII Div 12A of the Family Law Act: What the Children’s Cases 
Pilot Program can and can’t tell us’ (2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 227. (Note Children’s Cases Pilot Program 
is now referred to as Less Adversarial Trial – LAT). 
108 Ibid 235. 
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nature for LAT.109  The Judge can ask questions of the parents and the parents can speak 
directly to the Judge.  The Judge can make directions about the running of the case and seek 
inter alia the production of documents relevant to the proceedings.110  However, the court 
practices do not specify children’s participation in LAT nor are they usually directly involved 
in LAT.  A child's engagement in the process is through the Child Responsive Program.  The 
Child Responsive Program involves the meeting of parents and children with a family 
consultant prior to court hearing.  If an agreement is reached for parenting orders, it proceeds 
to a procedural hearing before a Family Court Registrar, but if there is no agreement then the 
matter goes to LAT.111  The main method therefore of ascertaining a child's view remains 
through the engagement of a family consultant and the preparation of the family report.  
However, Fernando's Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children is a tool which Judges 
could utilise to permit children to have a meaningful and safe engagement in LAT. 
 
In Division 12A there are no definitions of a child's view and there are no case authorities 
regarding LAT that inform whether a child’s view is treated differently from a wish in LAT.  
Current authority states that the final weight the judicial officer places on children’s views is 
still according to what is in the best interest of the child112 and the emphasis is on 'a welfare 
approach to children over one concerned with children’s rights to participation’.113  
 
Part B - The role of the Independent Children's Lawyer 
 
1.4.3 The evolution of role of the lawyer representing the child 
 
Judicial officers consider that the role of the lawyer representing the child's best interests in 
custody cases is an important one. 114  The lawyer representing the child ('LRC') is the 
conduit through which a child’s voice can be heard.  The role of the LRC was first defined in 
																																								 																				
109 Matters not suitable may include cases of sexual abuse, family violence and high conflict cases. 
110 FLA s 69ZX(1)(a). See Truman and Truman (2008) FLC 93-360, [9] where the Full Court details the procedural features 
of what the LAT looks like.  See also Chief Justice Diana Bryant, 'The Family Court and family violence' (Speech delivered 
at the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, Adelaide, 10 October 2015) 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/fcoaweb/reports-and-publications/speeches-conference-
papers/2015/speech-bryant-familyviolence> .	
111 The Registrar may make procedure orders to progress the matter further before the first day of the trial, including the   
appointment of an ICL and may also refer the parties to counselling or some other dispute resolution service.  The Registrar 
will also direct the parties to complete a parenting questionnaire which is required at least 28 days before attendance of the 
first day of the less adversarial trial. 
112 B and B, Re; Family Law Reform 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676. 
113 N Cahn, ‘State Representation of Children’s Interests’ (2006-2007) 40 Family Law Quarterly 109 in Geoff Monahan & 
Lisa Young (eds) above n 101, 555. 
114 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 33, 169. 
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1976 in the case of In the Marriage of Pailas.115  The LRC was to find out the child’s wishes 
‘which would naturally include interviews with the children for the purpose of ascertaining 
their wishes’116 as well as arranging reports.  Over time jurisprudence developed regarding 
what was considered the role of the LRC.117 In Marriage of Bennett (1990) 102 FLR 370 at 
380, the Full Court stated: 	
 
We think that the role of the separate representative is broadly analogous to that of counsel assisting the 
Royal Commission in the sense that his or her duty to act impartially but, if thought appropriate, to 
make submissions suggesting the adoption by the Court of a particular course of action, if he or she 
considers that the adoption of such a course is in the best interests of the child. Unless the separate 
representative does this it seems to us that there is little purpose in having a separate representative. 
 
The title of the LRC also evolved under various names: Separate Representative ('SR');118 
Child Representative ('CR')119 and ICL.120  In 1994, the authoritative case that outlined in 
detail the principles for appointing a lawyer to represent the child's interest was Re K (1994) 
17 Fam LR 537. Nicholson CJ, Fogarty J and Baker J said in their judgement that the 
appointment of the LRC should occur when the interests of the child requires 
representation.121  Their Honours provided a list of ‘appointment’ factors which included 
cases where it was ‘highly desirable for the child to have access to a person independent of 
the conflict … who will be capable of assisting the child and putting both the child’s view 
and submissions as to the children’s best interests to the Court.’122  The 1995 FLA 
amendments followed Re K and the term Separate Representative was changed to a Child 
Representative.  Re K and the 1995 amendments did not contain any direction or provisions 
specifying that the CRs were to speak with children and find out their wishes, however the 
FLA did provide that the wishes could be obtained through reports or other means.123 
 
																																								 																				
115 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149. Originally the proceedings in this case were filed pursuant 
to the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) but the proceedings for custody of the children were heard 
pursuant to the newly enacted Family Law Act 1975 s 9(4). 
116 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149, 154. 
117 In the Marriage of Wotherspoon and Cooper (1980) 7 Fam LR 71; In the Marriage of Bennett (1980) 102 FLR 370; In 
Marriage of Lyons and Bosely (1977) 32 FLR 386; In Marriage of Waghorne and Dempster [1979] FLC 78-733; In 
Marriage of F and R (No 2) 1992 107 FLR 74; Re S (A Minor) (Independent Representation) [1993] 2 WLR 801; [1993] 3 
All ER 36; In Marriage of Pagliarella(1993) 114 FLR 185. 
118 FLA s 65 as amended by Family Law Amendment Act 1983 (Cth). See Family Law Rules 1984 (Cth).Order 23, r 4(1) and 
(2).  
119 FLA s 68L as amended by Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
120  FLA as amended by Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006. 
121 Re K (1994) 17 Fam LR 537, 555. 
122 Ibid 557. 
123 FLA s 68G as amended by  Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
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1.4.4 The role of the Independent Children's Lawyer post-2006 FLA 
amendments 
 
The evolution of the role of the LRC continued with FLA 2006 amendments124 which 
provided more clarification and a descriptive role for the LRC.  The amendments also 
changed the name of the LRC to that of an ICL.125  According to the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth) ('FLASPR Bill'), the ICL was 
not a child’s lawyer (as in a party representative), but an officer of the court who was to 
maintain an independent role, put evidence before the court and provide the court with their 
opinion on the best interest of the child factors.126  The amendments required the ICL to 
advocate for the child’s interests whilst ‘simultaneously allowing the child’s voice to be 
heard’.127  The amendments in essence codified the existing practices as articulated in Re K 
(1994) 17 Fam LR 537.  The FLA provided that the views of the child should be ascertained 
by an ICL or those persons required to write a report.128  The ICL was to ensure that the 
child’s views are ‘fully put before the court’.129   
 
In FLA Division 10 - Independent Representation of child interest, section 68L(2) provides 
that the court: '(a) may order that the child’s interests in the proceedings are to be 
independently represented by a lawyer; and (b) may make such other orders as it considers 
necessary to secure that independent representation of the child’s interests.' Section 68L(5) 
provides that 'the court may make an order ... for the purpose of allowing the lawyer who is to 
represent the child’s interests to find out what the child’s views are on the matters to which 
the proceedings relate.' Section 68L(6) provides that section 68L(5) does not apply 'if 
complying with that subsection would be inappropriate because of: (a) the child’s age or 
maturity; or (b) some other special circumstance.' 
 
																																								 																				
124 See Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006 (Cth), Schedule 5 Representation of Child's 
Interests by Independent Children's Lawyer, Part 1, Item 5 Division 10 of Part VII. 
125 Ibid Part 1, Item 1, 133, [43]. See FLA s 68LA(5) as amended by the Family Law Amendment  (Shared Parental 
Responsibility Bill) 2006 (Cth).  See also the report on the recommendations for the appointment and role of the Independent 
Children's Lawyer; Family Law Council, Pathways for Children: A Review of Children's Representation in Family Law 
(August 2004).  This report was produced in response to a Commonwealth Government's directive regarding the findings of: 
Commonwealth, Attorney-General's Department, Out of the Maze: pathways to the future for families experiencing 
separation, Report of the Family Law Pathways Advisory Group (2001) report. 
126 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006, Schedule 5, Representation of Child's Interests by 
Independent Children's Lawyer, Part 1, Item 5 Division 10 of Part VII, 135, [55]. 
127 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Item 5, Division 
10, of Part VII, 135, [55]. 
128 FLA s 60CD(2)(a). 
129 Ibid ss 60CD(2)(b), 68LA(5)(b) FLA). 
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In relation to the role of the ICL, the FLA, section 68LA (2)-(7) details that the ICL is to form 
an independent view of the evidence; the ICL does not act on the instructions of the child, but 
will act in the best interests of the child; and the ICL will ensure that the child's views are 
fully put before the court but is not under an obligation to disclose to the court 
communications had with the child, unless it is in the child's best interest. 
 
The case law may provide some insight into the role of the ICL, however, not all cases 
explain how an ICL ascertains the child’s views other than they predominantly analyse the 
findings of the family report.  The family report is prepared by a family consultant.  The 
family consultant is a qualified social worker or psychologist appointed by the court as an 
expert.  The consultant will interview the parties and the children and provide the courts with 
information about past and current parenting arrangements, parental capacity and they will 
speak to the child to ascertain their views.  The law does permit the ICL to speak to 
children.130  Further, the ICLs can determine if an older child can directly express their views 
in court;131 but it rarely happens.  The practice of whether an ICL speaks to children varies 
between states.132   
 
The issue of how children’s views are best presented to the court was highlighted in The 
Hague Convention child abduction matter, heard in the High Court, RCB as litigation 
guardian of EKV, CEV, CIV and LRV v The Honourable Justice Colin James Forrest, as one 
of the judicial officers of the Family Court of Australia & Ors (2012) 247 CLR 304,133 
('Italian Children's Case').  This case involved the return of four children to Italy and the 
argument of ascertaining the children’s views and the appointment of an ICL (pursuant to the 
Regulations dealing with Hague matters).134  The court in the proceedings had to consider 
whether the children were denied procedural fairness by not having an ICL appointed to 
make an independent assessment of the children's views.135  The views of the children were 
																																								 																				
130 Ibid ss 68L(5), 68LA(5)(b), 60CD(2)(b).  See also National Legal Aid. (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s 
Lawyers above n 44, 2. 
131 FLA s 68LA(8). 
132 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report above n 33, xii. 
133 High Court Justices presiding in this matter were the Chief Justice French and Justices Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and 
Heydon.  
134 FLA s 111B and Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 1A(1). 
135RCB as litigation guardian of EKV, CEV, CIV and LRV v The Honourable Justice Colin James Forrest, as one of the 
judicial officers of the Family Court of Australia & Ors (2012) 247 CLR 304, 322, [46]-[47], (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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conveyed to the court by a family consultant. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ 
held:  
 
The need for the Court to be sufficiently and fairly apprised of what the children wanted, how strongly 
that view was held, and how mature the children were, was sufficiently met by the Court’s appointment 
of a family consultant.  The children’s views were heard and assessed by the family consultant and 
reported to the court and to the parties.136   
 
Heydon J said that the proposition that a child’s views could only be properly presented to the 
court by an ICL was wrong.137  Further, the ICL is not the legal representative of the child 
and is therefore not obliged to act on the instructions of the child.138  The court found that 
'there was no procedural unfairness to the children'.139   
 
The Italian Children's case demonstrated the use of family reports as an appropriate means to 
advise the court of the child's views.  Current research by social scientists also suggests that 
family reports remain the main method of courts receiving information regarding the child's 
views140  The Italian Children's Case provides a useful analysis of what the court consider 
are the practices of ICLs in obtaining a child's view and the interplay of the report writer in 
custody cases involving considering a child's voice.  
 
1.4.5 Guidelines for the lawyers that represent the child's interests. 
 
To assist in defining what an ICL does, national Guidelines for ICLs were developed.141  The 
national Guidelines for ICLs142 describe the ‘professional relationship provided by an ICL 
																																								 																				
136 Ibid 305. 
137 Ibid 324 (Heydon J). 
138 Ibid 324, [55] (Heydon J). 
139 Ibid 322, [48] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
140 Ibid 317 [27] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  Their Honours at [27]: 'In some (perhaps many) cases, 
obtaining the report of a family consultant would avoid the difficulties and limitations inherent in receiving evidence of the 
children's views from one or both of the disputing parents ... And in a case such as this, ... it may be expected that a family 
consultant's report would ordinarily be obtained'. See also Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process. Report no 84 (1997) [16.35]. 
See also Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 33, 28, Box 2.  
141 Family Court of Australia, Practice Direction No 2 of 2003 - Guidelines for children’s representatives (11 July 2003); 
National Legal Aid. (2007) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian and 
Federal Magistrate’s Court of Australia), Hobart; National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers 
above n 39. 
142 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 44. 
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will be one of a skilful, competent and impartial best interests advocate.’143  The ICL is also 
described as being ‘truly independent of the court and the parties to the proceedings.’144  The 
Guidelines set out an expectation that the ICLs would meet a child.145  When representing the 
interests of children in parenting disputes, the ICL ‘is expected to use his/her professional 
judgement and skill’.146  The ICL is to ensure that the child’s view is fully presented to the 
court.147  Judges are to consider the evidence and determine what is in the child’s best 
interest.  The views148 of the child are one of those best interests of the child factors149 to be 
taken into account.  The Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia Best Practice 
Guidelines for lawyers doing family law work150(‘BPG’) set out important principles to 
ensure best practice in family law.  The BPG however states that ICLs should refer to their 
own State ICL guidelines.  The BPG explains that a child’s view can be obtained through a 
family report or evidence presented by the ICL.151   
 
Each Legal Aid Commission can provide additional practice notes on how the ICL is to meet 
with children.  In 2012 the amendments to the FLA concerning domestic violence, saw Legal 
Aid Queensland publish Best practice guidelines for independent children’s lawyers (ICLs) 
working with people who have experienced domestic violence152 (the ‘LAQ ICL guideline’).  
The LAQ ICL guideline provides seven principles of practice when working with people 
facing domestic violence.  The LAQ ICL guidelines do not discuss the ICLs speaking to 
children.  Legal Aid NSW published the Practice Standards for Independent Children’s 
Lawyers in Family Law Matters153 (the ‘NSW ICL guideline’).  The NSW ICL guideline 
provides very detailed information stating that the ICL will meet all children154 (with the 
																																								 																				
143 Ibid 2. 
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146 Ibid 2. 
147 Ibid. 
148 FLAs 60CC(3)(a). 
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150 Family Law Council and Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia, Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers 
doing family law work (2nd ed) October 2010. Note that at the time of writing the Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers 
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151 Ibid 46-47. 
152 Legal Aid Queensland. (2014). Best practice guidelines for independent children’s lawyers (ICLs) working with people 
who have experienced domestic violence. <tinyurl.com/oqpuebu>. 
153 Legal Aid New South Wales (2015) Practice Standards for Independent Children’s Lawyers in Family Law Matters.  
<http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/7097/Independent-Childrens-Lawyer-Panel-Practice-
Standards.pdf>.  (The practice standards were first published in 2014). 
154 Ibid 2.2.1.  The ICL will "meet with all children, other than those who are preverbal, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances (e.g. circumstances involving a traumatised young child where, on the basis of independent professional 
advice, an Independent Children’s Lawyer could reasonably decide not to meet with the child)". 
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exception of already traumatised children) and should see the child alone unless there are 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
As stated the National Guidelines for ICLs defines the role and expectations of the ICL and 
the FLA defines in Division 10, at sections 68L and 68LA, the appointment and role of the 
ICL.  In addition to this, the Family Law Rules (2004) (Cth) ('FLR') and the Federal Circuit 
Court Rules 2011 (Cth) ('FCCR') cover the procedural matters administered by the court.  
These Rules are made pursuant to the FLA.  The FLR and FCCR do not mention the 
consideration of a child's view or describe the meaning of the term.  However, in the FLR, 
rule 8.02 details that the appointment of an ICL can be upon the application of a party or the 
court and that the legal aid commission will arrange the appointment of the ICL.  The FCCR 
does not detail appointment of ICLs but matters of general procedural matters. FCCR rule 
15.02 details the order in which evidence is to be presented to the court if an ICL is appointed 
and at FCCR rule 2.08 the court may permit persons (including an ICL) to search court 
records if relevant.  The FLR and FCCR do not provide any details on how the ICL is to 
ascertain the child's view and they do not prescribe that the ICL should speak to the child.  
The inclusion in the FLR and FCCR of minimum best practice guidelines regarding the 
ascertaining of a child's view by an ICL should be considered.  
 
In 2014, the Independent Children’s Lawyers Study (ICL Study) was published.155  This 
report was funded and commissioned by the department of the Commonwealth Attorney-
General and was conducted by researchers from the Australian Institute of Family Studies 
(Rae Kaspiew, Rachel Carson, Sharnee Moore, John De Maio, Julie  Deblaquiere and Briony 
Horsfall).156  The purpose of the study was to examine how an ICL’s involvement in 
parenting matters affect the outcomes for children.157  The project involved a mixed research 
methodology using qualitative and quantitative data from the interviews of 528 professionals 
such as family consultants, ICLs, non ICL lawyers, Judges and 24 parents and carers and 10 
children.  Researchers from the ICL Study stated that the data indicated that the role of the 
																																								 																				
155 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 33. 
156 This report was published in 2014. 
157 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report above n 33, xi.  Also note that in relation to the 
appointment of ICLs in parenting cases, see Kaspiew, R., Moloney, L., Dunstan, J., & De Maio, J. (2015). Family law court 
filings 2004-05 to 2012-13 (Research Report No. 30). Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 4 provides that: 'In 
broad terms, the data reveal that over the period under examination here, ICLs were ordered in about one in four child-
related cases, from a low point of one in five cases prior to the commencement of the 2006 reforms, rising for a brief period 
to close to two in five cases and settling in recent years to an average of one in four cases'. 
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ICL was to gather evidence, manage the process in litigation, that is, act as the ‘honest 
broker’ and to facilitate the child’s participation in the proceedings.  The report’s main 
findings also said according to ICLs and Judges, ‘facilitating a child’s participation is of less 
significance than the evidence-gathering and litigation management function'158 in the ICL’s 
role.  However, in contrast, the rights of children to have a say, facilitated through the 
assistance of an ICL, was important to parents and children who saw the role of the ICL as 
one that ‘emphasises functions supportive of participation’.159  Children expressed feelings of 
‘disappointment and betrayal’, ‘were uncertain about what the ICL did’ and were ‘uncertain 
as to how their views fed into the decision eventually made.’160  These concerns about ICLs 
concentrating on evidence gathering rather than on speaking with or involving children 
directly was a theme expressed by participants extracted from the qualitative research 
conducted for this thesis (discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
Findings of the ICL Study also showed that a key area of difference between ICLs was the 
way they practised and, in particular, whether the ICL would consult with children or whether 
they viewed that as the role of the family consultant.161  This was also a theme found in the 
research conducted for this thesis.  Also, differences emerged on the interpretation of how an 
ICL spoke to a child directly, that is, it ranged from just being an introduction to the child to 
something more, such as interviewing a child.   
 
The ICL Study found funding models for ICLs differed between the State Legal Aid 
Commissions. 162  Further, the lack of funding to support ICLs	required significant pro-bono 
work by ICLs.163  Other reports have also flagged the concerns about the lack of funding164 
and researchers such as Ross have concluded that the lack of funding has influenced whether 
and how often the lawyers met with children.165  Lack of funding or variations of funding 
practices (for family reports) between States and court registries throughout the litigation 
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164 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Access to justice (2009) 10-16. 
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process was also a concern for ICLs acknowledged through the interviews conducted for this 
thesis.166  
 
The findings of the ICL Study said that the role of the ICL was highly regarded by Judges 
who saw that they assisted the courts greatly.  This was also expressed by participants in the 
research for this thesis.  
 
The changes to the FLA and the case law have required that the lawyer representing the 
child's best interest inform the court of the child’s views.  The appointment of the ICL 
recognises Australia’s obligations under the CROC.  The 2006 changes provide for the 
appointment of an ICL.  However, since the 2006 FLA amendments and in the context of how 
an ICL listens to children, there are no seminal cases concerning how the ICL’s role was 
affected by the change in terminology from considering a child’s wish or a child’s view.  
Further, the ICL Study, provides the data to support the view that, in the web of law and 
guidelines, how a child has a say in custody cases is affected by the complexities associated 
with the variations in the role of the ICL.  The variations flow from the differences in 
individual ICL practices and the ICL’s perceived role, court practices, Legal Aid Commission 
practices and legal aid funding.  As stated above, in addition to the Guidelines for ICLs, the 
inclusion in the FLR and FCCR of minimum best practice guidelines regarding the 
ascertaining of a child's view by an ICL should be considered.  This may address the issue of 
providing a consistent approach in ICL practices around Australia. 
 
Part C Hearing the voice of the child - social science research in Australia 
 
1.4.6 Social science research and the 2006 FLA reforms 
 
Social scientists play an important role in eliciting and reporting the child’s views; the child’s 
competence or ability to participate in parenting disputes generally and the implementation of 
practices, such as child inclusive mediations.167  A discussion of the leading studies around 
the time of the 2006 amendments provides insight into the programs initiated by the family 
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law community in recognition of children’s rights.  This insight is not gained in cases 
generally and therefore provides important context to the doctrinal discussion.   
Parkinson and Cashmore (PC1) conducted a significant research project on the cusp of the 
2006 FLA amendments.168  The objective of the research was to explore the perception of 
parents, children and professionals about the child’s involvement in arrangements post 
separation.169  The PC1 research adopted a mixed methodology approach drawing upon 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  The judicial interviews were conducted from February 
2005 to July 2006170 and interviews with the lawyers in 2004,171using semi-structured 
interviews combining open ended and also structured questions.172  The findings of the 
research were published in various articles and a book.173  The PC1 researchers interviewed 
parents (90), children (47), Judges (20, 10 men & 10 women from the Family Court and 
Federal Magistrates Court), family law specialists (42, 21 male, 21 female of whom 22 were 
child representatives ('CR') and family consultants (41).174  The PC1 researchers interviewed 
mostly mothers (39/43) who were also primarily the ‘resident’ parent and the fathers were the 
non-resident parent.  The reinterviewing of the parents occurred at the same time as the 
children and 32 parents participated at this time.  The remaining 58 parents were only 
interviewed once.  The interviews were conducted before the 2006 legislative amendments to 
the FLA involving the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and the 
consideration of equal time (‘shared parenting’).175   
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A total of 42 family lawyer specialists were interviewed in the PC1 study.  Out of this 
number, 22 lawyers had acted or were acting as CRs.176  The lawyers were asked how they 
communicated with children to establish the child’s views and the child’s best interest.  PC1 
research questions to lawyers included how they perceived the importance of children’s 
views in satisfactory parenting agreements, whether children should have a say in 
proceedings and if the child should have a say in the contact they have with the non-resident 
parent.177   
 
The majority of responses from lawyers interviewed (55% - 23 lawyers) in the PC1 project 
were that children should be protected from harm in the litigation process.178  Lawyers 
reported that children’s views could be about what they think their parents want to hear and 
factors such as age and maturity were important considerations in the court taking into 
account a child’s view.179  The researchers commented: 
 
 The discussion of age and maturity by so many lawyers reflects the transposition of that discourse to 
 the area of decision-making about parenting arrangements.  The question about children's voices 
 becomes interpreted as	being about the stage at which children's views are treated as sufficiently 
 rational and mature to be given weight.180   
 
The researchers commented that the amendments to the 2006 FLA section 60CC(3)(a) child 
view provision had in its provision consideration of the child's maturity and capacity and that 
it was not surprising that the lawyers comments reflected this.181  However, of note is that the 
interviews were conducted prior to the enactment of the 2006 child view amendments.182  
The qualitative analysis undertaken for this thesis considered the post-2006 FLA view regime 
and the ICLs comments reflected the pre-2006 opinions given by the lawyers in the PC1 
research.  That is, ICLs in considering the child's voice considered the child's age, maturity 
and capacity to determine what weight to be placed on what the child had to say. 
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With regards to the question regarding the child's participation in family law matters, the 
second largest group of lawyers (15 lawyers) in the PC1 research supported children’s 
participation as they felt that the consideration of the views enabled more workable orders 
and the ‘happiness of children’ was related to this workability.183  However, the overall 
responses of lawyers indicated a ‘voice rather than choice’ was the key issue in litigated 
matters.184  Most lawyers (60%) felt the legal system had it right in the way a child's voice 
was heard whereas 40% of responses said greater participation was needed.185  
 
The PC1 interviews with judicial officers comprised of 14 Judges from the Family Court and 
6 from the Federal Magistrates Court.186  The PC1 researchers asked judicial officers about 
children’s participation in ‘residence and contact ... the significance of children’s views ...the 
direct involvement of children through interviews in chambers or in court and the role of the 
child representative’.187  The PC1 researchers found that judicial officer’s questions and their 
views were similar to the family lawyers, although all judicial officers said that children’s 
voices should be heard.188  Children’s views, although important, were considered in light of 
the evidence and the age and maturity of the child were factors.189  Most judicial officers had 
reservations about conducting interviews with children on the basis of ‘risks to the quality of 
decision-making, the risks to the decision-making process and the risks to the child.’190  Some 
Judges felt that if they spoke with children in chambers it may be seen as damaging fairness 
and they may not be seen as a neutral decision maker.191  However, those Judges who had 
spoken to a child felt it assisted the process and were ‘positive about the benefits’,192 and 
provided ‘first-hand ... a useful and often better sense of what is important to children.’193  
The PC1 researchers found that lawyers/judicial officers’ focus when ascertaining children’s 
views was on the competence of the child to make ‘rational uninfluenced choices and 
workability’ and perhaps treated the child’s view with suspicion.194  These participants also 
																																								 																				
183 Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child above n 34, 97-8. 
184 Ibid 100. 
185 Ibid 104-5. 
186 Ibid 33.  The judicial officers were from Newcastle, Parramatta and Sydney; Melbourne, and Adelaide. 
187 Ibid 33. 
188 Ibid 115. 
189 Ibid 116. 
190 Ibid 171. 
191 Ibid 174. 
192 Ibid 177 – 181. 
193 Ibid 185.  
194 Ibid 120. 
46	
	
looked at the process of ascertaining a child’s view forensically and considered how the 
child’s views may have been influenced.195  Family consultants (social scientists) focused on 
ascertaining a child’s views in light of the ‘potential it had to offer’ and considered child’s 
views to see if they assisted in the resolution of the dispute by seeking child focused 
outcomes.196  They saw ascertaining a child’s views as a source of ‘enlightenment, 
empowerment and conflict resolution’.197   
 
The children involved in the PC1 research project were from the ages of 6 years old to 18 
years old and consisted of 29 girls and 18 boys.  Half of the children were involved in 
contested proceedings whereas the remaining participants’ matters had been resolved by 
agreement at some stage.  Most child participants lived with the mother (74.5%,) and 
approximately 20 % resided with the father and 2 children were in shared care arrangements.  
Family violence or abuse was alleged in 9 families (affecting 19 of the children).198  The 
second interview with the children occurred in 2005 (approximately 18-30 months after the 
initial interview).199  The interviews were conducted before the 2006 reforms, with the first 
interview before the implementation of the CCP and the second interview after the 
implementation of this program.  The PC1 researchers asked the children at the second 
interview if they would want to speak to a Judge if given the chance, 85% said yes and 5 
children said no.  The 5 children who said no, were not involved in litigation.200   
 
The questions posed by the PC1 researchers concerned the child's 'understanding of and 
participation in the decision-making about residence and contact issues following separation 
of their parents’.201  The outcome of the PC1 research was that the children and parents who 
wanted to speak to the Judges directly felt that it offered the children a right to be heard in the 
decision making process.202  Other participants felt talking to Judges would also facilitate the 
truth coming out about the family situation.203  Child participants in contested matters wanted 
to speak to the Judge whereas in non-litigated matters, the children preferred conveying their 
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wishes to their parents.204  Children in protracted litigated matters expressed a ‘desire to talk 
to the Judge even though in most cases they had experienced being interviewed by an 
independent expert (e.g. family consultant) and had a CR’.205   
 
PC1 researchers offered an explanation of the advantages of considering a child’s perspective 
in a broader sense rather than just considering a wish:206 
 
First it provides information which will help to assess how the competing proposals for parenting 
arrangements will impact upon the children ... even quite young children may have or be able to 
articulate perspective on their needs at that particular point in time, which offers decision makers 
insights on now particular decisions could affect them.  In particular, children’s views are an important 
window on their attachments.   
 
Secondly, children's perspectives may assist in resolving the disputes ... even if the matters cannot be 
resolved by agreement, the perspectives children may be able to offer on what they like most to do with 
each parent, or about aspects of their environment, may provide information to parents in resolving 
disputes.   
 
Thirdly, focusing on children's perspectives rather than wishes avoids the pitfalls involved in making 
children de facto decision-makers or placing upon them the intolerable burden of choice between their 
parents' proposals.   
 
Fourthly, seeing the issue ... in terms of perspectives rather than wishes allows the child’s voice to be 
heard at whatever age and stage they may have reached without worrying about their maturity.   
 
Finally... in terms of children's views and perspectives rather than children's wishes offers a potential 
resolution about the role of children's legal representatives in family law proceedings ... (where) the 
problems with the 'best interests' view of advocacy on behalf of children is that the view the lawyer 
takes of the children's best interest need not be informed by children's voices at all. 
 
The PC1 study provided information on the limiting nature of what consideration of the 
child's wishes means which is in contrast to listening to a child's view or their perspective.  
The PC1 research provided the context to consider the depth of what views would mean if 
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they were to 'capture a child's feelings and perceptions'.207  The PC1 research also explained 
the benefits of considering the broader context of a child's voice rather than just a child's 
wish.  The PC1 study is an important source of data to situate the responses of ICLs and 
Judges at the time of the 2006 wish to view amendments.  It is acknowledged that the PC1 
research interviews were conducted with the lawyer participants in 2004 and Judge 
participants between February 2005 and July 2006. That is, the responses by participants was 
given prior to the 2006 FLA view amendments.  This research therefore extends the research 
conducted by Parkinson and Cashmore by examining the impact of the 2006 FLA wish to 
view amendment to determine if a child's view was considered different from a child's wish 
in the post-2006 decisions of the court.  Further this research considered if Judge and ICL 
practices changed with the examination of the broader context of considering the child's view 
as opposed to a wish.  The qualitative study conducted for this research concluded that in the 
opinion of the majority of ICLs and Judges a view is not different from a wish in meaning.  
Further for the majority of ICLs and Judges the way they practiced in ascertaining a child's 
voice did not change whether the law described what a child had to say as a wish or a view.  
 
Another social scientist, Darlington, conducted qualitative surveys where 18 adults gave a 
retrospective account of their family law custody disputes and an evaluation of their 
participation as a child in the process and their perspectives on the family law professional’s 
role.  All the participants in the Darlington research project had been involved in litigation 
and had at least one family report prepared.  The cases were sourced from the Family Court 
Counselling files from the Brisbane Registry of the Family Court.208  Darlington sent letters 
to both parents (368) and 31 parents responded.  Following this, letters were then sent to 43 
adult children and 18 participated in the interview.  An interview guide asked the participants 
their recollections of wishes, experiences of contact with professionals and their satisfaction 
with that experience.209  Interviews were between thirty to sixty minutes and were taped. 
Only adult children were interviewed (that is no parents, children’s lawyers or Judges). 
 
Darlington stated the purpose of the interviews was to gauge the participants’ reflections on 
the past litigation experiences.  All participants in Darlington's research were aware of the 
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custody dispute between the parents and that it went to court.210  Of the 18 interviewed, all 
had been subject to Family Court proceedings although only four matters went to trial (others 
settled before trial) and only two children had a CR appointed.  Darlington found that the 
participants did not understand the context of the family law interviews other than it was 
about custody and two participants did not know who interviewed them.  The researcher also 
found that the experiences of the children depended on ‘how they saw their family situation 
... and what role they perceived themselves having in the determination of the outcome.’211  
Darlington concluded that ‘being listened to was very important for ... young people ... [and] 
they wanted to have input into the decision’.  Other themes were children wanted information 
about the legal process, information about the family situation and support from the CR 
external networks.212   
 
The Darlington research does not provide detail about the role of the CR or Judges.  It 
appears that the children’s views predominantly were obtained through the family report.  
The study does, however, provide a continuing theme that has been echoed in the PC1 
research; children do desire to be listened to.  It is also a useful source of data in that this 
thesis is able to draw upon the distinctions of pre- and post-2006 reforms and to ascertain if a 
child’s view is different from a wish.  Darlington did not discuss what a wish meant but did 
provide details about children that wanted to be heard in family law proceedings that affected 
them. 
 
Since the 2006 FLA amendments further research was undertaken by social scientists.  A 
significant research project commissioned by the Commonwealth Government213 regarding 
the 2006 FLA amendments was the AIFS report Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms214 (EFLR).  Those findings were released in 2009.  According to Kaspiew et al., the 
EFLR research project provided ‘a more extensive evidence base about the use and operation 
of the family law system than has previously been available in Australia and is arguably more 
extensive than other studies that exist internationally.’215  The EFLR report collected data 
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Reforms, Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies. 
215 Ibid 10.  
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from approximately 28,000 people ranging from parties to the family law proceedings (court 
data), family relationship centres and family law professionals (including Judges, lawyers and 
court officials).  In the context of the best interest of the child factors, the EFLR report 
provided information on the factors that judges took into account in parenting matters216 and 
judges must consider the evidence and determine what weight to place on that evidence.  
Kaspiew et al., said:  
 
 This is an area where strategic decisions by litigants and lawyers are important in deciding what issues 
 to emphasise in any case, and discretionary assessments by decisions makers are important in making 
 orders.217   
 
Children’s views according to the EFLR report were a factor in one in seven matters that 
required a judicial determination and one in ten matters that achieved consent after the 
initiating proceedings.  Of the 36 ‘factual consideration factors’, children’s views ranked at 
number eight.218  These figures are an important indicator because they highlight that a child's 
view is a significant factor in the number of child custody cases before the court.  The EFLR 
study has been widely accepted and cited in other reports since.219  The difference with the 
EFLR report and this thesis is that it does not show if the change from wishes to views has 
resulted in any differences in meaning or practice.  It does, however, confirm the earlier 
research that listening to a child’s perspective is important.   
 
The Commonwealth Government commissioned the Family Courts Violence Review: A 
Report by Professor Richard Chisholm.220  The Chisholm report was required to ‘assess the 
appropriateness of the legislation, practices and procedures’221 that apply to family 
																																								 																				
216 Ibid 340, Table 15.1. 
217 Ibid 338. 
218 Ibid 340, Table 15.1.details the 36 'factual consideration factors' and the top ten factors detailed are: (1) impact of 
substance misuse of a parent; (2) parent's allegations of family violence; (3) parent's facilitation of a child's relationship with 
the other parent; (4) parent's assertion of family violence - emotional, psychological, threatened; (5) Family Violence Order; 
(6) benefit to child of a meaningful relationship with a parent; (7) need to protect the child from physical harm; (8) views 
expressed by the child; (9) psychological/mental capacity of a parent to meet the child's needs; (10) need to protect the child 
from neglect. 
219 See Kaspiew, R., Moloney, L., Dunstan, J., & De Maio, J. (2015). Family law court filings 2004-05 to 2012-13 (Research 
Report No. 30). Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies.  This research reviewed data provided by the Family 
Court of Australia (and Western Australia) and Federal Magistrates Court and Federal Circuit Court.  This research is an 
update of the Kaspiew et al., Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms Summary Report, above n 214. See also Rhoades, 
H., Sheehan, G., & Dewar, J. Developing a consistent message about children's care needs across the family law system. 
(2013) 27 (3) Australian Journal of Family Law 191-219.  
220 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, above n 2. 
221 Ibid 5. 
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violence.222  Of relevance to this thesis was the discussion of the best interest of the child 
factors.  Chisholm recommended changes to section 60CC and, in particular, the provisions 
referring to children’s views so as to emphasise the importance of the courts considering what 
children are experiencing.  The provision concerning children’s views at section 60CC, 
Chisholm said should read as follows: 
 
(1) In considering what parenting orders to make, the court must not assume that any particular 
parenting arrangement is more likely than others to be in the child’s best interests, but should seek to 
identify the arrangements that are most likely to advance the child’s best interests in the circumstances 
of each case.  
(2) In considering what parenting orders to make, the court must take into account the following 
matters, so far as they are relevant:  
(a) any views expressed by the child concerning the child’s relationship with each parent and 
with other persons, and about any other matters that are important to the child ...'.223 
 
Chisholm further took into account the significance of the changes in terminology and stated: 
 
The earlier change from ‘wishes’ to ‘views’ suggests the focus should not be only on what outcome the 
children want.  Understanding the views and perceptions of quite young children, for example, might 
be important for the adults in deciding the best arrangements for the child, even though the child’s 
point of view might not be based on an informed and mature consideration.’224 
 
Chisholm, quoting Parkinson and Cashmore, acknowledged that the changes to the wording 
of wishes to views could provide insight into children’s experiences.225  Chisholm also stated 
that the consideration of a view, provides a holistic approach to understanding what 
children’s perceptions are and protects the child from family conflict.226 
 
																																								 																				
222 Further research on the implications of domestic violence on parenting cases in family law matters has been conducted. 
See Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Dunstan, J., De Maio, J., Moore, S., Moloney, L. (2015) Experiences of Separated Parents 
Study (Evaluation of the 2012 Family Violence Amendments), Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies; Hooker, L., 
R, Kaspiew, and A. Taft, 'Domestic and family violence and parenting: Mixed methods insights into impact and support 
needs' (2016) (1) ANROWS Landscapes, 26-32.  Also see Bagshaw, D., Brown, T., Wendt, S., Campbell, A., McInnes, E., 
Tinning, B., Baker, J. (2011) 'The effect of family violence on post-separation parenting arrangements: The experiences and 
views of children and adults from families who separated post-1995 and post-2006' (2011) 86 Family Matters 49-61; Chief 
Justice Diana Bryant, 'The Family Court and family violence' above n 105;  Richard Chisholm,(2015). 'Rewriting Part VII of 
the Family Law Act: A modest proposal', (2015) 24 (3) Australian Family Lawyer 17-37. 
223 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, above n 2, 
Recommendation 3.4, 13 and136-7.	
224 Ibid 136. 
225 Ibid 138-139. 
226 Ibid139.  
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Chisholm's study was important to situate the research conducted for this thesis.  The 
research for this thesis differs from Chisholm in that it considers the impact of the 2006 FLA 
wish to view amendments and if the amendments rendered the consideration of a view 
different from a wish in law and in the opinion and practices of ICLs.  The Chisholm Report 
acknowledged the importance of listening to children.  Chisholm articulates that considering 
a view can provide insight for practitioners and Judges in finding out the needs of children.  
This is how the explanatory memorandum sees the reasons for the change.  Chisholm also 
confirms what Parkinson and Cashmore acknowledged as being important.  The findings in 
this research (as detailed in Chapters 3) are that the legislative intention of the amendments 
confirmed that a view was meant to be different from a wish, however most post-2006 
judgements did not recognise or articulate the change that the legislature intended.  Further, 
(as detailed in Chapter 4), in the opinion of most ICLs and Judges a view was not different 
from a wish and most ICL and Judges said their practices of ascertaining a child's voice did 
not change as a result of the wish to view amendment.   
 
The Commonwealth Attorney-General commissioned a further report into the FLA reforms 
concerning shared parenting.  The report into Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 
2006 Family Law Reforms was published in May 2010.227  The research report was led by the 
Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) in collaboration with the University of Sydney Law 
School and the Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS).  The SPRC research was also a 
significant study (it acknowledged the significance of the EFLR study), using existing 
datasets from various sources including the Australian Bureau of Statistics and AIFS.  The 
study conducted surveys with more than 1000 parents, 136 children online, interviews with 
parents, case studies and data from the National Children’s and Youth Law Centre.228  In the 
context of listening to children the report found:  
 
A key concern for many children and adolescents, and one that was significantly associated with how 
happy they were with the arrangements, was their perception that they had some say in them.  Children 
who felt they had some say in the arrangements were happier with the arrangements than those who 
had not.229 
																																								 																				
227 Cashmore, J., Parkinson, P., Weston, R., Redmond, G., Qu, L., Baxter, J., Raikovic, M., Sitek, T., and Katz, L., (2010) 
Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law Reforms: Report to the Australian Government Attorney-
General's Department, Sydney, Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales. 
228 Ibid ix. 
229 Ibid 124. See also Graham, A and Fitzgerald, R., 'Exploring the promises and possibilities for children's participation in 
Family Relationship Centres' (2010) Family Matters 84, 52-60. See also Alasdair, R., McKinnon, G., and Yates, H., (2013) 
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Another researcher, Campbell, found that a child’s perspective about what they are going 
through is useful ‘in assisting parents and other adults to reach appropriate decisions about 
them’.230  Campbell concluded that family law practitioners do not understand the difference 
in the concepts of children’s views or children’s wishes and the way family law decisions are 
made will only change if there is a ‘continuing transition away from ascertaining children’s 
wishes to a greater exploration of their views.231  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction, objectives and overview of the chapters of the 
thesis.  A literature review (discussed in three parts) provided details of research previously 
conducted to situate the doctrinal and qualitative research undertaken for this thesis.  Part A, 
discussed the role of Australian family law Judges in listening to children in custody cases. 
Judges ultimately determine custody orders if parents cannot agree and as part of their 
decision-making role, a child's voice may be a factor for consideration.  Part B, detailed the 
role of the Independent Children's Lawyer.  ICLs play an important role in informing the 
court of the child's views and what orders would be in the child's best interests.  Part C, 
'hearing the voice of the child' details the social science research conducted in Australia.  
Social scientist has played an import role in ascertaining the child's views and they provide 
insight into how family law practices have facilitated listening to children in custody cases.  
 
Chapter 2 outlines the doctrinal and qualitative research methodology applied in this thesis.  
The doctrinal research provides an overview of the legal synthesis and legal analysis 
undertaken.  The qualitative research component is also explained in terms of (a) the nature 
and design of the research project; (b) participants; (c) ethics approval certification; (d) 
principles for conducting a valid and credible study and analysis; and (e) the themes extracted 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Talking with Children & Young People about Participation in Family Court Proceedings' A Report by the ACT Children & 
Young People Commissioner.  The report was requested by the Honourable Chief Justice Bryant of the Family Court of 
Australia. There was no specific funding for the report and it was undertaken by the ACT Children and Young Person 
Commissioner.  The report did not make formal recommendations (as it was not within the scope of the study) but confirms 
at 29 the 'value of speaking to children and young people about participation in Family Court proceedings'. 
230 Alan Campbell ‘I Wish the Views Were Clearer: Children’s Wishes and Views in Australian Family Law’ (2013) 38 
Children Australia 184-191, 189. 
231 Ibid. 
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from the qualitative study.  The semi structured interview guides used for this study and the 
ethical approval certifications are located in Appendix A, B, C and D. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the legal synthesis and legal analysis of this thesis and achieves objective 
one of the thesis.  The Chapter details whether the 2006 FLA amendments changed how the 
law considered a child’s voice, by analysing the legal nature and interpretation of a child’s 
view in parenting disputes in the post-2006 regime, as opposed to a child’s wish in the pre-
2006 FLA regime.  The Chapter provides three main conclusions: (1) a child's voice has been 
recognised since the enactment of the FLA; (2) the legislative intention of the wish to view 
amendment did anticipate a change in meaning, however most judicial decisions post-2006 
showed that the consideration of a child's view was not conceptually different from the 
previous framework of consideration of a child's wish.  Further, the pre-2006 child wish 
authorities of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children's Wishes 
(2000) 25 Fam LR 712 remain the authoritative cases for the post-2006 child views regime; 
and (3) the weight attached to what a child says has not differed from the pre-2006 
consideration of a wish to that of the post-2006 consideration of a child's view. 	
 
Chapter 4 presents the qualitative research for this thesis and achieves objectives two and 
three of the thesis.  The qualitative research involved a small scale purposive study of the 
opinions and practices of six Judges and 14 Independent Children’s Lawyers (ICLs) from 
New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria to the 2006 FLA amendments concerning 
ascertaining a child's view.  The findings are presented in five parts.  
 
Chapter 4 Part A provides a discussion on the interviews conducted with Judges and ICLs 
concerning the significance in meaning and in practice of the 2006 FLA change from 
ascertaining a child's wish to that of a child's view.  The themes extracted from Part A were: 
(a) wishes or views mean the same; (b) whether the FLA expresses the consideration of a 
child's voice as a wish (pre-2006 regime) or a view (post-2006 regime), the application of the 
consideration is similar in practice; and (c) the best interests of the child factors and parental 
capacity remain the paramount consideration whether what a child has to say is called a wish 
or a view.  
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Chapter 4, Part B provides a discussion on what ICLs and Judges consider is the role of the 
ICL. The themes extracted include: (a) the role of the ICL is described according to job 
related activities or according to the ICLs’ personal skills, attributes and qualities; (b) the ICL 
is an independent best interests advocate; and (c) the ICL's role is not mentioned specifically 
as one of ascertaining a child’s view but rather one of advocating for the child's best interests. 
 
Chapter 4, Part C provides a discussion of the views of ICLs and Judges regarding speaking 
to children. The themes extracted were: (a) the phrase 'speaking to children direct' is 
interpreted differently by the participants; (b) different practices exist between ICLs and 
Judges on whether they would speak to children in custody cases; and (c) the majority of the 
respondent ICLs and Judges believe that Judges should not speak to children. 
 
Chapter 4, Part D provides an overview of factors impacting on the consideration children's 
views in custody cases. These include (a) differences in judicial approaches between different 
court registries influence practice; (b) the geographic location (that is country based versus 
city based) may impact on ICL practices; (c) lack of funding influences ICLs practices; (d) a 
more integrated approach between family and child protection practices is needed; and (e) the 
LAT process did not enhance the way a child's view was heard.  
 
Chapter 4, Part E provides a brief summary of the qualitative research. 
 
Chapter Five provides a conclusion on the key findings on the tripartite inquiry.  The 
Chapter provides an explanation of the limitations in the research conducted and 
recommendations for further research.  The Chapter details the recommendation for change 
to the family law provisions.  The recommendations are that the FLA be amended by (a) 
inserting in the FLA a definition of the word "view" in the interpretation provisions of the 
FLA (section 4).  The definition should include that a view is a broader investigation into a 
child's perspective, it is to capture the child's perceptions, feelings and considerations that are 
important to the child and involve a more consultative approach with the child; (b) the 
insertion of consideration of the child's view should be included in the objects provision of 
the FLA section 60B; (c) FLA section 61DA (the presumption) and section 65DAA (time 
arrangement) provisions be amended to include a reference to consideration of the child’s 
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view before a parenting order is made; and (d) the inclusion in the FLR and FCCR details of 
minimum best practice guidelines regarding the ascertaining of a child's view by an ICL. 
 
1.6 Notes on terminology  
 
The term 'custody' is used throughout this thesis.  It is acknowledged that pursuant to the 
FLA, the word 'custody' is no longer the term used to describe the nature of parenting 
arrangements. This is due to the proprietary implications attached to that word.  The term is 
therefore used in this thesis only as a general term to describe: the care arrangements 
determined by the court, regarding the parents’ roles in the day to day arrangements; the 
long-term decision making arrangements for the child (such as health, well-being and 
education); and who the child lives with and spends time with.232 
  
The FLA applies to Judges of the Family Court of Australia (‘FCA’), Federal Circuit Court 
(‘FCC’) and Federal Magistrates of the Federal Magistrates Court (‘FMC’) (as it applied 
prior to 12 April 2013). The qualitative research involved interviewing Judges of the FCA 
only.  In Chapter 4, the term Judge, unless otherwise specified, will refer to Judges of the 
FCA. The term Judge however in the remainder of the thesis can apply to all Judges of the 
FCA and FCC.233  A capital letter is used for the term Judge as it describes the person without 
disclosing their name. 
 
The term ‘child’ is a child defined pursuant to section 4 of the FLA and ‘means a person who 
is under the age of 18 years old’.234  The child who is the subject of the litigated parenting 
dispute refers to a child who is the subject of the proceedings pursuant to Part VII of the FLA.  
The child referred to in the litigated parenting dispute is the subject of any parenting orders in 
relation to where the child lives and who the child spends time with.  These orders are made 
pursuant to Part VII of the FLA.  The term child used in this thesis is as defined by the FLA. 
	
																																								 																				
232 See also LexisNexis, Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Volume 1 A-K (4th Ed, 2007), the word 'care' defined at 328-
329 and 'custody' defined at 562-566. 
233 On 12 April 2013 the Federal Magistrates Court became known as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (‘FCC’). The 
FCC was created pursuant to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 2012. 
234 FLA s 4. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This study used a combination of doctrinal legal research and qualitative research 
methodology to achieve the objectives stated in Chapter 1.  The legal research involved two 
components; legal synthesis and legal analysis.  In the context of this thesis, the legal 
synthesis describes and investigates the custody laws in Australia that centre on the 2006 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('FLA') child's view provisions.  The legal analysis provides a 
discussion of this law and the interconnection between the purpose and nature of the 2006 
FLA best interest of the child provisions.  Part 2.2 of this chapter elaborates on the doctrinal 
legal research undertaken in this thesis. 
 
The qualitative research involved a small scale purposive study of Independent Children’s 
Lawyers ('ICL') and Judges. Fourteen ICLs and six Judges of the Family Law Courts from 
New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria were interviewed.  Part 2.3 of this chapter 
elaborates on the qualitative research undertaken in this thesis. 
 
The design of the research methodology ensures the originality of the thesis. It has filled the 
gaps in knowledge and has therefore made a notable contribution to professional knowledge 
in family law.  
 
2.2 Doctrinal legal research 
 
2.2.1 Legal synthesis 
 
The doctrinal research provides the structural framework for this thesis.  This thesis 
investigated the implementation of the 2006 FLA child views provision to ascertain if a view 
was different in meaning and in practice from the pre-2006 child wishes provision.  This was 
achieved by reviewing primary sources, that is, legislation and cases and secondary sources 
such as explanatory memoranda, parliamentary reports, texts, journal articles and social 
science research.  
 
The process of legal research involved identifying and locating pre-2006 and post-2006 
Commonwealth child custody legislative provisions using various databases.  The Federal 
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Register of Legislation (formerly ComLaw) database is the authorised government website 
which details full text legislative provisions.  It also provides historic information on 
legislation and Bills.  The site is managed by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
('OPC').   
 
On the home site for the OPC, using the search function and the search terms 'family law' a 
link 'Key internet links on Family law' was located.  This link provided a gateway to a vast 
array of primary and secondary sources including:  (a) legislation, Bills, Bills Digest, 
parliamentary speeches, parliamentary reports, House of Representative and Senate Standing 
Committees reports; (b) links to national bodies undertaking research in family law such as 
the Australian Institute of Family Studies and the Law Council of Australia - Family Law 
Section; (c) interest or lobby groups such as the Lone Fathers Association of Australia, Men's 
Rights Agency, Nation Council of Single Mothers and their Children and the Shared 
Parenting Council of Australia; (d) legal resource sites such as various Legal Aid 
Commissions and Family Law Courts websites; and (e) links to journal articles and family 
law publication resources.  
 
Other free sites accessed included the Australia.gov.au website which provided links to 
legislation and the Australian Law Reform Commission site. AGIS1 provided commentary on 
legislation by using the "leg" field and search terms 'family law' and 'children's views'.  The 
Austlii site provided access to primary and secondary resources such as legislation, cases, 
journal articles and links to the United Nations Conventions. 
 
Subscriptions databases accessed through QUT library resources located legislation using 
LawOne (by Timebase) and CCH Intelliconnect.  The CCH database also provided access to 
case law. 
 
In researching case law for this thesis, a legal synthesis and analysis of selected cases 
regarding children’s wishes (pre-2006) and children’s views (post-2006) were chosen by key 
word search terms ‘children’s wishes’ or ‘children’s views’ and were then selected according 
to those cases where the child’s wishes/views was a live issue.  A search was also conducted 
																																								 																				
1 Attorney General's Information Service. 
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on 'child view' cases which mentioned the less adversarial trial process (LAT) as provided for 
in FLA Division 12A.  Further, cases which discussed the best interest of the child factors and 
the interaction with the Part VII FLA were reviewed.  
 
The free sites used to locate cases were: the Family Court of Australia, Federal Circuit Court2 
and Austlii.  On Austlii a search for cases was also undertaken by clicking the 'noteup' 
function on the relevant provision of the FLA being considered.  The Austlii site also 
provides LawCite, a legal case citator function (similar to Casebase and Firstpoint). For paid 
subscription databases (accessed through the QUT library), the following databases were 
used: Firstpoint (Legal Online), Casebase (Lexisnexis Butterworths - Australia), Australian 
Current Law (ACL Reporter) and CCH Intelliconect.  Firstpoint showed the litigation history 
of cases as well as key summaries of cases.  Casebase provided case and statute annotations 
as well as word and phrases judicially considered.  The ACL Reporter provided decisions 
from the Family Court and High Court with a comprehensive digest of judgements. 
2.2.2 Legal analysis 
 
Doctrinal legal analysis (DLA) involves an examination of the elements of the law to analyse 
the meaning and purpose of the legislation and to determine if the relevant provisions are 
congruent with government policies.  The DLA of case law determines whether the case law 
principles are applied consistently, are coherent and in accordance with the legislative 
principles and purpose. 
 
The DLA methodology adopted in this thesis included analysing the post-2006 FLA 
legislative principles with reference to the Part VII objects of the FLA; the 2006 primary and 
additional considerations of the best interest of the child factors including the delegation of a 
child’s views as an additional consideration and Division 12A child related proceedings.  The 
legislative and case law analysis considered if the changes affected the practical application 
of how Judges and ICLs listened to children and whether this change gave greater weight to 
what a child was saying in custody cases.  Also, the doctrinal methodology further analysed 
the historical changes in legislation (from the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) ('MCA') to 
the FLA in the context of how the child's voice has been heard throughout the decades.   
																																								 																				
2 The Federal Magistrates Court website was also accessed prior to the commencement of the Federal Circuit Court. The 
Federal Magistrates Court website has been decommissioned. 
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The DLA also examined the 2006 FLA child view provisions using secondary sources to 
determine whether they were consistent with government policy principles as set out in the 
extrinsic materials (Hansard, Explanatory Memoranda, Parliamentary Reports).   
 
Reviewing legislation and cases provided insight into how the courts interpreted the child's 
views and best interests of the child provisions.  Secondary sources provided an explanation 
of government policy considerations and the social science research concerning a child's 
participation in custody matters.  Chapter 3 of this thesis discusses the doctrinal legal 
research synthesis and legal analysis. 
 
2.3 Empirical - Qualitative research 
 
The doctrinal research provided a structure to situate the qualitative research.  The qualitative 
research for this thesis involved a small-scale study using semi-structure interviews with a 
purposive sample of fourteen ICLs and six Family Court Judges from New South Wales, 
Queensland and Victoria.  Qualitative research methodology using semi structured interviews 
allowed the collection of data which provided a deeper insight into how ICLs and Judges 
practice.  One of the limitations of qualitative study is that it may not be representative of all 
practitioners.  However, interviews are, by their very nature, social encounters where 
speakers collaborate in producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of 
their past (or future) actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts’,3 and it can nonetheless 
through the sampling and selection of the participants be indicative of practice.   
 
Described in this section are the nature of qualitative research, the design of the interview 
questions, the recruitment and selection of participants, ethical approval process and the 
interview process, data collection, storage, de-identification and verification. 
2.3.1 What is the nature of qualitative research? 
 
Qualitative research is concerned with exploring ideas and themes and uses data collection 
methods such as semi-structured interviews.  According to VanderStoep and Johnson4 
																																								 																				
3 Tim Rapley, 'Interviews' in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman (eds) Qualitative 
Research Practices, (Sage Publications, 2004) 16-34, 16. 
4 Scott W VanderStoep and Deidre D Johnson, Research Methods for Everyday Life Blending Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (2008), 9. 
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qualitative research does not rely on the number of persons sampled to describe phenomenon 
but rather the text of that discussion.5  They further describe that purposive sampling 
comprises of ‘people based on a particular attribute’ and the goal of this is to present a range 
of perspectives or information on a topic.6  Patton and Cochran7 state that purposive sampling 
means ‘participants are selected because they are likely to generate useful data’.  Yin 
describes it as 'the selection of participants .... based on their anticipated richness and 
relevance of information in relation to the study’s research questions.'8 
 
VanderStoep and Johnson argue that qualitative research helps to understand the reasons for 
beliefs with the goal being ‘to understand ... the viewpoint of a research participant’9 and that 
the ‘qualitative approach is typically less concerned with aggregate generalizations ... rather it 
claims only to represent the people studied.'10  Qualitative research has also been defined as 
descriptive in content (not predictive); the methods include inductive analysis of texts; the 
criteria for truth is the “Aha” criterion and it is adequate and realistic as opposed to needing 
to have a statistical, replicative basis and cumulative findings.11 
2.3.2 The design of the research interview questions 
 
The rationale for undertaking qualitative interviewing is that it 'enables you to gather 
contrasting and complementary talk on the same theme or issue.'12  The development and 
design of the interview questions, should be informed by the literature review.13  Rapley 
states that in addition to the literature review, questions can also develop 'alongside your 
thoughts and hunches about what areas might be important to cover in the interview.'14  
Further, the interview questions should be flexible and general enough to permit the 
exploration of the study undertaken.15  Typically questions asked can be theoretical, or 
focused on a particular population or specific site.16  Further the questions 'focus on 
																																								 																				
5 See also Margarete Sandelowski, 'Sample Size in qualitative research', (1995) 18 (2) Research in Nursing and Health 179-
183. The author states that determining sample size is a matter of judgement and the quality of information obtained from the 
sampling as opposed to the quantity is important. 
6 VanderStoep and Johnson, above n 4 187-188. 
7 Michael Quinn Patton and Michael Cochran A Guide to Using Qualitative Research Methodology, (2002). 
8 Robert K Yin, Qualitative research from start to finish (Guilford Press, 2011), 311. 
9 VanderStoep and Johnson, above n 4, 167. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Rapley, above n 3, 18. 
13 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (3rd ed) (1999), 35-36 and 38-39. 
14 Rapley, above n 3, 18. 
15 Marshall and Rossman, above n 13. 
16 Ibid 39-40. 
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interactions and processes in ... organizations and thus link to important research literature ... 
but are grounded in everyday realities.'17  
 
The 'initial curiosities for research often come from direct-world observations, emerging from 
the interplay of the researcher's direct experience ... and interests in practice'.18  This was the 
case for the writer of this thesis.  The genesis of the research topic, ideas about who should be 
interviewed and the design of the semi structured questions was therefore developed not only 
from the examination of literature in the field of family law practice but also through the 
writer's practice in family law.  The literature review revealed the historical development of 
the law and the research undertaken in the area of the consideration of children's voices in 
litigated parenting disputes.  The literature review revealed the gaps in knowledge and 
therefore assisted in the development of the qualitative research design and the interview 
questions.  
 
In addition to the literature review, the interview questions were developed in consultation 
with the thesis supervisors.  The semi-structured questions were also submitted with the 
writer's ethics application to the University's Human Research Ethics Committee and the 
Family Court of Australia Research and Ethics Committee (see discussion at 2.3.4).  The 
semi-structured interview guides are located at Appendix A and B and the ethics approvals 
are located at Appendix C and D. 
2.3.3 Judges and ICLs as participants in the study 
 
The choice participants in the research was informed by the literature review and the 
researcher’s experience in legal practice.19  The number of participants chosen for this study 
was devised in consultation with the supervisory team and qualitative adviser.  
 
The parameters of the thesis did not permit for children to be interviewed although this, on its 
own would be worthy of a thesis in itself.  However, the lack of interviews with children does 
not adversely affect the notable contribution to the knowledge of family law as valuable 
information was gleaned from the interviews of Judges and ICLs.  
																																								 																				
17 Ibid 40. See also Rapley, above n 3, 16. 
18 Marshall and Rossman, above n 13, 25. 
19 Ibid 37-38. See discussion on identifying in the literature review, research significant for practice and the significance for 
social issues and actions.  See also Yin, above n 8. 
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Pursuant to the FLA, Judges determine the best interest of the child20 factors in judgments 
concerning parenting disputes.  If parents cannot agree Judges ultimately are the sole decision 
makers about where the child lives or who the child spends time with.  The Judge must take 
into account a child's views, but the process of how a Judge listens to children is the cause of 
much debate.21  However a gap identified in the literature review was the impact of the 2006 
child voice amendment in the context of whether a Judge considered a view was different 
from a wish and if the Division 12A FLA amendments changed the practices of Judges when 
ascertaining a child's view.  Judges were chosen as participants because of the significance of 
their role as decision makers in child custody cases.  
 
The FLA provides that one of the ways the court may inform itself of the views of the child is 
through the child being represented by an ICL.22  ICLs are legal practitioners with specialist 
training in children's matters in family law disputes.  ICLs are not the child's legal 
representative (that is party representative) but rather an independent best interest advocate.23  
The FLA24 prescribes the role of the ICL and the Guidelines for Independent Children’s 
Lawyers25 provide ICLs with guidance for practice.  The literature review (presented in 
Chapter 1) revealed however that there was a variation in the way ICLs practiced between 
different Australian states.  Some ICLs do not speak to children; other ICLs regularly speak 
to children.  Studies regarding the practices of ICLs have been undertaken with the most 
recent report being published by the AIFS in 2014.26  However there has been little research 
on how the 2006 amendment from a wish to a view made a difference in practice for ICLs in 
																																								 																				
20 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC ('FLA') 
21 See Michelle Fernando, 2009, 'Conversations between Judges and Children: an Argument in Favour of Judicial 
Conferences in Contested Children's Matters' (2009) 23 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law, 48-70; Michelle Fernando,  
'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' (2012) 26 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law,  
51-77; Michelle Fernando, 'Children's direct participation and the views of Australian judges' (2013) 92 Family Matters,. 41-
47; Michelle Fernando, 'How can we best listen to Children in Family Law Proceedings?' (2013) 3 New Zealand Law 
Review, 387-407; Michelle Fernando,  'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings', 
(2012) 2 (4) Family Law Review, 213-224; Michelle Meilin Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family 
Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices. (PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2011). See also L. Young, E. Ryrstedt 
and A Nicholson, 'The Child and the Judge: Reflections on the Voice of the Child in Australia', (2012) 3 Journal of Family 
Law and Practice 19.   
22 FLA s 60CD(2)(b). 
23 FLA s 60CC. 
24 FLA s 68LA. 
25 National Legal Aid. (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian 
and Federal Circuit Court of Australia). 
26 Rachel Carson, Rae Kaspiew, Sharnee Moore, Julie Delabuiere, John De Maio and Briony Horsfall, ‘The role and efficacy 
of Independent Children’s Lawyers: Findings from the AIFS Independent Children’s Lawyer Study, Family Matters No. 94, 
2014, aifs.gov.au accessed 22 December 2014. See also Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Deblaquiere J., and 
Horsfall B. (2014) Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, (2nd ed). Canberra: Attorney General’s Department. 
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ascertaining a child’s view.  The ICLs were chosen as participants due to the importance of 
their role as the best interest of the child representative.  
 
A significant number of custody cases are heard in the eastern states of Australia and the 
largest number of Judges appointed in the Family Court are located in Queensland, New 
South Wales and Victoria.27  A significant number of grants of aid for ICLs are in those three 
states.28  The Judge and ICL participants were therefore selected from these states.  
2.3.4 University and Family Court ethics approval  
 
As this empirical research project involved research with human participants, a full National 
Ethics Application Form ('NEAF') application was submitted to QUT's Office of Research.  
The application required details of the research project, including preliminary literature 
review, the benefits and risks of the project, research participant descriptions including the 
recruitment process.  The application also required a submission of recruitment letters, 
consent forms, semi-structured interview questions and details on the storage, security and 
confidentiality and privacy processes adopted.  (The ethical conduct of the research is 
discussed below).  The research project was approved; reference details are QUT - University 
Human Research Ethics Committee, Human Ethics Approval Certificate, NHMRC 
Registered Committee Number EC00171, Approval Number 0900000090, date approved 28 
July 2009 (herein after referred to as 'HREC').  A copy is located at Appendix C. 
 
Because Judges of the Family Court of Australia were being interviewed, an ethics 
application was also required by the Family Court of Australia.  Details in this ethics 
application were similar to that of the HREC application.  It required a project synopsis with 
copies of the participant information forms and questions along with a literature review, 
research methodology, details of the supervisors and supervisor's qualifications.  
Confidentiality and ethical issues were also addressed along with risk benefit analysis and a 
copy of the HREC ethics approval certificate.  The application was submitted to the Family 
Court Research Committee, Manager Statistical Service Unit on 13 August 2010.  A letter 
																																								 																				
27 Refer to the Family Court of Australia, Annual Reports (various) 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/fcoaweb/reports-and-publications/annual-reports/>. 
28 See also Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Deblaquiere J., and Horsfall B. (2014) Independent Children’s 
Lawyers Study, Final Report, (2nd ed) above n 26, 19, Figure 2.1. 
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dated 20 September 2010 advised that ethical approval had been granted. A copy of this 
approval is located at Appendix D. 
2.3.5 Accessing the Judges and ICL participants 
 
Once ethics approval was obtained from the University and Family Court, the researcher 
sourced participants for the qualitative study.  Before sending requests for participation, the 
researcher received letters of 'in principle support' from the Family Court of Australia, Legal 
Aid Queensland and the Family Law Practitioner's Association (Qld) (FLPA).  
 
An expression of interest was sent via the Family Courts and Family Law Practitioner’s 
Association (FLPA) member’s only website and notice boards requesting judicial officer and 
ICL participation.  The researcher sent letters requesting participation via email and post to 
Judges and ICLs.  Legal Aid Commissions across the three states were sent letters requesting 
assistance in disseminating requests for participation.  The FLPA (Qld) assisted the 
researcher by providing a referral and an introduction to potential Judge participants.  Also, it 
is acknowledged that as well as purposive sampling, snowball sampling was undertaken, that 
is the recruiting of Judges as a result of information and recommendations given from the 
purposively obtained Judges.  
 
Those participants who responded with an expression of interest were then sent a letter of 
introduction, an information sheet which provided details of the research and a consent form.  
A list of the semi structured questions was also provided at that time and the participants 
were advised that they could withdraw their consent at any time.  
 
One of the significant challenges in the project was the recruitment of ICLs and Judges from 
New South Wales and Victoria.  ICL and Judge participants from Queensland were readily 
sourced.  Further recruitment and expression of interest requests were made over a significant 
duration of time until sufficient participants were sourced.   
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2.3.6 Principles for conducting interviews 
 
As discussed above, a full NEAF application was required and permission given prior to 
undertaking interviews with the selected participants.  Part of the NEAF application was a 
literature review explaining best practices for conducting interviews: 
 
 Good practice in interviewing was seen to involve appropriate preparation; demonstration of 
 appropriate respect for participants; intensive listening on the part of the interviewer; development of 
 thoughtful interview guides that used appropriate question formulation with fewer, rather than more, 
 questions; posing of short, open-ended questions; flexibility on the part of the interviewer to deviate 
 from prior plans when necessary; and effective use of follow up questions within interviews to elicit 
 the participants’ understandings of topics.29 
 
In conducting the interviews the participants were advised of the goals of the interview at the 
outset.  The style of communication, either through words and non-verbal ways (such as 
voice tone and speed of speech) was adjusted in the interview to meet the participants' needs.  
This involved the interviewer asking questions, but giving the participant 'space to talk' and 
the interviewer 'selectively following up on specific themes or topics'.30  Rapley states that 
the interview can be conducted in an 'engaged, active or [a] collaborative format of 
interviewing' as this allows the interviewer and participant to become connected in the 
process.  All interviews were done in a suitable location for privacy reasons and were free of 
disturbances and the participants were advised that they could withdraw their consent at any 
time.  All interviews were taped recorded for accuracy and note taking purposes and 
confidentiality and anonymity of the participants was explained.31 
 
The interviews conducted for this thesis followed Rapley's 'key interactional and best practice 
principles of qualitative interviewing'.32 
2.3.7 Consent, anonymity, recording, de-identification, feedback and accuracy 
 
Participants who agreed to an interview provided a signed consent form before the interview 
commenced.  The participants were advised that they could withdraw their consent at any 
																																								 																				
29 Kathryn Roulston, Reflective Interviewing: A Guide to Theory and Practice (Sage Publications, 2010), 178. 
30 Rapley, above n 3, 20. 
31 See also Rapley, above n 3, 18-19. 
32 Ibid 20. 
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time prior to, during or after the interview.  Only one participant declined to proceed and 
withdrew from participating prior to the date of the interview. 
 
The interviews were conducted in consultation with the participants at a time and venue 
suitable to them.33  The interviews were conducted either via telephone or face to face 
(whichever best suited the participant).  Most participants preferred the telephone interview 
as it suited their work commitments. 
 
Interviews were conducted with Judges and ICLs in a semi structured manner as per the semi 
structured interview guide.  All participants were provided with the list of questions at the 
point of the request of participation and were asked at the interview if they had received the 
questions.  All participants acknowledged receipt of the semi-structured questions.  
Participants were asked if they had any questions about the process before proceeding with 
the interview and were invited to stop the interview at any time to ask questions or seek 
clarification on any matters discussed. 
 
The participants were advised at the commencement of the interview about privacy and 
confidentiality and were told to advise the interviewer if any disclosures needed to be 
withheld from transcribing if there was a risk of identification.  Participants were also told 
that the interviews were being audio recorded for accuracy and that field notes were also 
being taken.  The interviews were audio recorded using a hand-held audio recording device.  
At this point and when the recording commenced, the interviewer announced the date and 
immediately de-identified the person being recorded in the interview and gave the participant 
a pseudonym.  That is, ICLs and Judges interviewed were identified on the recording 
according to their State and number; for example, the first ICL interviewed for Queensland 
was identified as ICLQ1 and the first Judge interviewed for Queensland was identified as 
JQ1.   
 
Further to reduce the risk of identification of participants, the years of experience as an ICL 
or appointment as a Judge was not disclosed in the findings.  However, to provide a general 
indication without risking identification of individuals, ICL participant experience ranged 
																																								 																				
33 After the ethics approvals were obtained, the interviews were conducted with ICLs between 2010 to mid 2012 and with 
Judges from late 2010 to mid 2012.  
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between 12 months and 25 years plus and the Judge participant experience ranged from less 
than 5 years, to between 5 and 15-plus years experience.  Also, rather than disclose the 
gender of the participant, instead of using 'he' or 'she' and 'him' or 'her', the words 'they' or 
'their' was used in the presentation of the findings in Chapter 4. 
 
The length of the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 1 hour 40 minutes long.  The length 
of time of the interview depended on the responses from the participants. 
 
During and at the end of the interview and for the purposes of accuracy and feedback, the 
participant was provided with a summary of the issues discussed during the interview.  The 
participant was then given an opportunity to provide the interviewer with feedback or points 
of clarification.  At that point each participant involved in the interview acknowledged the 
accuracy of the contents of interview undertaken. 
	
2.3.8 Transcribing, de-identification, data storage and security 
 
The audio recordings of the interviews were fully transcribed after the interviews.  A copy of 
the handwritten notes was also kept by the researcher.  After transcribing, the audio and the 
typed transcript were compared and the typed record (the transcript) was verified and 
acknowledged as a true and correct account of the interview.	
	
In the presentation of the research findings the participants are identified with pseudonyms as 
explained in 2.3.7.  Further, at the point of transcribing, if any information collected 
identified parties in a matter, the name or descriptions involving the ICL or Judge, this data 
was made de-identifiable.  
 
Research data security was implemented at the commencement of the research project to 
ensure the integrity of the research from conception, through the collection, storage and 
transcription of the interviews and interpretation and analysis.  The data remains stored in a 
locked filing cabinet in a locked facility.  The data stored on a computer is protected by 
password access and antivirus software. 
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2.3.9 Research validity, credibility, analysis and extraction of themes 
 
Validity of the qualitative study requires the data to be properly collected and interpreted to 
reflect and present the findings.  It is often referred to as the 'quality control'. 34  A valid study 
is also described as involving a 'credible description, conclusion, explanation or account' of 
the research undertaken.35  To ensure the credibility of the research, it should be transparent, 
methodical, adhere to the evidence found,36 explained and open to scrutiny.37  
 
The data analysis undertaken in this research involved a rigorous checking and rechecking of 
the accuracy of the data, a thorough process of revisiting the data collected and the exclusion 
of any personal biases in reviewing the data.38  Further, to remove or minimise personal bias 
in this study, the research participants, that is ICLs and Judges were selected as they are 
acknowledged as experts in family law practice (see discussion at 2.3.3).  Further the rigorous 
ethics approval process and the sourcing and recruitment of independent expert participants 
assisted in the exclusion of personal bias in analysing the findings (see discussion at 2.3.4 and 
2.3.5). 
 
The steps of analysing the research data involved a five phase cycle of: compiling, 
disassembly, reassembling, interpreting and concluding.39  Compiling involves the process of 
gathering the audio recordings, transcripts, field notes and putting them into some order.  
This can be through manual means or the use of software programs.  Disassembly is the 
breaking down of the data into pieces or fragments and the reassembly is the phase that 
groups the data into codes or themes.  The fourth phase of interpreting provides a narrative of 
the findings and perhaps the refinement of the disassembly and reassembly phase.  The 
conclusions are the findings of the research.40 The phases also involve an ongoing recursive 
process to correct, verify and test the validity and credibility of the data.41 
 
																																								 																				
34 Yin, above n 8, 78. 
35 Joseph A Maxwell, Qualitative research design: A interactive Approach (1996) cited in Robert K Yin, Qualitative 
research from start to finish (2011), 79.  See also Joseph A Maxwell ‘Designing a Qualitative Study’ in L Bickam & D Rog 
(eds) The Sage Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2009), 214-253; Whittemore, R, 
Chase, S and Mandle, C, ‘Validity in Qualitative Research’ (2001) 11 Qualitative Health Research, 522-537. 
36 Yin, above n 8, 19-21. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid 177. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid 178-179. 
41 Ibid 178. 
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In this qualitative study the data was initially compiled and disassembled using a word 
document and excel spreadsheet and the third stage of reassembly was conducted to identify 
themes.  This process was lengthy but it did provide an initial analysis of possible themes and 
the sorting or compiling of the data.  It was evident at this first stage of compiling and 
disassembly that the large volume of data collected required a more sophisticated program for 
extraction of relevant information and to enable a more rigorous analysis of the data.  The 
qualitative data analysis computer software package called NVivo42 was then used to manage 
the data.  NVivo supported the analysis by helping to manage the data, manage and show 
ideas, query the data and concepts and presented the ideas with visual matrices and reports 
from the data collected.43  
 
Once the data (transcripts and audio recordings) were stored on NVivo, a starting point for 
coding or extracting themes, was to consider the objectives of the thesis and the questions 
used in the interviews.  A textual analysis of the data collected then followed.  Textual 
analysis involves the identification and interpretation of the responses given.  VanderStoep 
and Johnson argue that textual analysis can provide an infinite variety of interpretations 
according to the researcher’s interpretation and this is ‘one of many possible valid 
interpretations of a given text.  In textual analysis, the researcher seldom seeks the 
interpretations of others; the researcher’s own interpretation is salient.’44  The qualitative 
research conducted for this thesis also used thematic analysis that is coding of the data to 
identify themes.  Mills et al.,45 describe thematic analysis as ‘a systematic approach to the 
analysis of qualitative data that involves the identifying themes ... coding and classifying data 
usually text, according to themes and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking 
commonalities, relationships, overarching patterns ... or explanatory principles’.  Further, 
Mills et al., stated this assists in ‘defining emergent themes, constantly comparing data 
against codes and categories, cycling back through documents to revise coding, recording 
[and] interpretive insights.’46   
 
																																								 																				
42 Throughout the research, NVivo was updated. For this thesis NVivo versions 9, 10 and 11 were used. 
43 Pat Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo (Sage Publications, 2007) 2-3. 
44 VanderStoep and Johnson, above n 4, 211. 
45 Albert J Mills & Gabrielle Durepos & Eiden Wiebe, Encyclopaedia of Case Research Thematic Analysis (Sage 
Publications, 2010), 2. 
46 Ibid, 3. 
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The emerging themes from NVivo were cross-checked against the initial word tables and 
Excel spreadsheet first created.  Nodes were then created in NVivo.  A ‘node’ is the term 
used by NVivo that means ‘themes’ or ‘coding’.  The nodes were again tested against the 
stored data and the themes first extracted.  During this process constant checking of the data 
involved the reading and re-reading, checking against the nodes created and deleting nodes 
that did not match the objectives or that were identified as points of interest rather than 
themes. 
 
The researcher has followed the research methodology principles to ensure, transparency, 
credibility and validity in the analysis of the interviews conducted for the research project.  
 
The findings of the qualitative research are provided in Chapter 4 of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Child custody laws in Australia have evolved over the last forty years since the enactment of 
the Family Law Act (1975) (Cth) (‘FLA’).  Where parents were previously 'awarded custody' 
on the basis of fault disclosed in a divorce petition,1 the FLA provided a pathway to consider 
the welfare or best interests of the child instead.2  When courts considered the child's welfare, 
this also included the rights of the child to be listened to.3 
 
Listening to children has been described in Australian law under different FLA frameworks 
as considering the child’s wish or a child’s view.  These two conceptions may differ, but an 
important unifying principle is the requirement to listen to the child’s voice.  Clearly, a legal 
context which listens to children’s voice will contemplate the child’s perspective in the 
custody matter;4 or, as Graham and Fitzgerald conceive it, engage in a dialogue5 with 
children.  This contrasts with a legal context which does not engage in any meaningful way 
with a child’s voice.  This is important because prominent social science researchers have 
concluded that listening to children provides them with a voice, or a chance to participate in 
decisions which affect them, albeit not necessarily a determinative choice which decides the 
outcome.6  
 
As shown by the Explanatory Memorandum, the 2006 FLA amendments were intended to 
consider a child’s view instead of a wish, with the purpose of capturing more of the child’s 
perceptions and feelings.7  Through doctrinal methods of reviewing the legislative 
amendments and selecting authoritative pre- and post-2006 wishes and views cases, this 
																																								 																				
1 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth), s 28 ('MCA'). 
2 Amendments of note regarding child custody laws since the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) include: 1983, 
the Family Law Amendment Act 1983 (Cth) (No 72 of 1983); in 1995, the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) (No 167, 
1995); in 2006 the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) (No 46, 2006); and in 2011 the 
Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures Act 2011(Cth) (No 189, 2011). See also Helen 
Rhoades, 'Children, families and the law. A view of the past with an eye to the future' in Families, policy and the law: 
Selected essays on contemporary issues for Australia, Australian Institute of Family Studies (2014) 160-175, 170. 
3 Prior to the 2006 amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 68F(2)(a) ('FLA') provided that the best interest of the 
child factors included consideration of a child's wish. See also United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened 
for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 
1991, Article 12 where the child view was recognised in matters that affected them. 
4 Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008) 204. 
5 Anne Graham and Robyn Fitzgerald, ‘Progressing children’s participation: exploring the potential of a dialogical turn’ 
(2010) 17(3) Childhood 343-59, 349. The authors define the word dialogue as deriving from two Greek words – logos 
meaning ‘the word’ or ‘what is talked about’ and dia, meaning ‘through’ thus meaning ‘among and through us and between 
us’. 
6 Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child, above n 4, 198-9. 
7 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - Shared 
Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
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thesis considers if there has been changes in law, meaning or in practice as a result of the 
2006 FLA amendments.  The analysis of case law informs a conclusion about whether the 
legislative intention of generational change8 is reflected in the court decisions.  Secondary 
sources including journal articles and social science research9 described in this thesis gives 
context to the historical discussion. 
 
This Chapter presents the synthesis and analysis of Australian law, achieving objective one of 
this thesis.  Namely, this chapter considers whether the Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) ('FLASPRA') amendments to the FLA section 
60CC(3)(a) changed how the law considered a child’s voice, by analysing the legal nature 
and practical interpretation of a child’s view in parenting disputes in the 2006 regime, as 
opposed to a child’s wish in the pre-2006 FLA regime.  This synthesis and analysis of 
Australian law draws three main conclusions.  
 
First, since the enactment of the FLA in 1975, the child's wishes or views is considered in the 
context of their best interest in custody cases.  Second, the change in FLA terminology from 
the pre-2006 requirement to consider a child's wishes to the post-2006 consideration of a 
child's views, had a legislative intention to 'capture a child’s perceptions and feelings, and ... 
allow for any decision to be made in consultation with the child.'10  However, whilst the 
legislative intention did anticipate a change in meaning, most post-2006 judicial decisions did 
not see a conceptual difference from the previous framework of the consideration of a child's 
wish.  Further the pre-2006 child wish case authorities remain the authorities for the post-
2006 child view cases. Third, the weight attached to what a child says in custody cases 
follows the Gillick competence test and has not differed under the two regimes whether the 
child's voice is expressed as a wish or a view. 
 
Chapter 3 has two discrete areas which positions the legislation and case law parameters: Part 
3.2, the pre-2006 FLA child wish regime; and Part 3.3, the post-2006 child view regime. Part 
3.4 provides the conclusions to this Chapter. 
 
																																								 																				
8 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), General Outline, 1. 
9 See discussion in this thesis - Chapter 1, Part 1.4 Literature review. 
10 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
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Chapter 3, Part 3.2 conducts an examination of the legislation and case law regime pre-2006 
FLA amendments.  It situates the historical development in Australia of the consideration of 
the child's voice in custody cases.  It provides a discussion on the enactment of the first 
legislative recognition of the judicial obligation to listen to a child and the concepts of 
welfare and best interest of the child factors to be considered.  This Part also describes the 
involvement of lawyers representing the interests of the child and then the momentum for 
change highlighted by the government inquiries into child custody cases.  The purpose of this 
Part is to situate the child wish provisions as they were prior to the 2006 FLA amendments 
and to provide context to the legislative and policy intentions regarding the 2006 FLA 
reforms. 
 
Chapter 3, Part 3.3 provides an examination of the post-2006 FLA regime concerning the 
child view provisions.  Of significance to the post-2006 FLA amendments were the Part VII 
Children provisions.  These included new objects and principles,11 presumptive shared 
parental responsibility provisions,12 time arrangement provisions13 and the creation of a two-
tiered best interest of the child factor provisions.14  The FLA's child wish provision15 was 
amended to a consideration of a child's view, so as to allow a ‘more holistic approach to 
children’s wishes, feelings and perceptions'.16  Part 3.3 provides a discussion on what the 
meaning of view is by considering: (a) the government's policy intention  for the change from 
consideration of a child's wish to a child's view; (b) statutory interpretation principles to 
ascertain the meaning of the term view; and (c) judicial interpretation of children's view 
cases.  
 
Chapter 3 provides the basis upon which the three main findings are drawn and achieves 
objective one of the thesis, that is does the FLASPRA amendment to the FLA section 
60CC(3)(a) render the consideration of a child’s view different from a wish.  Chapter 3 also 
situates the qualitative research discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
																																								 																				
11 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60B ('FLA'). 
12 Ibid s 61DA. 
13 Ibid s 65DAA. 
14 Ibid s 60CC. 
15 FLA s68F(2) as repealed by Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) ('FLASPRA'). 
16 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, Canberra, Attorney-
General’s Department 34. 
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3.2 Legislation and case law regarding a child’s wish in the pre-2006 regime 
 
Child custody laws prior to the FLA were determined pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1959 (Cth) ('MCA').  The MCA's focus was on the 'fitness' of the parents to look after the 
children and was decided by the courts on the grounds cited in the divorce petition.  The 
fourteen grounds for divorce included adultery, desertion, being a drunkard, cruelty or failing 
to provide financial support.17		The MCA did not expressly provide any statutory recognition 
of a child's right to express their wishes, however the MCA did permit a welfare report to be 
prepared for the court to assist in the custody proceedings.18  The reliance on these reports 
was at times subject to criticism from some members of the judiciary who thought that the 
report's usefulness was questionable and that the child's wishes could be subjected to 
influence.19  Some Judges also thought that the assistance of experts in deciding which parent 
was to have custody was presumptuous and superfluous.20  
 
In 1973, the case of Reynolds v Reynolds21 was heard in the High Court of Australia.  Justices 
Mason, Menzies and Walsh were asked to consider the admissibility of evidence in a custody 
case and the wrongful rejection of evidence.  One of the central issues of this case was the 
consideration of the admissibility of out of court statements made by children.22  Arguments 
for the appellant was that the oral evidence of the child's attitudes and wishes about living 
with the mother and the mother's friend should have been permitted into evidence and were 
relevant as to the state of mind of the children.23  The court found that: 
 
There may be some cases in which it is desirable, or indeed necessary, for a court on a custody issue to 
receive evidence of a statement of a child as to its attitude to, or affection for, a parent, but the court is 
not always bound to receive such evidence.24 
 
Their Honours were also cautious of receiving the evidence of a child due to the probative 
value of the child's statement.  Justice Mason (with whom Menzies and Walsh JJ agreed) 
said: 
																																								 																				
17 MCA ss 84-5. See s 28 for the ground of divorce. 
18 Ibid s 85(2). 
19 Frank Bates, 'Custody of Children: Towards a New Approach' (1975) 49 The Australian Law Journal 129-133, 132. 
20 Ibid 132 citing Lynch v Lynch (1966) 8 F.L.R 433, 434 (Begg J). 
21 Reynolds v Reynolds (1973) 47 A.L.J.R. 499. Heard in Sydney August 20, 21 and September 12, 1973. It was an appeal of 
the decision of Justice Joske of the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island. The custody issue concerned two girls aged 10 and 7. 
22 Reynolds v Reynolds (1973) 47 A.L.J.R. 499. 
23 Ibid 502 [C]. 
24 Ibid. 
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The relationship which exists between a child and its parents is plainly a relevant consideration and the 
wish of a child (of reasonable age) to live with one parent rather than the other is a matter to be taken 
into account by the Court, although the weight to be given to it will depend upon the circumstances of 
the case.25 
 
Reynolds v Reynolds has been cited in subsequent cases26and is an authoritative statement of 
the admissibility of receiving evidence from children of their wishes, which would otherwise 
be considered hearsay.  
 
Listening to children in custody cases, saw the courts adopt a cautionary approach to the 
credence of what children had to say.  There was growing a momentum for change so as 'to 
keep pace with social change and community values'27 that saw reforms to divorce and 
custody laws firmly on the agenda of the Government of the day.  Part 3.2.1 explains the next 
significant reform.  
 
3.2.1 A child’s wish is first recognised in legislation 
 
In 1975, the Commonwealth Attorney General, the Honourable Kep Enderby QC commented 
on the impact of the introduction of the FLA (and repealing of the MCA) as 'unquestionably a 
change of a great magnitude in law ... [and] the most humane and enlightened social reform 
to be enacted in Australia...'28  The FLA was also seen as Parliaments way 'to give particular 
emphasis to the ... wishes of children'.29  
 
The explanatory memorandum to the FLA30 explained the importance of the welfare of the 
child being paramount and introduced a new provision dealing with child custody:  
 
																																								 																				
25 Ibid 502 [F]-[G]. 
26 See Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [246]; In the Marriage of Harrison & Woollard (1995) 18 Fam 
LR 788, 797; In the Marriage of Pailas (1976) 26 FLR 149, 154; In the Marriage of Ahmad (1979) 5 Fam LR 15, 20; Borak 
v Veitch [2008] FMCAfam 335, [43]. 
27 Whitlam Institute in Western Sydney University, Whitlam Government Achievements, 
<https://www.whitlam.org/gough_whitlam/achievements/womenandsocialreforms>. 
28 The Honourable Kep Enderby QC, 'The Family Law Act' (1975) 49 The Australian Law Journal 477-487, 477. 
29 In the Marriage of Harrison & Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788, 797 (Murray J) ('Harrison and Woollard'). 
30 Family Law Bill 1974 (Cth) clause 43(1). This thesis will not consider the marital status of the parents with regards to 
children’s wishes or views but acknowledges that the status requirements was amended 1995. 
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In proceedings with respect to the custody … or access to, a child of a marriage – where the child has 
attained the age of fourteen years, the court shall not make an order under this Part contrary to the 
wishes of the child unless the Court is satisfied that, by reason of special circumstances, it is necessary 
to do so.31 
 
However, the provision was not without criticism, particularly with reference to the drafting 
of an age-specific wish provision.  The Final Report of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs regarding the Family Law Bill 1974 explained: 
 
That the clause relating to a specific age be omitted as it was “too rigid and restrictive on the court” and 
that the provisions relating to the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration were “adequate 
for the purpose of taking account of a child’s wishes in custody proceedings”.32 
 
Despite the criticism, the piece of legislation was significant in the context of listening to 
children.  The FLA's introduction of the child wishes provision was the first legislative 
recognition of the judicial obligation for the child’s wishes to be taken into account.  The 
term wish was not defined however according to Whelan it was also an indication that ‘the 
legislation establishes the age of 14 years as chronologically significant in terms of a child’s 
ability to make a choice.’33  Nevertheless the importance of the recognition of the child’s 
rights was not without a caveat, in that the courts could go against the wishes of the child in 
special circumstances.  What ‘special circumstances’ meant was not defined in the 
legislation.  The meaning of wish was also not defined. Whelen observed that the courts 
‘have been reticent in defining “special circumstances”, preferring to leave each case to the 
discretion of the presiding judge.’34 
 
The first authoritative case concerning child wishes post FLA enactment was In the Marriage 
of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149.35  This case involved the custody arrangements 
for two boys aged 15 (‘A’) and 10 (‘L’).  The presiding Judge, McCall J ordered that the 
children be separately represented and that the Legal Aid Commission appoint the children’s 
																																								 																				
31 Family Law Bill 1974 (Cth) repealing MCA and inserting FLA s 64(1)(b). 
32 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Final Report of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs regarding the Family Law Bill 1974 (1974).  
33 Dominica Whelan, ‘The wishes of children and the role of the separate representation’ (1978-1979) 5 Monash University 
Law Review 287, 287. 
34 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149; In the Marriage of Wotherspoon and Cooper (1980) 7 Fam 
LR71; and Nicholson and Crans [1976] F.L.C. 90-025; Hill and Hill (unreported) No. 3806/76 Family Court of Western 
Australia, 3 as cited in Whelan, above n 33, 290. 
35 Originally these proceedings were filed pursuant to the provisions of the MCA but the proceedings for custody of the 
children were heard pursuant to the newly enacted FLA s 9(4). 
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legal representative.  This case was also significant in that this was the first case of a court 
appointed separate representative to represent the interests of the child.  
 
In this case, the Judge gave broad directions to the legal representative of the children 
(‘LRC’) about how the children’s wishes should be presented to the court.36  The Judge’s 
directions to the LRC included that the wishes of the child would be ascertained by 
interviews; the LRC could decide what witnesses to call and the LRC could assist the court at 
the hearing in the cross examination of witnesses.  The LRC was also to advance future 
options for the access and custody of the children.  It was also at the LRC’s discretion to seek 
leave to call the children as witnesses in the proceedings.  Court counselling facilities were 
also an option for the LRC to consider for the parties and the children.37 
 
The LRC did not call the children as witnesses in this case, but filed an affidavit on behalf of 
the 15-year-old child.  McCall J was also asked to speak to the children in chambers but 
declined to take that option.  McCall J said that Judges should not speak to children unless in 
exceptional circumstances and ‘in any event, in this case the children were separately 
represented.’38 
 
The father at the hearing wanted to present in evidence a letter signed by the children 
outlining their wishes as he believed the children’s wishes were not appropriately addressed 
in the affidavit presented by the LRC.  The mother stated that the letter signed by the children 
and presented by the father was written under coercion and in the presence of the father and 
the children’s wishes expressed in that letter should not be given any weight.  McCall J ruled 
against the admissibility of the letter and commented that the communication should have 
gone through the LRC.39 
 
This case illustrated the role of the LRC and the expectation that the LRC was to present to 
the court all matters which had a bearing on the best interests of the child, including advising 
the court of the child’s wishes.  The LRC did not provide submissions regarding special 
																																								 																				
36 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149, 154. 
37 Ibid 154-5. 
38 Ibid 155-6. 
39 Ibid 155-6. 
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circumstances existing40 that warranted that the court disregard the 15-year-old child’s 
wishes.  McCall J found ‘accordingly, in my view, the effect of s. 64(1)(b) is to require me to 
grant the custody of the boy A to the mother.’41   
 
The judgement does not provide a discussion by McCall J on how he determined the weight 
given or the factors or circumstances considered to accept the child’s wishes other than an 
acceptance of the LRC submissions and the affidavit of the 15-year-old as being an accurate 
reflection of the child’s wishes.  His Honour stated that there were no special circumstances 
in the case to warrant not following the 15-year-old’s wishes.42  McCall J’s acceptance of the 
15-year-old’s wishes, without further information provided in the judgement, could, as 
Whelan suggested be an acknowledgement of the legislature’s acceptance that 14 years is 
chronologically significant in terms of a child’s ability to make a choice.’43  
 
In relation to the wishes of the 10-year-old child, the judgement does not provide details of 
how the wishes were accepted or the weight given to them other than that the evidence ‘was 
that he was a boy who required the comfort and compassionate treatment’ of his mother and 
that ‘the evidence clearly indicated that this was a case in which the children should not be 
separated … the boys were close friends … and [the 10-year-old] obtained a good deal of 
comfort and protection from his older brother.’44  McCall J also reiterated that the court must 
consider a child's wish in the context of what was in the child's best interests in all 
circumstances.   
 
In 1980, the Commonwealth Government commissioned a Report of the Parliamentary Joint 
Select Committee on the Family Law Act.45  One of the matters that the Committee 
considered was the provision defining the child’s wish being determinative by the 
chronological age of the child: 
 
																																								 																				
40 As required by the legislation at that time to disregard a child’s wish if the child was over 14 years old, FLA s 64(1)(b). 
41 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149, 157. 
42 Ibid 157. 
43 Whelan, above n 33, 287. 
44 In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149, 157. 
45 Commonwealth, Family Law in Australia: Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Family Law Act, Volumes 1 and 2, 
Parl Paper No 150 (1980) 52-4. 
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The law determines that in the case of a child aged 14 and above it is the child’s wishes and not the 
court’s concept of what the welfare of the children requires, which is the determinative factor in the 
first instance.  To overcome this the court must find “special circumstances” which will require more 
than a finding that in the court’s opinion one parent is a better custodian than the other.  It must be 
show that the parent whom the child has chosen is positively unfit or incapable of exercising custody 
over the child or that the child’s will has been overborne.  As regards children under the age of 14, the 
courts must determine for itself what the welfare of the child requires having regard to the child’s own 
wishes if it considers that the child is capable of forming a reasonable and independent view on the 
matter.46 
 
A 1980 authoritative decision concerning children’s wishes pursuant to the age specific 
provisions was In the Marriage of Wotherspoon and Cooper (1980) 7 Fam LR 71 
(‘Wotherspoon’).  Wotherspoon was one of the first post FLA enactment cases that 
highlighted that the courts should consider the maturity of the child and not just the age of the 
child. 
 
The facts of Wotherspoon47 involved the custody arrangements of a 12-year-old boy ‘S’48 
who expressed a wish to live with his father.49  The mother had custody of the boy and the 
father had access. ‘S’ was separately represented by a LRC and told the LRC his wishes. ‘S’ 
told the family report writer too that he wished to live with the father.  Woods SJ on hearing 
the evidence of the father and mother found the competing interests to be evenly balanced 
and that ‘the element which … is critical … is the question of the child’s wishes.’50 Wood SJ, 
in his judgement gave details of the LRC’s submissions. His Honour said:  
 
I have been at pains to set out counsel’s submissions in some detail because they are such a departure 
from the norm in these cases.  Usually, counsel representing children argue in favour of the child’s 
wishes51 … [w]hat the court has to consider is the welfare, rather than the mere desires of the child.52 
Counsel’s submission were that the child’s wishes were not in the child’s best interests and that ‘S is 
not thirteen and that he is no wiser than his years allow – that there is a lot at stake in a change in his 
custody and more in it than he appreciates’.53   
																																								 																				
46 Ibid 52-3. 
47 In the Marriage of Wotherspoon and Cooper (1980) 7 Fam LR 71 ('Wotherspoon') 
48 The child ‘S’ turned 13 years old at the time of the judgement. 
49 There were two children, the younger child A did not wish to have access to his father. The case considered the wishes of 
the 12-year-old boy S.  The Court gave liberty to the parties to raise the question of access of the child A with the father. 
50 Wotherspoon (1980) 7 Fam LR71, 76. 
51 Ibid 79. 
52 Ibid 78. 
53 Ibid 78-9. 
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Wood SJ ordered that the child S remain living with the mother and ‘in the event that S 
sustains his wish to be with his father after his fourteenth birthday, the parents would be well 
advised to prepare for the fact that there may ultimately be a change in his custodial 
placement.’54  His Honour was also not without criticism of the age specific wish provision 
saying: 
 
As a matter of law, if a court is to give effect to the wishes of a child … it must be satisfied that those 
wishes are soundly based and founded upon considerations as well thought through as the ability and 
state of maturity of the child will allow … I have from the outset been unable to understand why the 
age of fourteen has been selected by the legislature as the age at which a child can in effect make his 
own decision as to future placement, subject only to this decision being overridden if special 
circumstances exists.  The common law enables a judge to give effect to the wishes of a child if the 
strength of those wishes measures up to the criteria which I have stated.55 
 
The age-specific wish provision was further criticised in the 1980 Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Family Law Act.56  However the 
alternatives to recognising the maturity and reasoning abilities of the child instead of their age 
remained as part of the law until the FLA was amended in 1983. 
 
3.2.2 A child's wishes are considered according to their capacity and maturity  
 
The earlier cases provide insight into how the Judges navigated the initial provisions of the 
FLA. The age specific provision was amended by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983 
(Cth)57 (‘FLAA’).  The FLAA omitted the original provision and replaced it with a new 
provision in the FLA: 
 
The court shall consider any wishes expressed by the child in relation to the custody … or access to, 
the child, or in relation to any other matter relevant to the proceedings, and shall give those wishes such 
weight as the court considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.58 
																																								 																				
54 Ibid 79. 
55 Ibid 76. 
56 Commonwealth, Family Law in Australia: Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Family Law Act, Volumes 1 and 2, 
Parl Paper No 150 (1980) 52-3. 
57 FLA as amended by Family Law Amendment Act 1983 s 29 ('FLAA'). Section 64 of the FLA was amended by omitting s 
64(1)(b) and substituting it with a new section omitting the age reference to ascertaining a child’s wish. 
58 FLA s 64(1)(b). 
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Although the law still confirmed that a child could express a wish if they wanted to, the 
weight given to those wishes and the appropriateness of it was not defined or restricted by 
age and the meaning of wish was not defined.  The FLA as amended by the FLAA also 
provided that the ‘court must regard the welfare of the child as the paramount 
consideration.’59  
 
In 1980 Woods SJ, in Wotherspoon60 flagged that the child’s opinions could be considered 
based on their maturity and reasoning abilities.  In 1985 the English case Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,61 cited a method to analyse the weight to be 
given to a child's wish according to the competence of the child to make a decision for 
themselves.  It found that a child's opinion can be valued based on their ability to reason, their 
ability to make sound judgements, their maturity and their capacity to understand the issues.  
This became known as the 'Gillick competence' test.  In the Australian family law context 
Marion's Case,62 a 1992 decision, employed the Gillick competence test.  Deane J in his 
judgement63 referred to the legal capacity as a consideration in placing weight on the child 
wishes: 
 
 The ...extent of the legal capacity of a young person to make decisions for herself or himself is not 
 susceptible of precise abstract definition. Pending the attainment of full adulthood, legal capacity varies 
 according to the gravity of the particular matter and the maturity and understanding of the particular 
 young person.64 
 
Recognition of the Gillick competence test was enshrined in the 1989 Convention of the 
Rights of the Child65 (‘CROC’).  The articles of CROC provided recognition of the child’s 
right to be heard in legal matters that affect them and a platform for the recognition of 
children’s right with the weight determinate on the child's age, capacity and maturity.  Article 
12 of CROC provides:  
  
																																								 																				
59 Ibid s 64(1)(a). 
60 Wotherspoon (1980) 7 Fam LR71, 76. 
61 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 ('Gillick'). 
62 Marion’s case; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 
('Marion's case'). 
63 Marion's case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 288-308 (Deane J). 
64 Ibid 293. 
65 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991 ('CROC'). 
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1. State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
 
2. For this purpose the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.66 
 
Australia became a signatory to this convention and the FLA67 recognised that the court must 
consider a child’s wish however the weight is according to Gillick competence test principles 
as applied now in Marion's Case.68  This caveat set the parameters for decision makers and 
the legislation stated that it must consider the welfare of the child,69 thus contextualising the 
wishes of the child according to the adult construct of what is best for them.  
 
In Marriage of Doyle70a 1993 decision, the court considered the child's wishes according to 
the Gillick principles.  Doyle was a custody dispute which involved two boys aged 9 and 13 
years old.  The mother consented to the eldest child living with the father, but wanted custody 
of the youngest child.  The mother alleged that the homosexual lifestyle of the father would 
be detrimental to the youngest child and place that child in moral danger.  The children were 
consulted regarding their wishes by a family report writer and both children expressed a wish 
to live with the father.  Hannon J in his decision said: 
 
If the Court is satisfied that the wishes expressed by the child are soundly based and founded upon 
proper considerations as well as thought through as the ability and state of maturity of the child will 
allow, it is appropriate to have regard to those wishes and to give such weight to them as may be proper 
in the circumstances.71 
 
Another authoritative child wishes case was In the Marriage of Harrison and Woollard 
(1995) 18 Fam LR 78872 ('Harrison and Woollard').  The provisions of the FLA at the time of 
Harrison and Woollard73 provided that the court must regard the welfare of the child as the 
																																								 																				
66 Ibid art 12. 
67 Refer to discussion regarding the 1995 amendments to the FLA at 3.2.3. 
68 Marion's case (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
69 As it was in the FLA s 64(1)(a). 
70 In Marriage of Doyle (1993) 106 FLR. 
71 Ibid 125. 
72 Harrison and Woollard is also cited as H v W (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
73 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
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paramount consideration74 and shall consider any wishes expressed by the child and give 
appropriate weight as determined by the court.75  This case followed Doyle76 by applying the 
same principles in that if the wishes are soundly based then proper consideration should be 
had of those wishes.77 
 
Harrison and Woollard78 concerned an appeal against the orders made by Murray J regarding 
the custody arrangements of two children; S aged 8 and D aged 7.  The case outlined the 
volatility of the relationship between the mother and father and a history of litigation 
regarding the custodial/access arrangements for the children.  Sexual abuse and physical 
violence were alleged to be perpetrated by the mother’s defacto against the children.  At trial, 
two family reports had been prepared where the children and parents were interviewed and 
the children expressed a wish to live with the father.  The children were separately 
represented and at trial the LRC supported that the father was the preferred custodian.  The 
children expressed a wish to live with the father. Murray J ordered custody to the mother.  
The father appealed and the matter was presided over by Justices Fogarty, Baker and Kay. 
Justices Kay and Fogarty provided their own judgement and disagreed with the extent by 
which Baker J referred to psychological or academic studies but nonetheless did agree with 
the discussion on the importance of the consideration of children’s wishes.  Fogarty and Kay 
JJ in their joint decision79 stated: 
 
The wishes of the children are important and proper and realistic weight should be attached to any 
wishes expressed by children ... the courts will attach varying degrees of weight to a child’s stated 
wishes depending upon, amongst other factors, the strength and duration of their wishes, their basis and 
the maturity of the child, including the degree of appreciation by the child of the factors involved in the 
issue before the court and their longer term implications.  Ultimately the overall welfare of the child is 
the determinant. 
 
Baker J discussed the various methods by which children’s wishes could be presented to the 
court:80 through family reports, an expert assessment, evidence of witnesses, a child speaking 
																																								 																				
74 FLA s 64(1)(a). 
75 Ibid s 64(1)(b). 
76 In Marriage of Doyle (1993) 106 FLR. 
77 Gillick [1986] 1 AC 113 where the competence of children to make decisions is according to their maturity and have a 
sufficient understanding of the matters. 
78 Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
79 Ibid 797.  
80 Ibid 819. 
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to LRC or Judges talking to children in chambers.  Baker J said that referring to the literature 
provided by ‘psychiatrists, psychologists, welfare officers, counsellors and judicial officers 
concerned with custody and access disputes involving children [help] understand the 
significance of children's wishes and their proper evaluation.’81  Baker J at 825 found:  
 
A child’s wishes must not only be considered, but must be shown to have been considered, in the 
reasons for judgement of the trial judge. Further if the trial judge decides to reject the wishes of a child, 
then clear and cogent reasons for such a rejection must be given ... The wishes of children should not 
be discounted simply because they are expressed by children. The weight to be given to the wishes of a 
child depends upon the individual child and an assessment of the validity of the wishes must be made 
by the trial judge in each individual case. Such an exercise will require a consideration of both the 
child’s level of maturity and understanding.82   
 
This case demonstrated the continued prevailing view that children can express their wish, 
considered through the prism of their maturity, but they need to be protected and the welfare 
principle expressed in the legislation was the paramount consideration.  
 
Ultimately the overall welfare of the child is the determinant. That is so because the legislation says so 
and also because long before specific legislation the practice of the court in its parens patriae 
jurisdiction established that view … recent social forces have indicated that more realistic weight 
should be attached to the wishes of the children … but there is nothing new or surprising; … the 
Family Law Act is fundamentally about the application of its general provisions in the light of 
changing social values.83   
 
Harrison and Woollard’s84 guidance about how a child has a say in matters which affect 
them is still cited as authority in post-2006 cases.  
 
3.2.3 Children's wishes are not defined but are considered in the context of their 
best interests  
 
The next significant overhaul of custody laws in Australia was through the enactment of the 
Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) (‘FLRA’) which amended the FLA.  The reforms 
																																								 																				
81 Ibid 819. 
82 Ibid 825. 
83 Ibid 800 (Fogarty and Kay JJ). 
84 Ibid. 
88	
	
introduced recognition of parental responsibility regardless of marital status.85  The FLRA 
repealed the parenting provisions of Part VII of the FLA replacing it with a new Part VII.  In 
Part VII, section 60B provided the objects and principles.  The word ‘welfare’ was replaced 
with the term ‘best interests’ and the courts had to consider the best interests of the child86 
guided by factors that determine the ‘best interests’.87  The first factor mentioned was:  
 
Any wishes expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of 
understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s wishes.88 
 
The provision of the FLA still did not define the meaning of the term wish, however this 
provision differed to the early provision in that it listed factors such as the child’s mental 
capacity or a level of maturity (the Gillick competent principles).  However, the weight given 
to those wishes was still a discretionary factor for Judges considering the case.  The 
amendments also described that wishes must be considered by the Judges in their 
deliberations and the courts can inform itself of those wishes by a report or any other means it 
sees necessary to ascertain those wishes.89  Children were not required to express a wish if 
they did not want to do so.90  
 
The FLRA amendments recognised a commitment to the principles of the rights of the child 
and parental responsibility.  ‘Custody’ and ‘access’ terms were replaced with ‘residence’ and 
‘contact’ and best interest factors were considered the paramount consideration.  The aim of 
the FLRA reforms was to shift the notion of children as property rights to parental 
responsibility.  The changes were designed to take away the concept of winners and losers in 
parenting disputes.  The changes recognised Gillick competence test principles and best 
interest factors and the FLRA reforms recognised Australia’s commitment to the principles in 
the CROC.91  A child's wishes remained as a factor to be taken into account when 
determining best interests. Justice Chisholm (as he was then) stated that the 1995 FLRA 
amendments reflected article 12(1) of the CROC in sections 68F and 68H of the FLA.  
																																								 																				
85 FLA s 61C as amended by Family Law Reform Act 1995 s 31 ('FLRA'). 
86 Ibid s 68F(1). 
87 Ibid s 68F(2). 
88 Ibid s 68F(2)(a). 
89 Ibid ss 68G (1)-(2). 
90 Ibid s 68H. 
91 Eithne Mills (3rd ed), Family Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2008), 109-110; See also B and B, Re; Family Law 
Reform Act 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676. 
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Chisholm cautioned though that the FLA 'does not give it as much emphasis as if it had been 
included in the sections articulating principles.’92  Chisholm concluded:93 
 
In terms of principles ... the legislation provides, in summary, that the children’s best interests are 
paramount, and that their wishes, if freely given, should be taken into account in litigation. The 
legislation provides mechanisms for discovering their wishes. But is says nothing else about involving 
them; [and] no statement of principle that implements Article 12(2) of the Convention.  
 
The best interest principles stated in the 1995 FLRA amendments were considered open to 
interpretation94 and there was no clear consensus of what was best for children if societal 
values95 were the benchmark.  In the context of children's wishes, Parkinson and Cashmore 
argued that in listening to children ‘the way forward is to abandon the idea that children’s 
best interests can be served by protection from participation and to find ways of protecting 
them in participation.’96  Justice Brennan in Marion’s case97 was also at pains to consider the 
exercise of discretionary power in analysing a best interest approach.98  In his judgment, His 
Honour quoted Professor Ian Kennedy,99 to articulate this problem:  
 
To decide any case by reference to the formula of the best interests of the child must be suspect … it is 
a somewhat crude conclusion of social policy... The best interests approach of family law allows the 
courts to atomise the law, to claim that each case depends on its own facts.  The court can then respond 
intuitively to each case while seeking to legitimate its conclusion by asserting that it is derived from the 
general principle contained in the best interests formula.  In fact, of course, there is no general principle 
other than the empty rhetoric of best interests; or rather, there is some principle (or principles) but the 
court is not telling.  Obviously the court must be following some principles, otherwise a toss of a coin 
could decide cases.  But these principles, which serve as pointers to what amounts to the best interests, 
are not articulated by the court. Only the conclusion is set out.  The opportunity for reasoned analysis 
and scrutiny is lost. 
 
																																								 																				
92 Justice Richard Chisholm FCOA, ‘Children’s participation in litigation’. (Paper presented at the Third National Family 
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93 Richard Chisholm, ‘Children’s Participation in Family Court Litigation’ (Paper presented at the International Society of 
Family Law, 10th World Conference, Brisbane, 9-13 July 2000) 6-7. 
94 Moira Rayner ‘Children’s Voices, Adults Choices: Children’s Rights to Legal Representation’ (1992) 33 Family Matters 
4-10.  
95 R H Mnookin 'Child custody adjudication: Judicial function in the face of indeterminacy’ (1975) 39 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 226, 260.  
96 Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child, above n 4, 219. 
97 Marion's Case (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
98 Ibid 270-271. 
99 Ibid 271. See especially Professor Ian Kennedy 'Patients, doctors and human rights', in Blackburn and Taylor (eds), 
Human Rights for the 1990s, (1991) 90-1. 
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In contrast, others have argued that the best interest factors can provide a basis for 
considering the child's needs over the needs of other parties in the litigation and that it can 
meet the community standards of that time.100  This best interest considerations, despite the 
identified flaws, must be at least an outcome that considers the needs of children.  However, 
how are the child’s wishes heard if the basis upon which they are considered is against a list 
of factors deemed as the determinants of best interests and yet the best interests are also to be 
the paramount consideration?  The first best interest factor mentioned in the FLRA 
amendments was the wishes of the child.  The legislation did not provide details on the order 
or the priority of the factors to be considered.  In determining how wishes are considered, the 
question was is there a continuum upon which the wishes are weighted, considering the 
judge's discretion and the Gillick competence factors?  Deborah Fry a counsellor of the 
Family Court of Australia explained: 
 
Those advocating an extreme empowerment position would promote the notion that children should not 
be patronised or considered as inferior to adults in their ability to consider information and make 
informed and appropriate decisions about their own welfare.  Those at the protection end would take 
the position that children ought not be burdened by having to make decisions about their lives when 
they are not emotionally or psychologically mature enough especially when, if they are being put in a 
position to do so. 101 
 
Fry described how a child’s wish could be considered and interpreted based on the view point 
of the decision maker or practitioner: 
 
A protectionist confronted with a child (especially pre-teen child, say) expressing a strong felt 
preference in a Family Court dispute, might be inclined to feel a little suspicious and hyper-sensitive to 
the possibilities of the child having been coerced or pressured by an over-zealous parent to “take a 
side”. A “kiddie Libber” counsellor or judge might give significantly different weight from a “child 
saver” to what a particular child has to say about his or her predicament.102 
 
																																								 																				
100 Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority 
for Children in the Legal Process. Report no 84 (1997) [16.9] ('Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the legal Process') 
(This section referred to children’s involvement in family law proceedings). 
101 Deborah Fry, ‘Children and the Family Court: what we make of what they say.’ (Paper presented at the Third National 
Conference, Family Court of Australia Paper and Reports, Litigation: Children and parents, Melbourne, 24 October 1998), 2. 
102 Ibid. 
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Fry also stated that the way decisions are made regarding how to assess a child’s wishes are 
‘inextricably mixed with our professional knowledge bases and our personal values and 
morals, our histories and our personalities.’103   
 
The courts first considered the 1995 best interest principles in the case In B and B: Family 
Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676.  The court found that although the terminology 
'welfare' was changed to 'best interest' so as to be more child focused and less paternalistic, 
the change in terminology was found, in practice to be of no significance.104 
 
The next authoritative case regarding a child’s wish post 1995 reform was the decision of R 
and R: Children’s wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 ('R and R: Children's wishes').105  This case 
concerned an international relocation case involving a 12.5-year-old (‘M’) and 10-year-old 
(‘A’) (these were the ages of the children at the time of the trial).  A family report was 
obtained at trial and in the interviews with the report writer, both children expressed a wish to 
live with the father.  The father argued that the wishes of the children should prevail.  The 
trial Judge, although considering the children’s wishes, found on balance that the best 
interests of the children favoured living with their mother and having contact with their 
father.  The matter was heard on appeal to the Full Court of the Family Court with Nicholson 
CJ, Finn and Guest JJ presiding.  In a joint judgement, the Full Court gave careful 
consideration to the children’s wishes and found that 'when validly held wishes are departed 
from by the trial judge, it is apparent that good reason should be shown for doing'.106  Their 
Honours said: 
 
There are many factors that go to the weight that should be given to the wishes of children and these 
will vary from case to case and it is undesirable and indeed impossible to catalogue and confine them 
… Ultimately, it is a process of intuitive synthesis on the part of any trial Judge weighing up all the 
evidence relevant to the wishes of the children and applying them in a common-sense way as one of the 
factors in the overall assessment of the children’s best interests.107 
 
																																								 																				
103 Ibid 3. 
104 B and B, Re: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676, 730. 
105 This case is also cited as R and R (2000) 25 Fam LR 712; and R and R: Children's Wishes [2000] FamCA 43 (4 February 
2000). 
106 R and R: Children's wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712, 723 [44]. 
107 Ibid 724 [54]. 
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Their Honours also provided commentary on how a family report writer could assist the court 
by asking further questions to aid in the interpretation of the child’s wishes and the weight to 
be attached to those wishes.108  Their Honours described the role of the CR in assisting the 
court in arranging ‘for evidence to be before the court as to how the child would feel if the 
court did not reach a conclusion which accorded with the child’s wishes.’109  This case 
applied Harrison and Woollard.110   
 
Following R and R: Children’s wishes111 was Re G (children’s schooling) (2000) Fam LR 
143 ('Re G').  The matter involved arguments regarding a change of school for the children.  
The family reporter writer ascertained the child’s wishes and found that although the children 
expressed an ambivalence for not wanting to start at a new school, it could be considered as 
normal for a child to think this way.  The court considered the children’s wishes however 
their wishes were not the determinate factor: 
 
Proper regard must be had to the expressed wishes of the children and that reasons for decision must 
reflect their significance.  However there is no presumption that decisions should accord with 
expressed wishes and it is not to be expected that lengthy reasons for departing from expressed wishes 
is the equivalent to showing “good reason” for doing so.112  
 
Re G113 followed the approach of the Full Court in R and R: Children’s Wishes.114  These 
decisions reflect that children’s wishes are considered but are weighed against other factors.  
Whether it is called welfare principles or best interests, these principles were the determining 
factor in consideration of the orders. 
 
Another 1995 reform authoritative child wishes case is In the Marriage of R (Children’s 
Wishes) (2002) 29 Fam LR 230.115  This was an appeal against orders for contact of a 10-
year-old child with their father.  The original trial was heard over 11 days and family reports 
were prepared by a psychologist and later a court counsellor.  The child had been treated by 
																																								 																				
108 Ibid 725 [59]-[61]. 
109 Ibid 725 [62]. 
110 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
111 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
112 Nicholson CJ, Kay and Brown JJ in the Family Court of Australia decision: Re G (children’s schooling) (2000) Fam LR 
143, 161. 
113 Ibid. 
114 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
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her own psychiatrist and doctor and those experts gave evidence at the trial.  A CR was 
appointed.  The child ‘C’ expressed a wish that she did not want to have contact with the 
father.  It is not clear from the judgement how the CR ascertained those wishes116 but the CR 
was of the view that the child C should have contact with the father.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, Guest J ordered that the child have contact with the father.  His Honour considered the 
wishes of the child however was not satisfied that the child’s wishes were reached in a mature 
and independently considered way and it was in the child’s best interest to have a relationship 
with the father.  The mother appealed the orders saying that, inter alia, the Judge did not give 
sufficient weight to the wishes of the child and the weight to the evidence of the experts.  The 
Full Court, dismissing the appeal cited the authorities referred to by Guest J (Harrison and 
Woollard117 and R and R: Children’s Wishes118) and found the principles set out in those 
decisions applied.  Nicholson CJ, Holden and Monteith JJ at 244119 said: 
 
The principle is clear that a court must take children’s wishes into account, but is not bound by them.  
In this case, his Honour found that the wishes expressed by the child should be given less weight that 
would normally be the case having regard to all of the evidence and particularly the attitude of the 
mother to contact. 
 
The authoritative decisions of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: 
Children’s Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 provided guidance about what a wish was to mean 
in the absence of a definition provided in the FLA. In these cases the courts determined that 
the terminology of a wish permits a child (if they want to and if they are Gillick competent) 
to have a choice about post separation arrangements - that is, which parent she or he wishes 
to live with - so long as it is in their best interests. 
 
Following the 1995 reform provisions, competing jurisprudential paradigms in the practice of 
family law abounded which fostered division between participants in family law disputes.  
There were differences between feminist groups, men's rights groups and judicial 
determinations reflected natural law inclinations that parents ought to morally act in 
accordance with what was in the child's best interest.  Further government inquiries into the 
family law system continued into the early 21st century. 
																																								 																				
116 That is through speaking to the children direct or just through the family report. 
117 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
118 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
119 In the Marriage of R (Children’s Wishes) (2002) 29 Fam LR 230, 244 [129]. 
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3.2.4 Government inquiries lead to the 2006 FLA amendments 
 
The next significant investigation post the 1995 FLA reforms was the Government inquiry 
conducted by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community 
Affairs.  The report, Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody 
arrangements in the event of family separation120 (also known as the 'Hull Report'), was 
delivered on 29 December 2003.  The findings of the Hull Report provided inter alia, 
explanations of the key family law issues under scrutiny, the best interest of the child factors 
and child inclusive practices. 
 
The Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Report on the Exposure Draft on the Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (2005) (‘REDFLA’)121 summarised the Committee’s 
response (following the Hull Report).  REDFLA recommended inter alia that the FLA be 
amended and include a parental responsibility presumption, considerations of time sharing 
arrangements and a revised list of best interest factors.  The Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility Bill) 2005 (Cth) ('FLASPR Bill') was introduced to parliament as a 
result of the Hull Report and REDFLA and the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) ('FLASPRA') was assented to on 22 May 2006. 
 
The government’s reasoning for the changes to the FLA was to ‘represent a generational 
change in family law and … to bring about a cultural shift in how family separation is 
managed...'.122  However, others contended that the change related to perceptions of how 
parenting matters were decided and that focus groups were driving the amendments.  Smart 
and Neale123 argued that the feminist perspective that had underpinned family law parenting 
decisions in the courts traditionally reflected the role of the mother in nurturing the child and 
																																								 																				
120 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Every picture 
tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation (2003). ('Every picture 
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Hull report).	
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the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (2005). 
122 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), General Outline, 
1. 
123 C Smart and B Neale, Family Fragments? in Patrick Parkinson and Juliet Behrens, Australian Family Law in Context 
Cases and Materials, (Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2004) 169.  
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therefore afforded her the main parental responsibility of the child.  The amendments 
attempted to change the traditional parenting roles by requiring that equal shared parental 
responsibility generally be the starting point in ‘custody’ disputes.  This reflected a rights-
based focus.  Parkinson and Behrens124 stated that some groups believed the amendments 
would change the way the courts decided custody and balance the perceived bias against men 
in family court decisions.  However, feminists considered the amendments as ‘[a] systematic 
discrimination against women in litigation and mediation ... and [an] inequitable distribution 
of rights and responsibilities following divorce’.125  Dewar argued that the change was a shift 
from a ‘utility or needs model of family law towards a rights model ... associated with greater 
reliance on rules, or at least norms.’126  
 
Whether feminist groups or men’s rights groups considered the changes to the FLA were 
needed to overcome a perceived bias, or whether they corrected an imbalance in favour of a 
particular parent, the amendments provided that children have a right to spend time with 
people that are significant to them and that they be protected from harm and abuse.  The 
rights based focus was evident by the inclusion in the FLA of the presumption of equal shared 
parental responsibility,127 the child's rights to have equal time or substantial and significant  
time with their parents128 and the child's right to a meaningful relationship with both 
parents.129  If the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility130applied then the 
courts were required to consider the time arrangements detailed in the new section FLA 
65DAA.  This provision provided that the courts must consider that a child spend equal time 
with each parent; so long as it was reasonably practicable and in the best interests of the 
child.  If equal time was not in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable then the 
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court would need to consider if the child was to spend substantial and significant time with 
each parent.  The legislation particularized substantial and significant time (FLA section 
65DAA(3)) and reasonable practicality (FLA section 65DAA(5)).  The High Court years later 
in MRR v GR131 also discussed the scope of reasonable practicality.  
 
Public debate abounded concerning whether the rights of the child were best served by a 
presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and court considerations of equal time or 
substantial and significant time.  Included in this debate was how a child's right to have a 
meaningful relationship with both parents132 was interpreted.  The FLASPRA Explanatory 
Memorandum provided that the amendments to the Part VII objects 'recognises the 
importance of ensuring that children are given the opportunity for their parents to have a 
meaningful involvement in their lives to the maximum extent possible, consistent with their 
best interests', however it did not define the term 'meaningful relationship'.133  The term has 
been judicially considered since the amendments and deliberated by social scientist and  
academics.134  Justice Brown in Mazorski and Albright135 emphasised that the term  
'meaningful relationship' is a relationship 'which is important, significant and valuable to the 
child'.136 
 
Of most significance to FLASPR Bill amendments was the ‘best interest of the child factors’ 
where there was a ‘greater prominence ... to a large range of issues’.137  The paramountcy 
principle138 highlighted the best interest of the child provisions so as to ‘increase the visibility 
and emphasis on this important provision’.139  In deciding what was best for children, 
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FLASPRA deleted the 1995 ‘best interests’ provisions140 replacing them with a 2 tiered list of 
best interest factors,141 and advised that a child’s views can be expressed through an 
Independent Children's Lawyer,142or by any means a court thinks appropriate or through a 
report.143  The family report was, according to the authors of the report Seen and heard: 
priority for children in the legal process (ALRC Report 84), an important method of 
informing the court of the child's wishes144 and was prepared in 60% of the parental matters 
contested.145  Further it was 'one of the primary and purest ways in which a child may be 
heard ... and their wishes ascertained without the need for the child to give direct evidence'.146  
Post-2006 FLA the family report remains the primary way that the views of the child are 
expressed to the court.147 
 
FLASPRA amendments148 also provided a new division which detailed provisions by which 
Judges were given a broader scope to conduct the child-related proceedings.  The Division 
12A (as it became known), gave Judges greater power in determining how to manage and 
control the proceedings;149 a domain usually reserved for the advocates in the proceedings.  
Judges could also conduct the hearing with less formality than usual proceedings.150  The 
Division 12A principles151 did not however provide in the legislation a direction to Judges 
about how they considered the child’s views but rather gave Judges an opportunity to 
undertake an active inquisitorial exploration to determine what was best for children.   
Other rights based approaches intended by parliament to give greater emphasis to the rights 
of the child, was the removal of the terms ‘custody/access’ and ‘residence/contact’ and 
replacing them with who the child ‘lives with’ and ‘spends time with and communicates  
with’.152   
																																								 																				
140 Former best interest of the child provisions ss 68F, 68G and 68H as it was in the FLA pre 2006. 
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152 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, A new family 
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Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family 
separation (2005) 6-7. ('A new family law system Government Response to Every picture tells a story'). This 
98	
	
 
FLASPRA proposed clearer directions on the role of family law professionals such as the 
Independent Children's Lawyer153 and reiterated the focus on deciding parenting disputes was 
on determining the best interest of the child as the paramount consideration.  
 
FLASPRA said child focused outcomes could be assisted by requiring professionals such as 
lawyers to advise clients on the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, equal 
time or substantial and significant time and the development of a parenting plan when giving 
legal advice.154 
 
The FLASPRA amendments to the FLA took effect on 1 July 2006. 
 
3.3 The FLA post-2006 Part VII Children amendments replacing a wish with a 
view  
3.3.1 Part VII Children: Objects and Principles  
 
The parenting provisions in the 2006 FLA were detailed in Part VII Children (sections 60A to 
70Q).  This Part gives the statutory framework upon which the Courts exercise their powers.  
In particular, section 60A outlines the direction on what the division contains.155  Section 60B 
details the objects and principles of Part VII and section 60CA provides that the best interest 
of the child is the paramount consideration when making a parenting order.  Section 60CC 
details the two-tiered best interest of the child factors.  The Full Court of the Family Court 
has directed that the 'objects and principles contained in s60B provide the context in which 
the factors in s60CC are to be examined, weighted and applied'.156  
 
The objects detailed in section 60B FLA are outlined firstly and the principles behind those 
objects are then provided in the provision.  The revised section 60B provision157guides 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
recommendation was in line with the recommendation 4 of FCAC which wanted the attention to be on parenting time not 
parenting orders.	
153 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) General Outline, 
Schedule 5, 2. 
154 A new family law system Government Response to Every picture tells a story, above n 152, 7. 
155 FLA s 60A(a). 
156 Goode v Goode (2006) FLC 93-286, 10 (Bryant CJ, Finn and Boland JJ). 
157 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 8 - Section 60B. 
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Judges and practitioners on navigating parenting matters.  It has produced a delineated focus 
and a 'greater emphasis to those [best] interests when interpreting other [FLA] provisions'.158  
The section 60B objects focus on the role of the parent and their relationship with the child.  
It considers developmental needs and the welfare of the child.  The principles focus on proper 
parenting and their inherent responsibilities and the child's rights in the relationship. In 
outlining the 'parenting focused' objects, section 60B(1) FLA provides that the courts must 
ensure that the best interests of the child are met by the child having a meaningful 
relationship with both parents,159 free from physical or psychological abuse or family 
violence.160  Further, children should be able to reach their full potential by having proper 
parenting161 and parents should ensure that they meet their parental responsibilities.162  
The section 60B principles163 detail that so long as it is in the best interests of the child, 
children have a right to know their parents regardless of the parent’s marital status,164 and 
they have a right to spend time with their parents and those that are significant to them.165  
Children also have a right to enjoy their culture166 and that maintaining a connection with 
their culture should be provided and encouraged.167  Parents should also try and establish a 
way to make decisions jointly and share the responsibilities of raising the child.168  A further 
amendment to the FLA section 60B in 2012,169 provided that the objects of the FLA were to 
give effect to the CROC.170  The impact of the insertion of section 60(B) into the FLA in 
terms of assisting with statutory interpretation is discussed in part 3.3.5.2. 
 
3.3.2 Approach to Part VII Children: parenting cases 
	
In consideration of the child's best interest, the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2006 FLA 
amendments asserts that the amendments to the section 60B objects are to ‘mirror the section 
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169 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011, Item 13. 
170 FLA s 60B(4). 
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60CC primary considerations’ and were listed in no particular order.171  The FLA 
amendments in section 60CA reminds the courts that the best interests of the child are the 
paramount considerations and provides the list of primary and additional factors to consider 
in section 60CC.  The 2006 FLA amendment inclusion of the presumptive provision in 
section 61DA require that the courts must consider whether the parents will have shared 
parental responsibility (subject to no violence, no abuse and it is in the best interests of the 
child).  Then if this presumption applies, the court must consider the time requirements in 
section 65DAA, whether the child should spend equal time (if reasonably practical and in the 
best interest of the child) or substantial and significant time with the parents.  The 
presumptive and time provisions in sections 61DA and 65DAA mention that the best interests 
of the child are the paramount consideration.  Fitzgerald and Graham172 contend that the 
presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and the time provisions as outlined in the 
FLA173 ‘are framed without any reference to the child’s views about such arrangements’.  
Without a clear reference point to the child’s view in these provisions the approach to 
listening to the child before consideration of a parenting order is left deficient. 
 
3.3.3 The authoritative cases that navigate the Part VII labyrinth 
 
Navigating the 2006 parenting amendments has been referred to as a 'dilemma of labyrinthine 
complexity'.174  There has been a number of authoritative cases decided on the approach to 
the Part VII FLA parenting provisions.175  In 2006, Chief Justice Bryant and Finn and Boland 
JJ in Goode v Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 provided the first comprehensive summary on the 
approach to the new regime for parenting orders.  It included the framework by which the 
court's approach interim hearings; the overturning of the principles of status quo principles 
provided in Cowling;176 and the courts requirement to apply the presumption of equal shared 
parental responsibility in parenting cases subject to the exemptions found in section 61DA 
																																								 																				
171 Replacement Explanatory Memorandum Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) 
Bill 2011, 35-36. 
172 Robyn Fitzgerald and Anne Graham, ‘The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality’ (2011) 
20(2) Griffith Law Review 421-448, 427. 
173 FLA ss 65D(1), 61DA, 65DAA. 
174 Zabini v Zabini [2010] FamCAFC 10 (2 February 2010) [3].  
175 See also an article authored by Judge Reithmuller of the Federal Circuit Court - Grant Reithmuller, 'Deciding parenting 
cases under Part VII - 42 Easy Steps' (2015) 24 (3) Australian Family Lawyer 38-44. 
176 A M Cowling and J H Cowling [1998] FamCA 19 (20 March 1998); also cited as In the Marriage of C (1998) 22 Fam LR 
776 ('Cowling'). 
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FLA.  Goode v Goode177 remains an authoritative case, often cited and followed in 
determining parenting cases. 
 
In the matter of Taylor & Barker [2007] 37 Fam LR 461 the Full Court of the Family Court 
considered the approach taken by a Federal Magistrate in a relocation case.  Bryant CJ and 
Finn J held that the Federal Magistrate did not err in considering the matter of relocation as a 
separate issue as the approach to the applicable provisions in FLA Part VII were accurately 
applied.178  Their Honours said that the legislation gave no direct guidance on the approach to 
Part VII and provided a framework of consideration: 
 
 [G]iven that the concept of the child’s best interests is the determinative factor in the application of 
 so many of the provisions of Pt VII, and given that s 60CC(1) provides that in determining what is in 
 the child’s best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subs (2) (primary 
 consideration) and subs(3) (additional considerations) of that section, it would seem only logical that 
 the court make findings regarding the matters contained in those subsections (so far as they are 
 relevant in a particular case) before attempting to apply any other provision in Pt VII in which the 
 determinative factor is the subject child’s best interests.179 
 
Although this was described as the logical approach to working through the parenting 
provisions, their Honours did say that failure to follow this approach would not be an 
appealable error unless the legislation was not applied and the reasons for the decision was  
not given.180  Taylor & Barker181 has been applied, followed and cited in many decisions of 
the Family Court, Federal Magistrates Court and Federal Circuit Court and remains a decisive 
case for practitioners and Judges in approaching parenting cases.182 
 
In 2011, in the Family Court decision of Heath & Hemming (No 2),183 Justice Kent 
considered the approach to parenting cases and the interconnection of the Part VII FLA 
																																								 																				
177 (2006) FLC 93-286. See also Marvel v Marvel (2010) 43 Fam LR 348, 375 [119] where Faults DCJ, Boland and 
Stevenson JJ in referring to Goode v Goode said: 'We acknowledge that the legislation since the amending Act is complex 
and does not in any significant way differentiate between matters which must be taken into account in a final hearing and 
those at an interim hearing.' 
178 Faults DCJ was the dissenting Judge in this case but did agree with the analysis and application of the law of Bryant CJ 
and Finn J. See Taylor & Barker [2007] 37 Fam LR 461, 487 [119]. 
179 Taylor & Barker [2007] 37 Fam LR 461, 476 [62].  
180 Ibid [63]. 
181 [2007] 37 Fam LR 461. 
182	See cases where Taylor & Baker [2007] 37 Fam LR 461 applied: McDonald v Chapman [2010] FamCA 173 (4 March 
2010); Sealey & Archer [2008] FamCAFC 142 (16 September 2008); Bartlett v Corey [2008] FMCAfam 607 (13 June 
2008); Starr & Duggan [2009] FamCAFC 115 (8 July 2009); Jeffreys v Jeffreys [2007] FMCAfam 1084 (18 December 
2007).	
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parenting provisions.  This case provided a detailed pathway which included the objects and 
principles of Part VII, the best interest of child two-tiered provisions, the effect of family 
violence on parenting orders and the presumptive parenting provisions and time arrangement 
provisions.  This decision has been applied, followed and cited in subsequent cases.184   
 
Justice Kent considered the various provisions of the FLA and the authorities and stated that a 
'logical and practical approach' which 'meets statutory imperatives' in parenting cases 
(including relocation cases) is:185 
 
 (a) Identify the respective proposals of each of the parties and any proposals of the Court substantially 
 different to those of either party that were identified to the parties ... as being proposals the Court might 
 consider ... (AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160 and U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238); 
 
 (b) Informed by the objects expressed in s 60B(1) and the principles underlying those objects in s 
 60B(2) (and where relevant s 60B(3)) undertake consideration of and make findings about each of the 
 “best interests” considerations set out in s 60CC having regard to the respective proposals.  It may be 
 preferable to look at the additional considerations in s 60CC(3) (incorporating subsections (4), (4A) 
 and (6) (where relevant)) before consideration of and findings about the primary considerations in s 
 60CC(2). (Collu & Rinaldo (supra)); 
 
 (c) Consideration of and findings about the s 60CC considerations will result in findings one way or the 
 other about “abuse” and “family violence” within the meaning of those terms as they are defined in s 4 
 of the Act (s 60CC(3)(g),(k) and s 60CC(2)(b)). 
 
 (d) In determining best interests the obligation upon the Court is to consider, weigh and assess the 
 evidence adduced on behalf of the parties ... After consideration of all those matters the Court should 
 indicate to which of those matters greater significance is attached and how all of those matters balance 
 out. (Collu & Rinaldo (supra) at [355] cited with approval in Sigley & Evor (2011) 44 Fam LR 439 at 
 [142]). 
 
 (e) Next, determine in accordance with s 61DA whether or not the presumption of equal shared 
 parental responsibility applies having regard to any findings as to “abuse” or “family violence” (s 
 61DA(2)) and the findings on “best interests” considerations (s 61DA(4)). 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
183 [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011). 
184 See Gratton & West [2013] FamCA 869 (31 July 2013); Geeves v Geeves [2013] FamCA 422 (23 May 2013); Peters v 
Patterson [2013] FamCA 295 (3 May 2013); Fallon v Stirrat (No 2) [2013] FamCA 237 (16 April 2013); Allenby v Allenby 
[2012] FamCA 1083 (21 December 2012) where Heath & Hemming (No 2) [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011) has 
been applied. 
185 Heath & Hemming (No 2) [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011), 87. 
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 (f) If, as a result, the s 61DA presumption is found not to apply, or is rebutted, and it is determined that 
 the parenting order will not provide for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility, s
 65DAA is not triggered and the Court may make parenting orders, consistent with the s 60CC findings, 
 having regard to ss 60CA, 60CC and 60B. 
 
 (g) If the presumption applies, or if it is determined that the parenting order should make provision for 
 the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility, then s 65DAA is triggered and the Court must 
 consider: (a) Whether an order for equal time is in the child’s best interests and is reasonably 
 practicable and, if it is, consider making an order for, or containing provision for, equal time; and if 
 not, (b)Whether an order for substantial and significant time would be in the child’s best interests and 
 is reasonably practicable and, if it is, consider making an order for, or containing provision for, 
 substantial and significant time. 
 
 (h) The questions about “best interests” posed by s 65DAA will be answered by reference to the s 
 60CC findings undertaken in steps (b),(c) and (d) above. 
 
 (i) To answer the question of “reasonably practicable” regard must be had to the factors identified in (a) 
 to (e) of s 65DAA(5) some of which will have also been considered in addressing the s 60CC 
 considerations (as but one example, parental capacity to implement arrangements and to communicate 
 and resolve difficulties).  As the High Court highlights in paragraph 15 of its judgment in MRR v GR 
 (supra) s 65DAA(1) is concerned with the reality of the situation of the parents and the child, not 
 whether it is desirable that there will be equal time (and the same can be said of s 65DAA(2) and 
 substantial and significant time) and s 65DAA(1)(b) (and s 65DAA(2)(d)) requires a practical 
 assessment to be made of the feasibility of equal time or substantial and significant time respectively. 
 
The courts approach to parenting cases as provided in Heath & Hemming (No 2)186 details 
that the best interests of the child factors are informed by the objects and principles of the 
FLA and those factors are to be weighed and assessed to determine the significance of each 
factor.  Children's views are not mentioned in the objects provisions, therefore the child's 
voice may not be of greater significance than the other best interest of the child factors, in 
particular the primary considerations which mirror the objects.  However, there remains 
significant debate about the impact of listing the child's view as an additional consideration.  
This issue is discussed further at 3.3.4.  Further, if the approach to parenting orders are to be 
informed by the objects and principles in section 60B, then the child's views should be 
included in that provision. 
																																								 																				
186 [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011). 
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After the evaluation detailed above is undertaken, the courts consider the presumption 
(section 61DA) and time arrangement provisions (section 65DAA).  Those sections do not 
refer to consideration of a child's view, yet if what a child has to say is to be captured and 
their perceptions expressed, then sections 61DA and 65DAA should have special reference 
made in those sections before the courts consider the orders regarding parenting 
arrangements.187   
3.3.4 The two-tiered best interest of the child factors and consideration of views 
 
Parenting orders are made by the court with reference to what is in the child's best interest.  
The 2006 FLA amendments list the best interest factors as a two-tiered classification of 
primary considerations at section 60CC(2)(a)-(b) and additional considerations at section 
60CC(3)(a)-(m).  The Explanatory Memorandum to these 2006 FLA amendments stated:  
 
The primary factors mirror the first two objects set out in … section 60B.  These objects are elevated to 
primary considerations as they deal with important rights of children and encourage a child focused 
approach.188 
 
The FLA refers to the second tier being ‘additional’ considerations, however in the 
Explanatory Memorandum the word ‘secondary' was used to describe how the provision 
could interact with the primary considerations: 
 
The intention of separating … into two tiers is to elevate the importance of the primary factors and to 
better direct the court’s attention to the revised objects of Part VII … set out in … section 60B.189 
 
The primary consideration factors set out in section 60CC(2)(a) concern the 'benefit of the 
child having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents and section 
60CC(2)(b) requires the 'need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from 
being subjected to, or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence'.  This provision was 
amended by the Family Law Legislation Amendments (Family Violence and other Measures) 
																																								 																				
187 See Fitzgerald and Graham, 'The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality?' above n 172, 427-
428. 
188 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 13, [51]. 
189  Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 13, [48]. 
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Act 2011190 with the insertion of section 60CC2(A).  This provision requires that the court 
give greater weight to the harm provisions of section 60CC(2)(b) than that of the meaningful 
relationship primary consideration provision.  However, the legislative pathway of navigating 
parenting cases has not changed from that which was discussed in Heath v Hemming (No 
2)191 and the Full Court of the Family Court, in Blinko and Blinko,192 found that:  
 
Whilst s 60CC(2A) demands that greater weight … be given to the consideration in s 60CC(2)(b) - 
something entirely consistent with the approach of the Courts since the commencement of the Act - the 
particular facts and circumstances of each individual case nevertheless require a careful evaluation and 
balancing of Considerations, and all the more so when what is at stake is the potential for a child to 
never know their parent. 
 
The division of the best interest factors into two tiers has caused much debate about the 
approach to take when considering the primary and additional considerations.  Even though 
the Explanatory Memorandum did provide examples where the ‘secondary considerations 
may outweigh the primary considerations’,193 Justice Carmody in Dylan & Dylan, [2007] 
FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) said: 
 
The best interests of a child are now ascertained … by reference to the statutory objects in s 60B, the 
presumption in s 61DA and two tiers of mandatory criteria set out in s 60CC.  There are two primary 
considerations contained in subs (2) and 13 additional (not secondary) factors in subs (3).194 
 
Chief Justice Bryant and Justices Boland and Crisford in Aldridge v Keaton195 found that 
although the best interest factors are listed as primary and additional considerations: 
 
																																								 																				
190 The Family Law Legislation Amendments (Family Violence and other Measures) Act 2011 was assented to on 7 
December 2011 and came into effect 7 June 2012. 
191 Heath & Hemming (No 2) [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011). See Fallon v Stirrat (No 2) [2013] FamCA 237 (16 
April 2013) [64] where Justice Kent referring to submissions made by Mr McGregor, Counsel for the Independent Children's 
Lawyer who acknowledged that the approach in Heath & Hemming (No 2) was the approach to be take post 2012 'best 
interest harm' provision. Kent J said: 'That submission was with the acknowledgment that relevant amendments were made 
to Part VII of the Act with effect from 7 June 2012 including to s 60CC and to adopt a new definition of “family violence” 
which is now contained in subsection 4AB(1) of the Act.  Part VII in its amended form applies to these proceedings.  I 
propose to adopt the approach identified taking into account the amendments to Part VII.' 
192 Blinko and Blinko [2015] FamCAFC 146 (23 July 2015), (May, Murphy and Tree JJ). 
193 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 13, [50]. Also referred to by 
Justice Carmody in Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) 78. 
194 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) 71. 
195 Aldridge v Keaton (2009) 235 FLR 450, 74. 
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 It is clear however from the EM that while the use of the word ‘primary’ is intended to stress the 
 importance of the consideration in s 60CC(2), in a particular case one or more of the considerations in s 
 60CC(3) may outweigh the  primary considerations.  
 
In the 2010, the Full Court of the Family Court decision in Collu and Rinaldo196 Justices 
May, O’Ryan and Strickland considered the overlapping of the best interest considerations 
and reflected on the circumstances of the case before them and the relevant statutory 
provisions.  Their Honours saw an overlap of section 60CC(2)(a); the meaningful relationship 
provision and section 60CC(3)(b) provision which relates to the relationship of the child with 
their parents.197  Their Honours concluded ‘there is some attraction in the idea that perhaps 
the additional considerations in s60CC(3) should be looked at before consideration of the 
primary considerations in s60CC(2) …’.198  
 
Judge Harman in Heiden & Kaufman [2011] FMCAfam 478 (15 April 2011) 116-118 citing 
Dylan199 said:  
 
Primary considerations are not more important than the additional considerations.  Indeed, there are 
circumstances in which the additional considerations may well not only inform the primary 
considerations but outweigh them. 
 
After the 2012 FLA best interest harm provisions,200Judge Harman in McLean & Stephens 
[2014] FCCA 3130 (10 October 2014) citing Dylan201 said:  
 
The additional considerations are ‘not subservient or inferior to the primary consideration.  They 
inform the primary considerations, and may singularly or in combination be, in some circumstance of 
greater importance than the primary considerations. 
 
Legal commentators, such as Parkinson, also saw that the additional considerations inform 
the primary considerations and that the primary considerations are the overarching 
																																								 																				
196 Collu and Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53 (25 March 2010). 
197 Ibid 335. 
198 Their Honours cited Mazorski and Alright [2007] FamCA 520 (31 May 2007); (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 per Brown J.  
199 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007). 
200 The amendment to the best interest of the child primary factors that required the courts to ensure that the harm provision 
was accorded more weight. 
201 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007). 
107	
	
consideration.202  Parkinson cited Aldridge v Keaton203 as authority to support his 
proposition.204  
 
In the context of a child's right to express their voice in parenting matters, the best interest 
factors pre-2006 listed the child's wishes as the first mentioned factor.205  The 2006 FLA 
amendments saw the amendment of a child's wish become a child’s view.  The child’s view 
became listed as the first additional consideration in section 60CC(3)(a):206 
 
 Any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of 
 understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views.  
 
The change in terminology from wishes to views was a means to provide a broader 
investigation into what children had to say207 and the courts were required to consider the 
child’s views208 and any factors it deems relevant.209  Chisholm210 argued that the best 
interest two-tiered approach downgraded the child’s views to additional considerations211 
however, views could be indicative of a more representative approach in considering a child’s 
perspective.212  Monahan and Young agreed with Chisholm’s proposition and stated that the 
child’s views were ‘relegated... to additional considerations’.213  Fitzgerald and Graham214 
considered that the child’s view was downgraded when placed in the additional 
considerations and stated that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and the 
section 65DAA time provisions as outlined in the FLA215 ‘are framed without any reference 
to the child’s views about such arrangements’.  Fitzgerald and Graham also argued that 
																																								 																				
202 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Decision-making about the best interest of the Child: The Impact of the two tiers’ (2006) 20 
Australian Journal of Family Law 179. 
203 (2009) 235 FLR 450. 
204 The judgement was also referred to in an article of Parkinson, Patrick, 'The Family Law Act and the UN Convention on 
Children's rights: A new focus on Children?' (2012) 265 Rights Now <http://rightnow.org.au/topics/children-and-youth/the-
family-law-act-and-the-un-convention-on-children%E2%80%99s-rights-a-new-focus-on-children/> 
205 FLA s 68F(2). 
206 FLA as amended by FLASPRA s 60CC best interest factors. 
207 See Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) 174. 
208 FLA s 60CC(3)(a). 
209 Ibid s 60CE. 
210 Richard Chisholm, ‘The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006: Putting Children at Centre 
Stage?” (Paper presented at the Contact and Relocation: Focusing on the Children, Centre for Children and Young People, 
Southern Cross University, Lismore, 6 May 2006)). 
211 Chisholm also argued that the two-tiered best interest factors were inconsistent with the governments own 
recommendations. 
212 Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation, above 
n 120.	
213 Geoff Monahan & Lisa Young (eds), Children and the law in Australia, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008), 555. 
214 Fitzgerald and Graham, ‘The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality’ above n 172, 427. 
215 FLA ss 65D(1), 61DA, 65DAA. 
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including views of the child as an additional consideration is inconsistent with the CROC.216  
Parkinson opined that to place importance on considering a child’s view it should be included 
in the primary considerations and that the primary objects are central to how courts interpret 
decisions affecting children. 217 
 
3.3.5 What does a view mean? 
 
In addition to the debate on the effect of views being listed as an additional consideration, the 
central question arose about the legal meaning of a view as opposed to a wish.  To consider if 
a view is different from a wish the following will be considered: (a) the policy background 
and intention of the legislation; (b) a consideration of the meaning of the word view using the 
principles of statutory interpretation and finally (c) a discussion on the judicial interpretation 
of a child's view in post-2006 authorities. 
 
3.3.5.1 The policy background and intention 
 
The revolving policy debate about child custody laws has had the common thread of 
providing families with better outcomes post separation.  In the context of listening to 
children the Family Law Advisory Group in 2001,218 provided a report to the Government: 
Out of the Maze. Pathways to the future for families experiencing separation.  This report 
found inter alia: 
 
 The system’s current focus on children is limited, and ... that children need to be heard and have their 
 needs included at all levels of their families’ involvement in the family law system. 219 
 
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, was 
given the task of conducting an inquiry into child custody matters.  Through extensive public 
consultation, the report Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody 
																																								 																				
216 Fitzgerald and Graham, ‘The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality’ above n 172, 427. 
217 Parkinson, ‘Decision-making about the best interest of the Child: The Impact of the two tiers’ above n 202. 
218 The Family Law Advisory Group consisted of a broad cross-section of the community and included a Family Court 
Judge, law and social work professors, a journalist, senior executive officers of the Child Support Agency, Legal Aid 
Queensland, Civil Justice and Legal Services, Attorney-General's Department.  The Chair of the Advisory Group was Des 
Simple (Chair of the Family Law Council).  
219 Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department, Out of the Maze: pathways to the future for families experiencing 
separation, Report of the Family Law Pathways Advisory Group (2001) ES11. 
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arrangements in the event of family separation,220 was delivered in December 2003 and 
acknowledged the importance of hearing the child's voice.221  As part of that consultation 
process, Dr Jennifer McIntosh and Professor Lawrie Moloney spoke to children about their 
perspective on custody matters.  The children expressed to McIntosh and Moloney their 
desire to have their views heard.222  The Committee recognised the importance of this and 
acknowledged that the family law system up to that point had not facilitated the child's voice. 
 
In 2005, the Government's response to the Hull Report was to provide 'the biggest investment 
in the family law system ever and the most significant changes to family law in 30 years ... 
and the changes in law will emphasise the best interest of the child factors.'223  The 
Government agreed to: 
 
[S]upport initiatives that ensure that the focus of the family law system is on the best interests of the 
children involved, and that enable services and decision-making agencies to directly involve children in 
decision making where appropriate ... [and] in relation to ... the less adversarial court processes ... 
include opportunities for the appropriate inclusion of children.'224 
 
In 2005, the Government introduced the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill into the House of Representatives.  In the second reading of the Bill, 
Attorney-General, Phillip Ruddock said: 
 
The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 represents the most 
significant changes to the Family Law Act 1975 since its inception 30 years ago ... However, this 
government is about making hard, but well considered, decisions in key areas of policy.225 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to that Bill described the amendments to the FLA as: 
 
[A] generational change in family law and aim to bring about a cultural shift in how family separation 
is managed: away from litigation and towards cooperative parenting.226 
																																								 																				
220 Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation, above 
n 120. 
221 Ibid [1.65] and [4.135]. 
222 Ibid [4.135]-[4.137]. 
223 A new family law system Government Response to Every picture tells a story, above n 152 Part 1, 1. 
224 Ibid Part 3, 12. In response to recommendations 12 and 13 of the  Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into 
child custody arrangements in the event of family separation above n 120. 
225 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 2005, 9, (Philip Rudduck, Attorney 
General). 
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With the changes proposed by the Government, Fitzgerald and Graham explained that the 
fanfare concerning the changes to the FLA conveyed: 
 
 [A] strong impression that the government had specifically set out to create the optimum conditions 
 for improving family law for children. Indeed, Professor Richard Chisholm, a former judge of the 
 Family Court, says of the sort of language that preceded the introduction of the reforms, ‘you might 
 expect to read a lot about the importance of listening to children and how it might be done, and 
 indeed, you might expect to find something about it in the numerous statements of goals, objectives 
 and so on'.227 
 
In the context of how the custody laws were meant to listen to children, a new subdivision to 
deal with a two-tiered best interest of the child factors was included in the 2006 FLA 
amendments.  Of interest though was the fact that the two-tiered best interest factors was not 
recommended in the Hull Report228 but nonetheless it appeared in the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill.229  The new best interest provisions were 
introduced so as to 'give greater prominence ... to the best interests now in the objects and 
principles...'.230 In the context of the child's voice the Explanatory Memorandum explained 
the amendment from the term wishes to views was:  
 
 [I]ntended [so] that ‘views’ will ... capture a child’s perceptions and feelings, and will 
 allow for any decision to be made in consultation with the child without the child 
 having to make a decision or express a ‘wish’ as to which parent he or she is to live 
 with or spend time with ... [and] ...replacing references to a child’s ‘wishes’ to a child’s ‘views’ is also 
 consistent with the wording in Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
 Child.231 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
226 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), General Outline, 
1. 
227 Fitzgerald and Graham, 'The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality?', above n 172, 423 
citing Richard Chisholm ‘The Family Laws Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2006: Putting Children at 
Centre Stage’ above n 210, 20.	
228 Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation, above 
n 120. 
229 See Richard Chisholm, 'Making it work: The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006' (2007) 
21 Australian Journal of Family Law 143-172, 164. 
230 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 Subdivision BA – Best interests of the child, 12, [43]. 
231 Ibid 15, [56] -[57]. 
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The Explanatory Statement to the Draft Bill also explained that the word views instead of 
expressing it as a wish also allows the child's voice to be heard without the pressure of the 
child having to make a decision about the future.232  
 
Other than the statements in the Explanatory Memorandum indicating that views capture the 
feelings and perception of the child,233 the statute did not define the word views.234  
Consideration of statutory interpretation principles are discussed at 3.3.5.2 to ascertain how 
the word view may be defined. 
 
3.3.5.2 An approach using the principles of statutory interpretation 
 
Former High Court Justice, the Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG stated235 the principles 
of statutory interpretation unanimously endorsed by the High Court are: 
 
 Where the applicable law is expressed in legislation the correct starting point for analysis is the text of 
 the legislation and not judicial statements of the common law or even judicial elaborations of the 
 statute.  The overall objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the purpose of Parliament as 
 expressed in the text of the statutory provisions.  It is a mistake to consider statutory words in isolation. 
 The proper approach demands the derivation of the meaning of words from the legislative context  in 
 which those words appear.  
 
The principles of statutory interpretation, that is the textual, contextual and purposive 
approaches were used to analyse the meaning of the word view. 
 
Textual approach 
 
The textual approach begins with the text of the Act.236  This requires looking at the 
legislative definition provisions or express statements which describe the meaning of the term 
or text.  The FLA however did not define the meaning of the word view.  Further the word 
																																								 																				
232 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report on 
the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility Bill 2005, (2005), 170, [6.22] citing the 
Explanatory Draft Statement. 
233 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
234 FLA s 4. In 2011, the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth) 
amended the FLA and inserted s4AB 'definition of family violence etc'. 
235 Michael Kirby, 'Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning' (2011) 35(1) Melbourne University Law Review 113, 
116. 
236 Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 1, 10. 
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view is not 'a scientific or technical word, or one that, in a legal context ... has a single fixed 
meaning.'237  Sanson states that 'for undefined words, reference may be had to a dictionary'238 
however, there is no particular preference to what dictionary is used.239  The Macquarie 
Dictionary defines view as an 'aim, intention, or purpose' or 'a particular way of regarding 
something'.  The Oxford Dictionary defines view as a 'manner of considering a subject, 
opinion, mental attitude.'  Kirby stated that 'the text is the anchor for the ascertainment of the 
purpose or intention of Parliament' however the FLA (and dictionary definitions) do not 
provide a clear meaning of the word view or what the parliament intended the word to mean.  
If the FLA does not contain any provisions which define the word view, then delegated 
legislation can be considered.  Sanson says that the rules for interpreting delegated legislation 
are the same as those applicable to legislation and: 
  
 [C]ourts ... in interpreting delegated legislation, attempt to give as full effect to them as possible, taking 
 into account that they are practice oriented, may have evolved over time, and are routinely used by 
 individuals in day to day activities ... if there is any ambiguity the principal Act applies.240 
 
Delegated legislation covers the procedural matters administered by the court and are made 
pursuant to the principal act (the FLA).241  The delegated legislation which covers the 
procedural family law matters are the Family Law Rules (2004) (Cth) ('FLR'), Family Law 
Regulations ('FL Regs') and the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth) ('FCCR') (formerly 
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) ('FMCR').  The FLR, FL Regs, FCCR (and the 
former FMCR) do not give any definitions or descriptions of the meaning of the word view.   
The only mention in delegated legislation was a reference to judicial interviewing of children. 
in rule 15.03 FLR.  This rule provided that:  
 
(1) A judicial officer may interview a child who is the subject of a case under Part  
       VII of the Act.  
																																								 																				
237 Kirby, above n 235, 123. 
238 Michelle Sanson, Statutory Interpretation (2012), 120. 
239 Ibid 121. Sanson cites five High Court authorities that used Australian and English dictionaries for the purpose of finding 
the meaning of a word.  Sanson further states at 120, that it appears the dictionary chosen is one which is within easy reach 
of the Judges Chamber.  Sanson at 121 cites the following cases and the dictionary used: Wainohu v New South Wales 
[2011] HCA 24 used Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 3rd ed (2010); White v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) 
[2011] HCA 20 used the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th edition (2007); Commissioner of Taxation v BHP Billiton 
Limited [2011] HCA 17 used Exford English Dictionary, 2nd edition  (1989), volume 2; Jemena Gas Networks (NSW) 
Limited v Mine Subsidence Board [2011] HCA 19 used the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition (1989) volume 1; Hogan 
v Hindi [2011] HCA 4 used the Macquarie Concise Dictionary, revised 3rd edition (2002). 
240 Sanson, above n 238, 244. 
241 Ibid 239-240. See Acts Interpretation Act (Cth) ('AI Act') s 2K Rules of Court, s 46 Construction of instrument. 
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 (2) The interview may be conducted in the presence of a family and child counsellor,  
      mediator or another person specified by the judicial officer.  
(3) If the child expresses a wish during the interview that is relevant to the case the  
      judicial officer may order a family report to be prepared.  
 
The rule did not use the term view but rather the word wish.  Further, rule 15.03 was deleted 
from the FLR in 2010.  The explanatory statement to that 2010 amendment said:  
 
 [T]he amendment removes the Rules which dealt with cases where a subject child was interviewed by 
 a judicial officer.  This does not generally occur and where it does it can be the subject of case specific 
 orders.’242		
 
The removing of any reference to Judges interviewing children is noteworthy in terms of the 
approaches to ascertaining a child's view in litigated parenting disputes.243  The amendment 
does not mean that Judges cannot interview children as some (although few) have continued 
to do so.  The amendment does however remove an explicit reference to judicial meetings 
with children from the Rules.244  
 
Contextual approach 
 
Through principles of statutory interpretation the meaning of the word view should be 
interpreted in the context of what complies with the objects and principles of the FLA and it 
must be consistent with the language of the FLA.245  In Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 
CLR 322, Chief Justice Gleeson at 332 said: 
 
 Meaning is always influenced, and sometimes controlled, by context. The context might include time, 
 place, and any other circumstance that could rationally assist understanding of meaning ... It includes 
 the whole of the instrument, its nature and purpose, the time when it was written and came into legal 
 effect, other facts and circumstances, including the state of the law, within the knowledge or 
 contemplation of the framers and legislators who prepared ... or secured its enactment, and 
																																								 																				
242 Family Law Amendment Rules 2010 (No. 1), Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument 2010 No. 238, at 16.  
243 See Michelle Fernando, 'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' (2012) 26 Australian 
Journal of Family Law 51-92, 55-56.	
244 Ibid 55-56.  See also Michelle Meilin Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: 
Hearing Children’s Voices. (PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2011). 
245 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382 [69]-[70] per McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, AI Act s 15AA. 
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 developments, over time, in the national and international context in which the instrument is to be 
 applied. 
 
The proper context of the meaning of view should be in contemplation of what the legislature 
intended.  There were many inquiries into the family law system that culminated in the 2006 
FLA reforms.  The contextual history of the reason for the change from wish to view was 
highlighted in the Explanatory Memorandum.246  The intention of the change in terminology 
was to ensure that in consultation with the child, the child's perceptions and feelings were 
captured without the pressure of the child expressing their wish regarding which parent they 
preferred to live with.  In this context, a view is different from the meaning of a wish. 
 
Kirby said that in finding the meaning of the word in question, the text should be considered 
with reference to the 'context of the statutory provisions ... however ... so far as the text 
permits [it should] give effect to the purpose or policy apparent in the statutory language.'247  
Pearce and Geddes state that the 'modern approach is that 'context' has a wide meaning, 
including the 'mischief' that is discoverable by the legitimate use of extrinsic materials.'248  
 
Purposive approach 
 
The purposive approach is 'applied by determining the purpose of the Act or the particular 
provision in question ... and ... adopting an interpretation of the word that [is] consistent with 
the purpose'249 of the legislative provision.  In the judgments of Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v 
Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) and CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club 
Ltd, the courts confirmed that the meaning of the text in the legislation must be considered 
having regard to the purpose of the objects of the Act.250  This therefore requires that the 
interpretation of the term found in the FLA which meets the objects must be applied, 
'consistent with the language of the instrument viewed as a whole'251and not read in 
																																								 																				
246 Explanatory Draft Statement; Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, 
[55]. 
247 Kirby, above n 235, 132. 
248 Dennis C Pearce and Robert S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014), 40. 
249 Ibid 38. 
250 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 2, [46]-[47] (Hayne, Heydon, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ) and CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ). 
251 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382 [69]-[70] per McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 
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isolation.252  Further, the Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act (Cth) ('AI Act') section 
15AA states that:  
 
 In interpreting a provision of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of 
 the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each 
 other interpretation. 
 
Section 15AB AI Act also assists with finding the purpose of the statute to determine the 
meaning of words by the use of extrinsic materials.  Extrinsic materials according to this 
provision include explanatory memoranda, committee reports of Government, parliamentary 
debates and speeches, Hansard, treaties or conventions, Law Reform Committee reports or 
documents that do not form part of the Act but are able to be used to aid in interpretation.  
Some have cautioned the use of extrinsic materials stating that 'parliamentary materials may 
be important indicators, but the written law as such is our legitimate guide'.253  Even so, 
extrinsic materials are a tool to assist in interpretation as explained in Bropho v Western 
Australia:254  
  
 [T]he contemporary approach to statutory construction with its added emphasis on legislative purpose 
 ... and permitted reference to a range of extrinsic materials for the ascertainment of that purpose [see, 
 e.g., Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.15AB ...].255 
 
Extrinsic materials such as parliamentary reports and the Explanatory Memorandum256 
(discussed in 3.3.5.1) indicated that the purpose and intention of the child voice legislative 
amendments was that views were to mean something more than a wish and the change in 
terminology was to be consistent with the language used in the CROC.  In Minister of State 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 182 CLR 273 ('Teoh'), specific 
mention was made of the use of conventions to aid in statutory interpretation.  Mason CJ and 
Deane J said that:   
																																								 																				
252 K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Ltd (1985) 60 ALR 509. 
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254 Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 ('Bropho'). 
255 Ibid [16] Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
256 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report 
on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility Bill 2005, (2005), 170, [6.22] citing 
the Explanatory Draft Statement; Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 
2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, 
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Where a statute … is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accords with 
Australia’s obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party… It is 
accepted that a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language permits, so that it is in 
conformity and not in conflict with the established rules of international law...if the language of the 
legislation is consistent with the terms of the international instrument and the obligations which it 
imposes on Australia, then that construction should prevail.257 
 
Teoh258 provides an important basis for statutory consideration of international treaties where 
Australia is a signatory to that convention.  Australia ratified the CROC convention in 
1991259and in the context of the FLA, the legislature amended the FLA section 60B objects 
provisions to include a specific reference to CROC:  
 
 An additional object of this Part is to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at 
 New York on 20 November 1989. 260 
 
How significant the section 60B objects' amendment in 2012 is or the provision generally is 
as an aid to judicial interpretation of child's view is questionable.  Parkinson considers the 
court's interpretation of the application of the objects261 in section 60B as 'uncertain and 
contentious' and subject to 'broad or very narrow interpretation'262by the courts.  Fitzgerald263 
argues that statutory interpretative principles embed this objects' provision with 'substantive 
application' and it should be treated as a 'statutory imperative that needs to be given effect 
before any substantive order is made.'  Fitzgerald believes that the insertion of the CROC 
provision in the objects is potentially a useful tool to enable a child's right to be heard.  
Fernando conversely contends that the impact of section 60B(4) is limited and will not allow 
the child any greater involvement or say in expressing their views.264  
 
																																								 																				
257 Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 182 CLR 273, 287 ('Teoh'). 
258 Ibid. 
259 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991. 
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If the insertion of the specific reference to the CROC in the FLA is at best an interpretive aid, 
the CROC does not provide a definition of views but does provide an explanation of the basis 
upon which views are formed.  The CROC General Comment No 12 stated:  
 
Research has shown that information, experience, environment, social and cultural expectations, and 
levels of support all contribute to the development of a child’s capacities to form a view.  For this 
reason, the views of the child have to be assessed on a case-by-case examination.265   
 
This would suggest that although there is no defined meaning of a view, what a child says is 
considered according to the age and maturity of the child along with the capacity of the child 
to reach the decision and in the context of what ultimately was in the child's best interest. 
General Comment 14 to CROC concurs with this:  
 
Authorities and decision makers will have to analyse and weigh the rights of all concerned, bearing in 
mind that the rights of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration means 
that the child’s interests have high priority and not just one of several considerations.  Therefore a 
larger weight must be attached to what serves the child best.266 
 
The courts can, according to Teoh,267 consider the CROC to aid in clearing ambiguity. 
However, CROC does not provide a definition of view but has, through general statements, 
explained how a child's view is formed.  The parliamentary debates, committee reports and 
explanatory memorandum detail the policy intention and context in what a view was to mean.  
Judicial interpretation of the meaning of the child's view is discussed in 3.3.5.3. 
 
3.3.5.3 Judicial interpretation: the case law 
 
In Goode v Goode268 an authoritative post-2006 case, the Court held that they were bound to 
follow the legislative intention of parliament.  In essence the message regarding the reforms 
was that the practice of family law must change and the approaches in practice should include 
embracing the reforms as provided by the legislature.  Part 3.2 provided an analysis of the 
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pre-2006 child wish regime.  This part will analyse post-2006 regime cases to ascertain if a 
view has been judicially interpreted as different from a wish. 
 
One of the first cases to consider a child’s view rather than a wish was Dylan & Dylan [2007] 
FamCA 842 (21 August 2007).  This case involved parenting orders for a 15-year-old boy 
and 10-year-old girl.  The father wanted equal or more substantial time with the children. 
Both children expressed a strong view for the status quo to remain.  The father said the views 
of the children were influenced by the mother.  An ICL, family report writer and child 
psychiatrist agreed that the status quo should remain.  
 
Carmody J provided a discussion on the historical context of the changes to the FLA and the 
research provided by social scientists on child inclusive practices.  His Honour stated that the 
2006 changes when considering the child’s views in the context of the best interest factors 
may emphasise the requirement of a broader investigation into hearing the voice of the 
child:269 
 
It is intended that views are not intended to exclude an expression of wishes.  Clearly a child may have 
a view that he or she should do something even though they do not wish to.  The word “views” is seen 
as emphasizing a broader based investigation from the child’s perspective. 
 
His Honour did question the best interest principles and like Brennan J in Marion flagged that 
the best interest principles are based on values not facts: 
 
The width of the discretion judges have in making child related decisions means that predictions, 
perceptions, assumptions and within reason even intuition and guesswork can all play a part in the 
reasoning process in the best interest exercise.  This is because best interests are really values not facts. 
They are not susceptible to scientific demonstration or conclusive proof.  The same body of evidence 
may produce opposite but nonetheless reasonable conclusions from different judges.  There is not 
always only one right answer. Informed and honest minds can genuinely disagree and yet neither be 
totally wrong nor completely right.  Sometimes, the least worst situation may be the best available.  
Many cases are finely balanced with the only option being a choice between two or more imperfect 
alternatives.270 
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119	
	
Further to the question of the significance of the change from wishes to views, Carmody J 
quoting Article12,271 questioned whether Australia’s FLA complies with its international 
obligations on the child’s right to have their views heard: 
 
The domestic law is supposed to include procedural requirements designed to ensure that the decision-
making process is fair and pays due respect to the children's interests and wishes by giving him or her a 
meaningful opportunity to genuinely participate in the process through which decisions[s] affecting 
them are made.  
 
In highlighting how a child’s view is to be considered and the child genuinely engaged, 
Carmody J discussed the appointment of an ICL to represent the child and the engagement of 
a family report writer as an expert to present the child’s views to the court.272  His Honour 
said the courts have been reluctant to allow (although the law permits) a child to be a party to 
the proceedings273 or give evidence274 which he believes reflects the welfare or best interests 
of the child principles.275  Carmody J also recognised the gradual increase in the utility of 
judicial interviews with children276 and raised this as an option in Dylan,277 however it was 
not adopted in this case.  His Honour said that due consideration should be given to 
children’s participation recognising their vulnerabilities and that the customs of keeping them 
‘out of the courtroom impedes the pursuit of truth, [and] infringes internationally recognised 
right of participation.’278  His Honour in citing the authorities in Harrison and Woollard,279 R 
and R: Children’s’ wishes280 and Re G281 said: 
 
Children’s views have to be examined in the light of the circumstances in which they have been formed 
and the considerations underlying them … I have no reason to think that given the age and apparent 
maturity of these children and the consistency and strength of their expressed views that they are not 
genuinely held.282 
Carmody J said that in contemplation of how best interests are ascertained it is by:  
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Reference to the statutory objects in s 60B, the presumption in s 61DA and two tiers of mandatory 
criteria set out in s 60CC.  There are two primary considerations contained in subs (2) and 13 additional 
(not secondary) factors in subs (3).  The primary matters are consistent with the concept of equal 
shared parental responsibility in s 61DA and reiterate in slightly different language the sentiments 
expressed in the first two of the objects stated in s 60B.283 
Further, the interaction of the time arrangement provisions in the context of considering a 
child’s view, His Honour said:284 
The combined force of ss 60CC(2) and (3) and 65DAA(5)(d) ensure that there is a child focus to the 
decision and that account is taken of the child’s … views …, the general benefit to the child of this 
kind of arrangement, the nature of the relationship the child has with each parent and any practical 
difficulties … [t]he impact of an arrangement involving equal or substantial and significant time with a 
parent … is an express s 60CC(3) consideration.  Applying ss 65DAA(1) and (2) … involves three 
crucial and consecutive steps.  The first is to consider whether equal or substantial and significant time 
would be in the best interests of the child.  The next is to decide whether it is reasonably practicable to 
make an order of that kind within the definition in subs (5).  Finally, if it is (e.g. both in the child’s best 
interests and reasonably practicable or workable) the court is to consider making an order to that effect.  
The effect of s 60CA is that the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration in deciding 
whether or not to actually go on to make a parenting order of that kind. 
 
Justice Carmody's opinion of what the term view permitted was a broader investigation and 
the careful contemplation of what the child was saying and that a child could have a view on 
something but it could be different to what the child wished for.  Further, consideration of a 
child's view permitted the court to weigh up of any decision it was to make in consultation 
with the child. 
 
In determining the weight to be applied to the views of the child, Carmody J said: 
 
 The weight to be given to a child's views in any given case is, however, dependent on a range of factors 
 including the child's age and maturity, any protective needs, the views of siblings where it appears best 
 to keep them together, and the desirability of maintaining a long-term relationship with the parent 
 where the child has negative views about the relationship at that point in time.285 
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The principles enunciated regarding the weight to be given to the child's views are the same 
as applied pre-2006 regime.286  
 
Justice Carmody's discussion on the change in terminology from wishes to views cites the 
explanatory memorandum and CROC to provide an explanation of the meaning of view.  
Dylan287 has been cited in post-2006 cases, however the authorities in all cases have applied 
the pre-2006 wish cases of Harrison and Woollard288 and R and R: Children’s wishes.289 
 
In Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October, 2007) Bennett J290 
acknowledged the previous provisions in the FLA and the jurisprudence concerning the 
consideration of the child’s wishes.  Her Honour cited the authorities in Harrison and 
Woollard291and R and R: Children’s Wishes292 which she considered relevant.  Her Honour 
provided an explanation of the meaning of the legislative change from wishes to views.  Her 
reasoning is that a view is different from a wish.   
There is a distinction between the concept of children’s wishes and children’s views.  ‘Views’ will 
capture a child’s perceptions, inclinations and feelings but not necessarily involve an aspiration or 
conclusion.  ‘Wishes’ are the result of perceptions, inclinations and feelings coalescing into a specific 
desire or ambition in the child’s mind.  The requirement to focus on the child’s views, as opposed to 
wishes, means that I may have regard to the child’s perceptions and inclinations without requiring the 
family consultant or independent children’s lawyer to make enquiries or elicit the child’s ultimate 
preference or wish.  I agree with the reference in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum that 
consideration of the children’s views will…allow for a decision to be made in consultation with the 
child without the child having to make a decision or express a ‘wish’ as to which parent he or she is to 
live or spend time with.  Consideration of a child’s views does not exclude consideration of a child’s 
wishes.293  
In consideration of the child’s view Her Honour said that it had to be balanced against the 
primary and additional considerations according to the child’s welfare and said the authority 
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in R and R: Children's Wishes294 should be followed.  Her Honour then stated that 'I consider 
that in the discussion by the Full Court in R & R, reference to wishes may be read 
interchangeably for views’.295  In terms of the weight to be applied to a child's view, Bennett 
J acknowledged the weight to be applied depends on the maturity of the child and the length, 
strength and the basis of the child's wishes.296  The principles enunciated regarding the weight 
to be given to the child's views are the same as applied pre-2006 regime. 
  
Justice Bennett's judgments discuss the change in terminology from wishes to views.  Her 
Honour has enunciated the same principles as cited in Mestronov297 in a number cases as 
recent as 2015;298 however the words, wishes and views, remain interchangeable.299  
 
3.3.5.4 Summary 
 
Researching case law for this thesis300 involved searching for children’s wishes cases (pre-
2006) and children’s views cases (post-2006) and child view cases which mentioned the less 
adversarial trial process (LAT) as provided for in Division 12A.301  A analysis of cases heard 
in the Family Court of Australia (including LAT), Federal Magistrates Court, Federal Circuit 
Court and the appeals courts in the post-2006 regime did not find any authority which 
overturned the authoritative pre-2006 cases of Harrison and Woollard302 and R and R: 
Children’s’ wishes.303  The law regarding children’s wishes as it was called pre-2006 is cited 
as authority in the post-2006 views cases.  The process of the weight to be applied to what a 
child is saying remains in accordance with the Gillick competence test as applied in Marion's 
Case 304 whether the law describes what a child has to say as a view or as a wish.305  
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It is acknowledged that some judicial officers have recognised that listening to a child's view 
is different from a wish, in that a view can capture the child's feelings and perceptions and is 
a broader investigation into the child's perspectives.306  However, most post-2006 judicial 
decisions where a child's view was an issue, the decisions did not recognise nor incorporate 
the change in meaning that was intended by the legislature.   
 
3.4 Conclusion   
 
The legislative and case law landscape in parenting matters shows from the earliest 
consideration of custody cases that what children had to say was cautiously evaluated 
according to the probative value of their statements307 and in the context of the child's 
maturity and reasoning abilities.308  The overhaul of custody laws in Australia in the 1995 
FLA amendments309 saw the introduction of the best interest of the child factors and in those 
factors, the consideration of a child's wish.  The 1995 FLA amendments recognised 
Australia's commitment to the CROC;310 and to the rights of the child and parental 
responsibility.  The authoritative child wishes cases at that time were the decisions in 
Harrison and Woollard311 and R and R: Children’s Wishes.312  These cases demonstrated that 
Judges considered the child's wishes using intuitive synthesis to assess their best 
interests313and family reports were used as a means of interpreting children’s wishes and the 
weight to be attached to those wishes.314  These cases remain the current authorities post-
2006 reforms and family reports remain as the main means for children's views to be 
presented to the court.315   
 
																																								 																				
306 See Justice Carmody in Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) and Justice Bennett in Mestronov & 
Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007). 
307 Reynolds v Reynolds (1973) 47 A.L.J.R. 499, 502. See In the Marriage of Pailas (D. and E.M.) (1976) 26 FLR 149 and 
Wotherspoon (1980) 2 Fam LR 71. 
308 Wotherspoon (1980) 7 Fam LR71, 76; Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
309 FLRA. 
310 Mills above n 91 109-110; See also B and B, Re; Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) 21 Fam LR 676. 
311 Harrison and Woollard (1995)18 Fam LR 788. Also referred to as H v W (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
312 R and R: Children’s wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
313 Ibid 724 [54]. 
314 Ibid 725 [59]-[61]. 
315 Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process above n 100,[16.35].  See Kaspiew et al., Independent 
Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report above n 147.	
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The evolution of family law continued and government enquiries316culminated in the shared 
parenting 2006 FLA amendments.317  The revised parenting provisions detailed in Part VII of 
the FLA now provide the statutory framework upon which the courts exercise their powers.  
The objects provision detailed in the FLA at section 60B is the machinery provision for the 
courts to navigate the parenting provisions.  The courts must now also consider the 
presumptive provisions of parental responsibility,318 the time arrangement provisions319 and 
the two-tiered best interest of the child factors (at section 60CC) described as primary and 
additional considerations.320  The court’s approach to listening to a child’s voice is referenced 
as an additional consideration in section 60CC(3)(a) and called a child's view.  The legislative 
intention of whether a child’s view is less important if categorised as an additional 
consideration remains unresolved, although it was not the legislative intention to downgrade 
the importance of listening to children.  The amendment from the term wish to view was to 
‘capture a child’s perceptions and feelings’321and was to be of significance.322  However, 
there is no definition of a view in the provision itself and it is not defined in the FLA, FLR or 
FCCR or the CROC.  However, using conventional methods of statutory interpretation, that is 
looking at the text, context and purpose, the legislative intention of the amendment did 
anticipate a change in meaning to include the consideration of the child's perceptions and 
feelings and to allow for any decision to be made in consultation with the child and to 
simultaneously preclude the child from being compelled to express their wish about the 
outcome. 
 
When considering the judicial interpretation of the child view provision, some post-2006 
cases323 described a view as being different from a wish in that wishes are the 'result of 
perceptions, inclinations and feelings coalescing into a specific desire or ambition in the 
child’s mind '324 whereas views 'capture a child’s perceptions, inclinations and feelings but 
																																								 																				
316 Every picture tells a story. Report on the inquiry into child custody arrangements in the event of family separation, above 
n 120.  The change was also to mirror the terminology used in the CROC. 
317 Family Law Amendment Bill (Shared Parental Responsibility Bill) 2005 (Cth). 
318 FLA s 61DA. 
319 Ibid s 65DAA. 
320 Ibid ss 60CC(2)-(3). 
321 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
322 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm above n 16, 139.  
323 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007); Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) 
60; Watson & Peterson [2013] FamCA 541 (11 July 2013); Eldred & Eldred [2015] FamCA 61 (9 February 2015); Coad & 
Coad [2011] FamCA 622 (1 July 2011) 80; Ana & Ana (No 3) [2013] FamCA 841 (21 August 2013). 
324 Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) [62]. 
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not necessarily an aspiration or conclusion'325 without the need to 'elicit the child’s ultimate 
preference or wish'.326  The cases also refer to the maturity and capacity of the child327 
balanced against the other factors and that the words wishes and views were to be read 
interchangeably.328  Further, in the context of whether a child's view is different from a wish, 
a review of cases in the Family Court of Australia, Federal Magistrates Court, Federal Circuit 
Court and the appeals courts did not find any authority which overturned the authoritative 
pre-2006 authorities of Harrison and Woollard329 and R and R: Children’s Wishes.330   
 
It is acknowledged that whilst some Judges did expressly recognise the difference in the 
legislative provision, most Judges in their judicial determinations did not indicate that there 
was a conceptual difference between the meaning of a wish and a view.  In the majority of 
cases, the change in terminology did not demonstrate any greater significance on what the 
child was saying, whether it is was expressed as a wish or a view.  The qualitative research 
conducted for this thesis (discussed in Chapter 4) also found that in the opinion of most 
Judges and ICLs, there was no conceptual difference in the meaning of the term view to that 
of a wish.  Further, most Judges and ICLs said in practice the way they ascertained a child's 
voice did not change as a result of the 2006 FLA amendments.   
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provided a literature review on the case law and social science studies 
undertaken on the role of the ICL and Judges in ascertaining a child's view.  In terms of the 
ICLs and Judges opinions on how to hear a child's voice, Parkinson and Cashmore's research 
found that lawyers and Judges thought that the children’s views should be considered 
according to the child’s age and maturity.331  The Parkinson and Cashmore research findings 
aligns with the findings of the doctrinal research conducted for this thesis.  The Gillick332 
competence test remains the test upon which the parameters are set by decision makers in 
consideration of what a child has to say and the weight to be attached to those wishes.   
 
																																								 																				
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid [62]. 
327 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA842 (21 August 2007) [247]. 
328 Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) [64]. 
329 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788, 
330 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
331 Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child, above n 4, 97. 
332 Gillick [1985] 3 All ER 402.  This test was first applied in; Marion's Case (1992) 175 CLR 218; see also R and R: 
Children’s wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
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Research333 (discussed in Chapter 1) has shown that in custody cases, the consideration of a 
child's view required judicial determination in one in seven matters.  These statistics highlight 
the frequency upon which the child's voice is an important factor in determining parenting 
orders.   
 
Guidance on the courts approach to parenting orders is detailed in the authoritative cases of 
Goode v Goode,334 Taylor & Baker,335 and Heath & Hemming (No 2).336  Heath & Hemming 
(No 2)337 provides a most comprehensive approach to the interconnection of the statutory 
provisions of Part VII, FLA.  However, to capture a child's feelings and perceptions the FLA 
requires amending.  Chisholm recommended changes to section 60CC FLA and, in particular, 
the provisions referring to children’s views so as to emphasise the importance of the courts 
considering what children are experiencing.338  Chisholm said that the section 60CC 
provision should be amended to include considering orders that 'identify the arrangements 
that are most likely to advance the best interest of the child in the circumstances of each case 
... [and] any views expressed by the child concerning the child’s relationship with each parent 
and with other persons and about any other matters that are important to the child'339  The 
writer concurs with Chisholm's proposal.  
 
Fernando has recommended Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children with the purpose 
of giving 'guidance to Judges in deciding whether to meet with a child and in conducting 
meetings with children.' 340  The writer concurs with the importance of implementing 
Fernando's recommendations.   
 
																																								 																				
333 Kaspiew, R., Gray, M., Weston R., Moloney, L., Hand, L., and Qu, L (2009), Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies. See discussion in this thesis at Chapter 1, part 1.4 Literature 
Review. 
334 (2006) FLC 93-286. 
335 [2007] 37 Fam LR 461. 
336 [2011] FamCA 749 (27 September 2011). 
337 Ibid. 
338 See Chisholm, R (2009). Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, above n 16, 136. See 
discussion in Chapter 1, part 1.4 Literature review of this thesis. 
339 The definition considers the references made in the Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of 
Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55] and Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard 
Chisholm, above n 22, Recommendation 3.4, 13 and136-7.  See also the decision of Carmody J in Dylan & Dylan [2007] 
FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [174]. 
340 Michelle Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings', (2012) 2 (4) 
Family Law Review 213-224, 216.  See discussion in Chapter 1, part 1.4 Literature review of this thesis. 
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In addition to Chisholm and Fernando's proposals and to advance the recognition of the 
child's view before a parenting order is made, it is advocated that the FLA be amended as 
follows by: (a) inserting a definition of the word "view" in the interpretation provisions of the 
FLA (section 4).  The definition should include that a view is a broader investigation into a 
child's perspective, it is to capture the child's perceptions and feelings and considerations that 
are important to the child and should involve a more consultative approach with the child; (b) 
the insertion of the consideration of the child's view should be included in the objects 
provision of section 60B; and (c) section 61DA (the presumption) and section 65DAA (time 
arrangement) provisions be amended to include a reference to consideration of the child’s 
view before a parenting order is made; and (d) the inclusion in the FLR and FCCR details of 
minimum best practice guidelines regarding the ascertaining of a child's view by an ICL.  
 
Chapter 3 legal synthesis and legal analysis has achieved objective one of the thesis and 
provides three main conclusions that: (1) a child's voice has been recognised since the 
enactment of the FLA; (2) the legislative intention of the wish to view amendment did 
anticipate a change in meaning, however most judicial decisions post-2006 showed that the 
consideration of a child's view was not conceptually different from the previous framework 
of consideration of a child's wish.  Further, the pre-2006 child wish authorities of Harrison 
and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children's Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 
remain the authoritative cases for the post-2006 child views regime; and (3) the weight 
attached to what a child says has not differed from the pre-2006 consideration of a wish to 
that of the post-2006 consideration of a child's view. 	
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Part A – Is a view different from a wish? 
4.2 Wishes to views - no difference in meaning and in practice 
4.3 Views are important but the best interest of the child factors and parental capacity 
are paramount consideration 
4.4 Part A conclusions  
 
Part B - The role of the ICL  
4.5 Overview 
4.6 The role of the ICL described according to job-related activities 
4.7 Personal skills, attributes or qualities necessary to effectively carry out the role of 
the ICL 
4.8 The ICL is an independent best interests advocate not the child's lawyer 
4.9 Minority say it's the ICL's role to provide the child an opportunity to express their 
views  
4.10 Part B conclusions 
 
Part C - Speaking to Children 
4.11 Overview of speaking to children 
4.12 ICLs – speaking to children  
4.12.1 Queensland ICLs – meeting children may be acceptable otherwise it is 'systems 
abuse'  
4.12.2. New South Wales ICLs divided in responses: City and country practices differ  
4.12.3 Victorian ICLs meet and interview children. Personal attributes play a role 
4.13 Summary of ICL practices regarding speaking to children  
4.14 Judges’ views on ICLs speaking to children  
4.15 ICLs’ views on Judges speaking to children direct  
4.15.1 ICLs say Judges are not trained to speak to children. It can result in 
'spectacular failures' and 'could border on systems abuse'  
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4.15.2 There is a place in the system for Judges to speak to children 
4.16 Judges' views on Judges speaking to children overview 
4.16.1 Judges are not trained to speak to children. 'The thought of it makes my flesh 
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4.16.2 'Children can benefit from a Judge speaking to them. Children are more savvy 
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4.17 Part C conclusions 
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4.21 'Deplorable funding' influences how ICLs and Judges practice 
4.22 Country ICLs versus city ICLs – the impact on practices 
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 4.24.1 ICLs and Judges consider that views are no different to wishes 
 4.24.2 Speaking to children direct means different things and involves different 
 practices 
 4.24.3 An ICL's role in ascertaining a child's view has not changed from the pre-
 2006 regime 
 4.24.4 Challenges faced in child focused practices  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The legal synthesis and analysis of the 2006 FLA child wish to child views amendments 
determined that although the legislative intention did anticipate a change in meaning, most 
post-2006 judicial decisions did not see a conceptual difference from the previous framework 
of the consideration of a child's wish. Further, the child's best interest remained the 
paramount consideration in determining custody cases.  Chapter 4 will present and analyse 
the qualitative findings of a small scale purposive study of the opinions and practices of 
Judges and ICLs regarding the 2006 FLA amendments about ascertaining a child's view 
instead of a child's wish.  For this study 14 ICLs and six Family Court Judges from New 
South Wales, Queensland and Victoria were interviewed.  The qualitative research 
methodology was detailed in Chapter 2.  The qualitative research undertaken meets 
objectives two and three of this thesis.  Objective two explored the opinions of Judges and 
ICLs into whether they thought views were different in meaning to that of ascertaining the 
pre-2006 wishes.  Further, this objective considered what Judges and ICLs thought their roles 
were in ascertaining a child’s views as opposed to a wish and what it meant to speak directly 
to children.  Objective three was to explore the practices of ICLs and Judges to explain what 
they did in their role (whether as an ICL or Judge) and if their practices had changed as a 
consequence of the 2006 wish to view amendments and the 2006 Division 12A FLA 
Principles for conducting child-related proceedings.  The findings of the study are presented 
in five parts. 
 
Chapter 4 Part A presents the data on the interviews conducted with Judges and ICLs 
concerning their opinions on the significance in meaning and in practice of the 2006 FLA 
change from ascertaining a child's wish to that of ascertaining a child's view.  The themes 
extracted from Part A were: (a) wishes or views mean the same; (b) whether the FLA 
expresses the consideration of a child's voice as a wish (pre-2006 regime) or a view (post-
2006 regime), the application of the consideration is similar in practice; and (c) the best 
interests of the child factors and parental capacity remain the paramount consideration 
whether what a child says is called a wish or a view.  
 
Chapter 4, Part B presents the data on what ICLs and Judges consider is the role of the ICL.  
The themes extracted were: (a) the ICL's role is described according to their job-related 
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activities, that is case management and evidence gathering roles; (b) the ICLs role is to be a 
best interest of the child advocate; and (c) most ICLs did not mention ascertaining the child's 
view but rather said their role was to ascertain the child's best interest. 
 
Chapter 4, Part C presents the data on the opinions and practices of ICLs and Judges 
regarding if they speak to children direct.  The themes extracted were: (a) the phrase 
'speaking to children direct' is interpreted differently by the participants, that is some "meet" 
children, others "talk" with children, some "interview" children; (b) different practices exist 
between ICLs and Judges on whether they would speak to children in custody cases; and (c) 
the majority of the respondent ICLs and Judges believe that Judges should not speak to 
children. 
 
Chapter 4 Part D presents the data on the consideration of the broader context of what ICLs 
and Judges consider as factors that impact on their practices in listening to children in 
custody cases.  The themes extracted were (a) differences in judicial approaches between 
different court registries influence practice; (b) the geographic location (that is country based 
versus city based) may impact on ICL practices; (c) lack of funding influences ICLs 
practices; (d) a more integrated approach between family and child protection practices is 
needed; and (e) in practice, the less adversarial trial process did not enhance the way a child's 
view was heard.  
 
Finally, in Part E of Chapter 4, a brief summary of the qualitative research is provided. 
 
In the context of reporting the findings of the research and to ensure the anonymity of the 
participants, pseudonyms were allocated at the commencement of the interview.  The ICLs 
and Judges interviewed were identified according to their State and a number; for example, 
the first ICL interviewed for Queensland was identified as ICLQ1 and the first Judge 
interviewed for Queensland was identified as JQ1.  Throughout this chapter, the Judges and 
ICLs interviewed will be identified accordingly.  Further rather than disclose the gender of 
the participant, instead of using 'he' or 'she' and 'him' or 'her' the word 'they' or 'their' was 
used. 
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Part A - Is a view different from a wish? 
	
4.2 Wishes to views - no difference in meaning and in practice 
 
The 2006 FLA amendments to the best interest of the child factors introduced a two-tiered 
classification of primary and additional considerations.1  Children's wishes became a child's 
views and were classified as an additional consideration.2  The legislative intention of 
whether a child’s voice is less important if categorised as an additional consideration remains 
unresolved.  However, the Explanatory Memorandum3 described that consideration of a 
child’s view instead of a wish captured more of the child’s perceptions and feelings.4  The 
doctrinal research discussed in Chapter 3 concluded that whilst some Judges did expressly 
recognise the difference in the 2006 legislative amendment from wish to view, most Judges 
in their judicial determinations did not indicate that there was a conceptual difference 
between the meaning of a wish and a view.  Also in the majority of cases, the change in 
terminology did not demonstrate any greater significance on what the child was saying, 
whether it is was expressed as a wish or a view.  Further, a review of case authorities from 
the Family Court of Australia, Federal Magistrates Court, Federal Circuit Court and the 
appeals courts did not overturn the seminal pre-2006 'child wish' authorities of In the 
Marriage of Harrison and Woollard (1995)18 Fam LR 788 ('Harrison and Woollard') and R 
and R: Children’s wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 ('R and R: Children's wishes'). 
 
To ascertain the opinions and the practices of the ICLs and Judges interviewed, the 
participants were asked if the 2006 FLA best interest 'child voice' amendments from wishes to 
views was different in meaning or in practice.  That is, is a view different from a wish?  Table 
1 provides the themes extracted for Part A. 
 
  
																																								 																				
1 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('FLA') as amended by Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 
(Cth) deleting s 68F and inserting ss 60CC(1)-(3).  
2 FLA ss 60CC(1)-(3). 
3 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth). 
4 Ibid Schedule 1 - Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
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Table 1  
Is a view different from a wish? 
Themes 
• Wishes or views mean the same 
• Whether the FLA expresses the consideration of a child's voice as a wish (pre-2006 
regime) or view (post -2006 regime), the application of the consideration is similar in 
practice 
• The best interests of the child remain the paramount consideration whether what a 
child has to say is called a wish or view 
 
The responses from 10 out of 14 ICLs5 and four out of six Judges6 was that there was no 
difference in the meaning whether the child voice provision was expressed as a wish or view.  
One of those respondents, ICLN4 acknowledged that 'based primarily on what I heard from 
other practitioners', the change in meaning was supposed to be significant but that had not 
translated to any change in meaning for that ICL.  Further, nine7 out of 14 ICLs and three8 out 
of four Judges saw no difference in practice with the change from wishes to views.  However, 
ICLN4 and JN2, thought although there was no change in meaning, there was a change in 
practice facilitated through the flexibility permitted in the 2006 FLA Division 12A 
amendments of consideration of a child's view.  JN2 explains: 
 
Basically the evidence of children is admissible although it’s hearsay.  Now if the evidence that’s 
admissible is primarily wishes, then that might be restrictive.  If it is views, it relates to anything that 
the child might say which has relevance.  So I think views includes wishes.’  
 
From the responses of the ICLs, a Queensland ICL was most vocal in expressing the lack of a 
difference:  
 
I don’t care what anybody else says they’re essentially the same.  So I’m not saying nothing has 
changed from a negative perspective, I’m saying it’s always been to me somewhat positive.9  
 
																																								 																				
5 ICLQ1, ICLQ2, ICLQ3, ICLQ4, ICLN1, ICLN2, ICLN4, ICLV3, ICLV4, ICLV5. 
6 JQ2, JN1, JN2, JV2. 
7 ICLQ1, ICLQ2, ICLQ3, ICLQ4, ICLN1, ICLN2, ICLV3, ICLV4, ICLV5. 
8 JQ2, JN1, JV2. 
9 ICLQ2. 
134 
	
ICLN1 said: ‘No I haven’t recognised there’s been a great difference’10 and the change was 
just ‘government claptrap’.11  ICLV5 thought that there was no difference in whether it was 
described as a wish or a view and said it was just a game with words, or just a change in 
words.  ICLQ1 did not see any difference in meaning or in the way they practiced whether it 
was expressed as a wish or view. 
 
Of the Judges, JQ2 said that they could not see the significance with the change in 
terminology.  JQ2 gave a description of their practice prior to the bench and then their 
observations from the bench:  
 
Although you might call them children’s views as opposed to children’s wishes, as I’ve seen it at the 
bar and then on the bench it’s done in the same way.  Social workers or psychologists who prepare 
reports simply report what the children have said in the same way they used to. 
 
A Victorian Judge said ‘we’re talking semantics really whether expressed as a wish or view’12 
and ‘it certainly didn’t change anything I did one iota’.13  JN1 was not convinced that the 
change in terminology had any difference in meaning or practice: 
 
 There’s a lot of academic debate and some legal debate … I mean there’s all sorts of learned 
dissertation as to the difference but in reality you want to find out what is going through that child’s 
mind and how that child is coping and whether it’s expressed as views or wishes, I'm not particularly 
fussed. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2006 FLA amendments, stated that the term child's 
view was not only to ‘capture a child’s perceptions and feelings,’14but it was to mirror the 
CROC terminology and comply with the CROC.15  The Judges16 expressed that although the 
changes meant for this to occur (as explained in the Explanatory Memorandum17) there was 
no difference demonstrated in practice.  JV2 said: 
																																								 																				
10 ICLN1. 
11 ICLN1. 
12 JV2. 
13 JV2. 
14 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
15 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991. 
16 JQ2, JN1, JV2. 
17 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth). 
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That amendment was to take account of CROC and bring us into better line with our international 
responsibilities ... but I don’t think that in fact anything turned on the difference between views and 
wishes.  
 
The ICLs18 that saw no difference in practice also held similar views to Judges regarding 
compliance with CROC.   
 
Whilst the majority said there was no difference in meaning and in practice, some 
participants offered an explanation of what they thought the amendment was intended to 
represent.  Consideration of a view instead of a wish was intended to assist in contextualising 
the circumstances of what was happening in the child’s life.  ICLV4 said that consideration of 
a child's view is 'probably better conceptually than asking what the children’s wishes are.  A 
wish seems to be a remote prospect rather than a view.’  ICLQ2 said:  
  
 Wishes are concerned … with what the child would prefer in his or her life.  Views are concerned    
               with the fundamental reasoning behind that and some more in-depth analysis rather than a     
               superficial exploration of it.   
 
ICLV1 said that: 'children may have wishes that are impossible to implement and they then 
have a  view about who is the appropriate parent to be with.'  ICLQ4 described it as: 'whether 
it’s expressed as a view or a wish, in terms of practical application of that evidence, it’s what 
the kids have to say.'  
 
ICLQ4 expressed what they thought the legislative intention of a view was: 
 
I think the intent was to try and move away from a ‘what do you want question’ to a child … the 
amendment was trying to clarify how that evidence ought to be dealt with; in the sense that something 
expressed by a child is just that. 
 
Dissimilar to the views expressed by the majority of respondents, two out of six Judges19 and 
four out of 14 ICLs20 were quite passionate about the 2006 FLA child view changes.  The 
																																								 																				
18 ICLQ1, ICLQ2, ICLQ3, ICLQ4, ICLN1, ICLN2,  ICLV3, ICLV4, ICLV5. 
19 JQ1, JV1. 
20 ICLV1, ICLV2, ICLQ5, ICLN3. 
136 
	
minority of respondents all reported that the change was significant in practice as it could 
provide a fairer outcome for children.  
 
ICLQ5 expressed the importance by saying that ‘the change in wording seriously has 
determined that it did mean a difference.’  ICLV2 ‘was passionate about the change in 
words’21 and stated that it had provided more flexibility in the way they practiced as an ICL:  
 
Where I find that practically [useful] is when speaking to parents.  I say there’s a distinction now in 
views that then empowers me to then bring into account lots of other concepts such as the context in 
which the alleged wishes were expressed.   
 
ICLV2 said that the meaning of the changes was best expressed by Her Honour Justice 
Bennett and quoted: 
 
Views will capture a child’s perception, inclinations and feelings but not necessarily involve an 
aspiration or conclusion.  Wishes are the result of perceptions, inclinations and feeling coalescing into a 
specific desire and ambition on the child’s mind.22  
 
The Judge who thought the changes significant said ‘views can be broader, vaguer, more 
aspirational whereas wishes are concrete conclusions.’23  JV1 said that they did not think it 
was fair or appropriate for children to express wishes about ‘the two people who should be 
precious to them’ and that the child’s relationship with the parents should be looked after and 
conserved.  JV1 added that the amendment was a welcome change and assisted the court 
particularly in considering matters in high conflict cases.  JQ1 considered the change not only 
important for the profession, but to the broader public: 
 
I think it’s important in terms of education of the community that ... it’s not a matter of asking children 
what they want and then saying well we found out what they want, let’s do that. ... I think probably 
views is a better expression ... it’s potentially helpful in educating the community generally.  
 
The 2006 amendment to the FLA provided a platform that practitioners could utilise to 
investigate what children had to say.  Changing a wish to a view was designed to result in a 
																																								 																				
21 ICLV2.  
22 ICLV2, quoting Justice Bennett in Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) [62]. 
23 JV1.  
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broader investigation into all the circumstances and events affecting the child’s life.  If a view 
is different from a wish, then consideration of a child’s view should give a child greater 
freedom to genuinely participate in the process rather than feeling alienated from the process.  
The minority’s opinion is an incisive statement of the significance of the change that was 
defined in the Explanatory Memorandum.24  The minority view did go to the heart of the 
symbolic change intended in the legislation.  In practice, however, this platform, according to 
the majority of those interviewed, has always existed and continues to do so.  The majority 
view was that although the change in terminology did not have implications in meaning or in 
practice, this did not detract from the importance of listening to children.  In practice the 
focus has remained on a thorough investigation of all aspects of the case to ensure best 
outcomes for children.  The words views or wishes are interchangeable and if further 
investigation was needed ICLs or Judges were able to conduct a broader investigation.  The 
majority view of the ICLs and Judges was that a view is not different from a wish in meaning 
and the amendments have fundamentally reflected what had always happened in practice.  
 
4.3 Views are important but the best interest of the child factors remain the  
paramount consideration  
 
The doctrinal research discussed in Chapter 3 found that a child's view was considered  
according to the maturity and capacity of the child25 and balanced against other factors such  
as parental capacity and best interest of the child factors.26  Participants interviewed by 
Parkinson and Cashmore27 stated that a child’s view was important but should be considered 
in light of the evidence, age and maturity of the child.28  Judges and ICLs interviewed for this 
research also considered that the best interests of the child factors and parental capacity were 
the focus of consideration.  Parental capacity is the ability of the parent to care for children 
responsibly and to be able to engage in a constructive meaningful way with the other parent.  
A child’s best interests are determined by the court with reference to the objects and 
																																								 																				
24 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth). 
25 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 ('Gillick'). See Dylan & Dylan [2007] 
FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [247].  
26 Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) [64]. 
27 Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008), 116. 
28 Ibid. 
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principles29 that ensure the child has meaningful involvement with their parents and is free 
from harm, so allowing them to grow to their full potential.30  
 
The courts consider what is best for the child by taking into account primary and additional 
considerations.31  A child's view is listed as an additional consideration,32 and is one in a list 
of factors.  The challenge therefore for ICLs and Judges is to determine whether parental 
capacity and the best interest paramountcy factors can co-exist with allowing a child the right 
to have their voice heard.  JQ1 expresses the difficulty in determining what is best for the 
child when parental capacity is questionable: 
 
People that come to this court are overwhelmingly personality disordered, drug addicted, mentally ill 
and essentially pretty horrible people.  They are not the sort of people you would want parenting your 
children.  That sounds harsh, it sounds horrible but it’s the truth. So to what extent should children’s 
wishes be heard?  Well of course that’s the big deal, the main game.  But the fact is that the cohort of 
people that run matters to parenting trials, enormous care has to be taken into hearing the views of 
children because often the views of children are immensely distorted by a plethora of things.  Not least 
to which the extent of which their psychopathology has been completed stuffed up by their bloody 
parents. 
 
ICLQ1 concurred with those sentiments expressed above by JQ1 and also spoke of the 
difficulty of listening to a child’s view when parental capacity is questionable.  ICLQ1 said 
that it was impossible to really know how much credence to place on things that are said by 
children because parents may have engaged children in the dispute.  ICLQ1 questioned 
whether the child could differentiate between what they ‘genuinely believe’ or if it was ‘a 
figment of their imagination.’  ICLQ1 further said that the family law system itself is not 
designed to have children’s views as the focal point and the system is very much based on 
‘parenting and capacity to parent and child development theories’.  ICLQ3 said that although 
a child’s views must be taken into account, it is not ‘the be all and end all of everything.  It’s 
about the parents.’33  ICLV1 stated that caution must be given when ascertaining a child’s 
view and parental capacity is the main issue:  
 
																																								 																				
29 Defined in the FLA. 
30 FLA s 60B. 
31 Ibid s 60CC. 
32 Ibid s 60CC(3)(a). 
33 ICLQ3. 
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My view is that I just try and assess, having regard to all the material I’ve got, where the child would 
be better off, which parent is better as the main caregiver because more often than not that is the main 
issue. 
 
The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration34 in parenting disputes.  Like 
parental capacity, the best interest paramountcy factor was a major response when 
participants were asked about considering children’s views.  The prevailing opinion is that 
the best interests will be paramount notwithstanding a child’s view.  ICLN3 explains: 
 
 Fundamentally what it means is that very few kids are in the position to know what’s best for them.  
Yeah maybe I'm interested in their views but the kids are caught in the middle of a war zone!  They 
might as well be in Sarajevo getting bombed … I think far too many people place far too much weight 
on children’s views.  I'm interested in their views and drawing that distinction.  I'm interested in their 
views, not just because the law says you should be but because they’re more insightful.  So the role of 
views and best interests - views are, in my book, a less important aspect than best interest.  
 
ICLV4 said that in considering a child’s view, the ICL had to consider the child’s need to  
have a meaningful relationship with the parents balanced against protecting the child from  
harm and that this ‘has always been the crux of it really so that’s what every case is about.’  
ICLV4 said that the child’s views can provide insight into important factors: 
  
 It allows me to extrapolate out some of the other factors such as the parent’s attitude to parenting, their 
level of insight into what their children’s needs are, their ability to promote a meaningful relationship.  
 
ICLQ2 said that the information put before the court to determine what is in the best interest 
can be challenged by the rules of evidence and technicalities and this may affect a child’s 
right to be heard.  In terms of the weight to be placed on the child’s views ICLQ4 said views 
are still nonetheless an additional consideration to be taken into account and therefore not as 
important as the primary considerations and what is in the child’s best interest.  ICLN2 
provided a similar opinion when consideration is given to a child’s views as ‘one needs to 
look at if it is their best interest and at all the circumstances of the case, including the child’s 
maturity or developmental delay’. 
 
																																								 																				
34 FLA s 60CA. 
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ICLV3 described the best interest of the child factors and parental capacity as a ‘forward 
looking decision based on what is referred to at that point.  It tends to be ...the best of two 
worst outcomes.’  ICLV3 said that in cases where there is a highly dysfunctional family ‘the 
only outcome was to look at the best of the worst-case scenarios in these parenting 
circumstances’.  JQ1’s comments displayed similar frustrations to that of ICLV3.  JQ1 
described the best interest of the child factors as ‘a many headed beast’ which generated 
much debate amongst academics, lawyers and community organisations.  However, JQ1 said 
that although a child’s view is important it is ‘parental capacity that is critical in determining 
best interest factors’.  JV2 described the best interest factors as ‘what’s best for the child’ and 
said that in that context when listening to children 'views are just one of the factors that the 
court exercises the discretion as to what’s in the best interests of the child and it can be no 
more than that.'  JN2 said a child’s interests have to be represented and it is important to take 
their views into account, however JN2 did not expand on this point.  JV1 said that when 
Judges look at the child’s views they look at the best interest factors and what is best for the 
child until they are 18 years old.  JV1 said that a number of factors are considered including 
‘having one parent out of the life of a child because otherwise the child will not have any 
peace or quiet.’  
 
The comments from the ICLs also indicated strong perceptions on how children's views are 
heard.  ICLN3 said: 
 
Developmentally this child is going to be less mature, less able to focus and differentiate their best 
interest etcetera and yet you’re expected to just do what they tell you?  I just think there’s a real danger 
in that.  It again elevates a child’s perception of what they want beyond … what is actually best for 
them. 
 
The view that children may not know what is best for them and that the best outcomes for 
listening to children will be decisions made by adults is described by ICLN4: 
 
I think it really becomes too hard for some people too and the judiciary as well as counsel, to give the 
proper weight to a child’s view. I mean I think we still maintain that children should be seen and not 
heard type of mentality.  I think that prevails through our custom. 
 
141 
	
The statements regarding parental capacity and best interest factors illustrate the practice that 
ICLs and Judges use to determine what is best for the child notwithstanding the child 
expressing a view.  The legislation requires that the parent is responsible for the child’s care 
and welfare until the child is 18 years old and the court must consider what is in the child’s 
best interest. 35  Parental capacity is a significant factor in parenting disputes.  Children’s best 
interests are served by protecting them from adults who have demonstrated an inability to 
foresee that the arguments they engage in are not healthy for childhood development.  The 
principle of the child’s right to be heard may be in clear conflict with the child’s need to be 
protected from those parents who have an inability to know what is in their child’s best 
interest.  This conflict is demonstrated in the responses provided by the respondents.  
 
4.4 Part A conclusions 
 
The collated responses provided by ICLs and Judges to the question ‘Is a view different from 
a wish’ are presented in Table A and Table B below.  The tables show 4 out of 6 Judges and 
10 out of 14 ICLs considered that a view is not different from a wish in meaning.  Further, 
three out of six Judges and nine out 14 ICLs considered that a view is not different from a 
wish in practice.  The minority of respondents (two Judges and four ICLs) believed that the 
change in terminology from wishes to views required a significant exploration of a child’s 
voice and that a view was different from a wish in meaning and in practice.  Further, four out 
of six Judges and eight out of 14 ICLs considered that parental capacity and the best interest 
of the child factors were most important notwithstanding the views expressed by the child.  
The majority view was that in practice, the focus remained on a thorough investigation of all 
aspects of the case to ensure best outcomes for children.  Compliance with legislative and 
case law authorities, guidelines36 along with international obligations37 fundamentally 
reflected what they had always done in practice regardless of the change in terminology.  
Children’s views are considered in the context of what is determined as the child's best 
interest and an assessment of parental capacity.  For the majority of respondents, the word 
view is not different from a wish and the terms are interchangeable.  The research findings 
																																								 																				
35 Ibid ss 60B, 61B, 61C. 
36 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian 
and Federal Circuit Court of Australia).  See also Family Law Council and Family Law Section of the Law Council of 
Australia, Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers doing family law work (2nd ed) October 2010. 
37 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991. 
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are indicative of the doctrinal research discussed in Chapter 3.  The doctrinal research 
concluded that in the context of whether a child's view is different from a wish, no case 
authority overturned the seminal pre-2006 child wish authorities and although some Judges 
did expressly recognise the difference in the legislative provision, most Judges in their 
judicial determinations did not indicate that there was a conceptual difference between the 
meaning of a child's view to that of the pre-2006 child's wish provision.   
	
Table A 
 
Is a view different from a wish? 
 
ICL responses. 
 
Wishes and views same in meaning 10 
Wishes and views same in meaning and practice 9 
Wishes and views same in meaning but different in practice due to Division 12A 1 
Views different in meaning to a wish 4 
Views different in practice to a wish 4 
Best interest of the child and parental capacity major factors in custody cases 8 
 
Table B 
 
Is a view different from a wish? 
 
Judge responses. 
 
Wishes and views same in meaning 4 
Wishes and views same in meaning and practice 3 
Wishes and views same in meaning but different in practice due to Division 12A 1 
Views different in meaning to a wish 2 
Views different in practice to a wish 2 
Best interest of the child and parental capacity major factors in custody cases 4 
 
Part B - The role of the ICL 
 
4.5 Overview 
 
The duties and functions of the lawyer representing the child's interests were enshrined in the 
2006 FLA amendments.38  The ICL's role is to act as an impartial best interest advocate39 and 
																																								 																				
38 FLA Part VII, Division 10. 
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to put the child's views fully before the court.40  A review of case authorities established that 
not all cases explain how an ICL ascertains or advocates the child’s views other than by 
analysis of the family consultant's report.  The ICL's have national Guidelines for ICLs41 and 
each Legal Aid Commission provides additional practice notes on how the ICL is to meet 
with children and find out the child's views.  Social science research42confirmed that ICL 
practices remain divergent43 and ICLs and Judges, thought that ‘facilitating a child’s 
participation is of less significance than the evidence-gathering and litigation management 
function'.44  Part B discusses the opinions of ICLs and Judges on the role of the ICL in 
ascertaining a child’s view, the skills considered necessary to practice as an ICL, the best 
model of representation for children and differences in ICL practices. 
 
The ‘role’ of the ICL includes the expected functions, duties, or responsibilities of the best 
interest advocate.  Sociologist define ‘role’ as:  
 
 [S]ystems of boundary conditions (normative constraints), to which the actors who play them are 
 supposed to conform, and of corresponding rights that these boundaries give ... the boundary 
 conditions generally include an indeterminacy and an ambiguity that provide ... a margin for 
 manoeuvre within which strategic conduct can develop.'45  
 
The word "role" also means 'the proper or customary function'46 or 'what [a] person ... is 
appointed or expected to do.'47 
 
The Guidelines for ICLs48 provides guidance and set out the expectations for the ICL.  The 
role of the ICL is described as being independent of the courts and parties, maintaining 
professionalism, working with the family consultant or other experts, providing to the court 
admissible evidence, making appropriate submissions and enabling the child to be involved 
in decision-making about the proceeding.49  The Guidelines also state that the ICL ‘does not 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
39 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 2. 
40 FLA s 68LA(5)(b). 
41 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36. 
42 Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Deblaquiere J., and Horsfall B. (2014) Independent Children’s Lawyers 
Study, Final Report, (2nd ed) Canberra: Attorney General’s Department. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid xi. 
45 Raymond Boudon and Francois Bourricaud, A Critical Dictionary of Sociology (Taylor & Francis, 2002), 308. 
46 The Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie Library, 1981), 1496. 
47 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 6th ed, 1976), 975. 
48 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36. 
49 Ibid 2. 
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take instructions from the child but is required to ensure the court is fully informed of the 
child’s views, in an admissible form where possible.’50  The Guidelines in practice will be 
further discussed in Chapter 4, Part D. 
 
The respondents were asked semi-structured questions regarding what they thought was the 
role of the ICL in the context of listening to children.  The ICLs and Judges interviewed were 
not provided with a definition of "role".  The majority described the role of the ICL in the 
context of job-related activities.  Others described the role of the ICL in the context of 
personal attributes such as having empathy, common-sense and good judgment.  The majority 
of the respondents were silent on, or did not expressly state that the role of the ICL was to 
communicate the child’s views to the court.  The message however from Judges and ICLs 
was that the lawyer appointed to the role of the ICL carried a great responsibility in 
representing the best interest of the child.  JN1 elucidates the principle of the importance of 
the role of the ICL: 
 
 The court has determined that this child’s interests have to be represented.  Most children have an 
interest, I mean children don’t live in a vacuum, they know what’s going on.  The child is entitled to 
know who’s representing their interests because there’s a broader context as to whether the ICLs 
should represent or should act for the child.  Sensibly I think we’ve adopted a view that it’s an interest 
based appointment.  But that doesn’t take away the responsibility of an ICL to know whose interest 
they’re representing to give the children the right to express themselves to that person.  There will no 
doubt be one or two who find it difficult and a good ICL will manage it.  
 
The courts must determine what is in the best interest of the child as this is the paramount 
consideration.51  This section addresses questions about what the role of the ICL is with 
respect to giving a child a voice in litigated parenting disputes.  Table 2 below details the 
themes. 
 
																																								 																				
50 Ibid. 
51 FLA s 60CA. 
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Table 2 
 
The role of the ICL 
 
 
Themes 
 
 
• The role of the ICL is described according to job related activities or according to the 
ICLs’ personal skills, attributes and qualities  
• The ICL is an independent best interests advocate 
• The ICL's role is not mentioned specifically as one of ascertaining a child's view  
• The ICL's role is to advocate for the child's best interests 
 
Table C and Table D summarises what Judges and ICLs regard as the role of the ICL. 
 
Table C 
 
The role of the ICL 
 
ICL responses 
	
Job related tasks important for ICLs 11 
Personal skills essential for ICLs 3 
Role of ICL must be independent 6 
Best Interest lawyer not child advocate lawyer 9 
ICLs role is to ascertain child's view 3 
 
Table D 
 
The role of the ICL 
 
Judge responses 
	
Job related tasks important for ICLs 6 
Personal skills essential for ICLs 4 
Role of ICL must be independent 2 
Best Interest lawyer not child advocate lawyer 5 
ICLs role is to ascertain child's view 2 
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4.6 The role of the ICL described according to job-related activities 
	
Job-related activities are what an ICL does in their day to day tasks.  These tasks include 
gathering and assessing evidence, providing an assessment about what is in the best interest 
of the child and working with other professionals.  
Eleven out of 14 ICLs52 and all six Judges stated that the role of the ICL was in the context of 
their task or job related activities.  JQ2 said that the best ICLs are 
Those who not only organise for a family report to be prepared and psychiatric assessments … [they] 
proactively go out and talk to teachers and doctors and police and issue the appropriate subpoena and 
get all of the information that’s required before the court and have all subpoenaed documents clearly 
inspected by the time a trial starts and copies of those documents they intend to tender … perhaps in 
conjunction with the report writer.  The ICL that does not do their job well are those who just do very 
little, other than put a couple of reports before you and don’t really carry out the investigations as 
thoroughly as they should. 
 
ICLQ5 echoed this view and also included analytical tasks:  
 
 The role of the ICL is to access relevant information, place it before the court in a way that places the 
best information before the court … provide an analysis of that information and … put it forward in the 
best possible way …to [give] the court … options.53 
 
Respondents who stated the role of the ICL was in the context of task oriented activities,  
were closely aligned with how the role was described in the FLA54 and the Guidelines for  
ICLs.55  The responses also linked with the theme that the ICL should act independently from 
the parties in the proceedings and be the advocate for the child's best interests, that is, not  
act as the child's lawyer. 
 
The working relationship with social scientists featured in the discussion about the job-related 
activities of the ICL.  The term ‘social scientist’ includes the family report writer or family 
consultant.56  Some ICLs recognised the importance of working with the social scientist and 
																																								 																				
52 ICLQ1,ICLQ2, ICLQ3, ICLQ4, ICLQ5, ICLN2, ICLN3, ICLN4, ICLV1, ICLV2,  ICLV3. JQ1, JQ2, JN1, JN2, JV1, JV2. 
53 ICLQ5. 
54FLA Division 10 - Independent representation of child's interests. 
55 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 2-3. 
56 The social scientist could be a social worker, psychologist or psychiatrist. 
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the skills that they bring to allow a child’s voice to be heard.  ICLN2 said that the role of the 
ICL required them to be more involved in the assessment of the child: 
 
As ICLs we work very closely with that social worker because obviously we’re not trained in that way 
to turn our mind to certain issues but I think ICLs are now pushing past the law and looking at the 
social science dynamic of situations.  So I think there’s a lot of discussions now, informal discussions 
… that perhaps weren’t being had before.  It used to be a situation where the social workers were just 
getting in the box and you were asking them questions.  Now there are a lot of conversations that are 
being had with the ICL and the social worker before and after the preparations of the report.57  
 
One aspect stressed in the multidisciplinary context was the necessity for ICLs to act 
independently.  ICLQ4 said that their role required them to make an assessment on the 
evidence and not to rely solely on the report of the social scientist ‘as the basis on assessing 
the whole case’.58  ICLN2 concurred and said:  
  
 The ICL is not to passively accept what a social scientist has to say and the ICL should be looking at 
the evidence, looking at each party’s case, speaking to the social worker and make an assessment 
themselves of what is going to be in the best interest of this child.59 
 
The opinions of some respondents regarding ICLs working within a multi-disciplinary 
environment are discussed in Part D. 
 
In relation to how the 2006 amendments impacted on the role of the ICL, ICLQ4 said it did 
not change their role but reflected what was already done by ICLs in practice.60  Some 
acknowledged that in addition to the Division 10 provisions of the FLA,61 Division 12A62 of 
the FLA provided more investigative provisions63 and a greater appreciation of social science 
and the assistance that knowledge brings with representing children.64  JN1 was very 
enthusiastic about the changes in the legislation and described them as ‘sensational’ and a 
‘really good tool’ for practice.  JV2 said that the ‘child focused’ provisions allowed flexibility 
																																								 																				
57 ICLN2.  
58 ICLQ4. 
59 ICLN2.  
60 ICLQ4.  
61 FLA. 
62 Ibid Division 12A. 
63 ICLN3. 
64 ICLN2. 
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in their judicial role and that the ICL was therefore able to do their job and to run matters in 
court with a more child friendly focus. 
 
One ICL said the change in the legislation from the title of “child representative” to 
“independent children’s lawyer”65 assisted in describing more accurately the role of the ICL.  
ICLV2 said that the change in name, was a ‘symbolic change that represents what the ICL’s 
role is and should be in practice’.66  
 
4.7 Personal skills, attributes or qualities necessary to effectively carry out the 
role of the ICL  
 
Personal skills, attributes or qualities that best serve a practitioner to act in the role of an ICL 
were reported by three out of 14 ICL67 respondents and four out of six Judges.68  The Judges, 
although acknowledging that knowledge of the laws was critical, did see that ‘non-legal 
skills’ were also essential qualities required of an ICL.  Key personal skills identified were 
good communication skills or interpersonal skills.  Necessary personal attributes were having 
empathy, common-sense and good judgement.  Knowledge has been described as being 
achieved ‘in an instant, however competence requires as a rule, repeated practice’69 and that 
competence comes from personal qualities.70  Empathy allows the ICL the ability to 
recognise in an appropriate way the emotional state of the person and respond to it 
appropriately.71  Further, according to Schwartz: 
 
 We recognise others as empathetic when we feel they have accurately acted on or somehow 
acknowledged in stated or unstated fashion our values or motivations, our knowledge, and our skills or 
competence …. We feel that the other person is showing empathy when we are acknowledged not just 
for what we know but for what we can handle….Empathic recognition is not intrusive, overwhelming, 
sadistic, or otherwise abusive of the vulnerability that such recognition might create … and is central to 
… “tactful” interpretation or any other intervention.72 
 
																																								 																				
65 Referring to FLA s 68LA. 
66 ICLV2. 
67 ICLN3, ICLV2, ICLV5. 
68 JQ1, JN1, JV1, JV2. 
69 See 'empathy' described in Wynn Schwartz 'From passivity to competence: A conceptualization of knowledge, skill, 
tolerance, and empathy'  (2002) 65(4) Psychiatry 338-345, 338  <www.sdp.org>.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid 342. 
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Along with empathy, common-sense was an attribute most important in fulfilling the ICL’s 
role.  Common sense is the ability of a person to judge matters and approach issues with a 
practicality in all circumstances so as to get the best outcomes.  Life skills, good judgement 
and the courage to ‘reality check’ clients were qualities identified as needed by ICLs.  ICLN3 
said that the role of the ICL requires: 
 
People who are empathetic to other human beings ... People who are sensitive to and can relate to 
childhood. ... A bucketful of common-sense; in a good spirit of cooperation and being conscious of the 
fragility of ongoing relationships.’73  
 
JQ1 said the good ICLs are:  
 
People who spend some time in the trenches ... it’s about judgement.  It’s about acquiring skills.  They 
don’t react to things and all the horrors.  They just apply huge dollops of common sense, empathy and 
good knowledge of the law and most importantly of all judgement.74  
 
JQ1 praised those ICLs that did bring common-sense to the proceedings and ‘wished that for  
every court proceedings involving parenting matters a well-trained and experienced ICL was 
appointed.’  JV2 also described the role of the ICL in terms of personal attributes: 
  
 They need to be intelligent, they need to be empathetic, they need to be compassionate, they need to 
have insight and perception, and they need to understand children.  It’s the empathy, the compassion; 
the insight and perception are ultimately what makes a good ICL. 
 
ICLN3 described the personal attributes an ICL needed to achieve the best outcome for 
children: 
 
  Humility ... and some passion.  Passion without becoming a ranting lunatic.  I really  
                want to see the best outcome possible ... and I'm going to use the tools and all the    
                referrals that I've got to try and achieve that for them. 
 
																																								 																				
73 ICLN3. 
74 JQ1. 
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The personal qualities described by the respondents are not defined in any legislation or 
guidelines.  Nevertheless, these skills were considered as essential characteristics for an ICL 
practitioner to perform the tasks efficiently. 
 
4.8 The ICL is an independent best interests advocate not the child's lawyer 
 
The FLA75 requires that the court must determine what is in the best interest of the child.  The 
court can determine that the child’s interest is best represented by an ICL.76  The ICL’s role 
in parenting proceedings is to form an independent view based on evidence as to what is in 
the best interest of the child77 however the ICL is not the child’s lawyer.78  Of the 14 ICLs 
and six Judges interviewed, six ICLs79 and two Judges80 specifically mentioned the 
importance of the independence of the ICL.  Being independent is defined as being 'free from 
control in action and judgement' and to be 'autonomous'.81  ICLs are to present ‘evidence to 
the court in an independent manner not focussing on what’s best for either parent.' 82  Another 
description of the role was that an ICL was to provide good checks and balances as the 
parents were looking after their own interests.83  ICLN1 said: 
 
 You’re the independent children’s lawyer and you hold a lot of power and a lot of influence … there 
are two things you are as an ICL, you are independent and you’re a lawyer.  You must always 
remember that.  What does the law say, and not how do I feel about this, what do I think, I am 
independent.84  
 
The independence of the ICL was seen as important so as to avoid potential conflict of  
interest or being positioned as a witness in the proceedings.  ICL5 said: 
 
The relationship between the ICL and the child is not like a solicitor and a party.  There are things that 
a kid may say that we need to investigate and we need to follow up, as a best interest principle.  So 
																																								 																				
75 FLA s 60CA. 
76 Ibid s 68L. 
77 Ibid s 68LA(2)(b). 
78 Ibid s 68LA(4)(a). 
79 ICLQ1, ICLQ3, ICLQ4, ICLQ5, ICLN1, ICLN4. 
80 JV1, JV2. 
81 Collins English Dictionary <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/independent> defining 'independent'. 
82 ICLQ1. 
83 ICLN4.  
84 ICLN1.  
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there’s a whole lot of issues around that and if a child were to make a disclosure of abuse, you’ve then 
got the dilemma of do you become a notifier?  And then you become conflicted out potentially. 
 
The independence of the ICL was, in the eyes of some respondents, critical to ensure that the 
child’s interests were effectively represented.  Listening to children, one Judge85 detailed,  
was enhanced by the independence of the ICL.  JV1 said including ICLs in court proceedings 
‘has corresponded with the views of children being put before the court in a way the court 
could have some confidence it was independent.’  JV2 also maintained that ICL 
independence is critical:  
 
 The view of the ICL in a difficult case is fundamental … it’s relatively rare that a party other than the 
ICL will focus on the child.  [The parents] usually and understandably are very self-interested 
otherwise they wouldn’t be there. So I think the role of the ICL… is absolutely fundamental. 
 
ICLs and Judges were asked whether an ICL should be a child advocate or best interest of the 
child advocate.  The best interest of the child representation requires that the advocate is an 
independent legal voice, not instructed by a child.  The ‘best interest’ lawyer is to present to 
the court the evidence of what they consider is the best outcome for the child in all the  
circumstances.  The lawyer can hear from the child as to their view; however, they are not  
bound by what the child expresses.  The ‘child advocate’ model is a lawyer who provides  
legal assistance and representation to the child and is instructed by the child and must act on  
that child’s instructions.  The lawyer must act on the child’s instructions even though they  
may not consider it is in their best interest.  
 
Nine ICLs86 and five Judges87 commented that the best interest model of representation was 
the appropriate ICL model and best conveyed a child’s views to the court.  Their views 
regarding the difficulty with a child advocate model versus best interest representation was 
best described by ICLQ2:  
 
You’ve got a best interests lawyer, who is objective and independent, has no vested interest other than 
the best interest principles.  Whereas if you’ve got someone representing a child who is duty bound and 
obligated to put … the child views before the court then you get some strange views expressed from 
time to time. 
																																								 																				
85 JV1. 
86 ICLQ1, ICLQ2, ICLQ3, ICLN1, ICLN4, ICLV1, ICLV2, ICLV3, ICLV4. 
87 JQ1, JQ2, JN1, JN2, JV1. 
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ICLQ2 further stated that the introduction of a child advocate model would ‘complicate 
things’.  ICLN1 said the child advocate model is not suitable as ‘children can be influenced 
by various different factors’ and it would ‘just be a funnel for that kind of information’.88  
ICLV1 believed that children did not always know what is in their best interest and ‘the 
situation where ICLs put what … the child needs is much more appropriate’.  ICLQ1 said:  
 
 I think the best interest ICL is the right way to approach the issue, I think you’d just be further 
complicating the system if you had lawyers that were really specifically just attending in court to argue 
for a child. 
 
ICLV4 said children experienced enough pressure and the child advocate model would not be 
appropriate and ‘that children just want their life to roll on as normal’.  ICLQ3 could see that 
the child advocate model may work under strict parameters however cautioned that the 
impartial person should not simply be a mouth-piece and should weigh up and contextualise 
the information given: 
 
It’s also important to make sure that in terms of ascertaining a view or a wish that it’s not just whacked 
into an affidavit with no context that you know she said she wants to live with me or whoever.  But 
rather ... that process of getting that information occurs ... in a way that is protective of kids, is looking 
at context. 
 
ICLV2 saw the potential for conflict with the direct representation model where a parent 
alleges a contravention of the orders: 
If a child instructs a lawyer that they condone the breaking of a court order because they have a 
particular view of where they will live or how they will see a parent then this then is in conflict with 
lawyer’s duty to the court. 
Judges were not enthusiastic about the child advocate model being the model of ICL  
representation of children.  Judges also expressed the view that the child advocate model  
would not necessarily be the best method of expressing the views or wishes of the child.   
Judges felt that it was sufficient to have a properly trained independent ICL89 to convey the  
child’s views and this model would always provide adequate means of conveying a child’s  
																																								 																				
88 ICLN1. 
89 JQ2.  
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view.90  JN1 stated that ‘it is about the best interest of the child, not what the child wants and 
the two are not necessarily the same’.91  JN2 stated that the ICL is required to ensure that the 
court knows the child’s wishes but the ‘predominant and overarching requirement and the 
most important aspect is the best interest of the children as opposed to what the best interest 
of the parties might be’.92  JN2 said that they could not think of a place where the child 
advocate model would be appropriate and the ICL’s position is ‘the best of both worlds’.  
JV1 stated that the child advocate model is not a good model to have; ‘it is like requiring a 
child to express views on a continual basis and ... I think it’s abusive ... our best interest 
representation of children is at odds [with CROC], but it’s probably better than it.’   
 
To summarise, the role of the ICL was seen by the majority of respondents as the impartial, 
independent, best interest advocate.  The ICL is also required to use their skills and 
judgement to assist the court with sound reasoning for the orders that they propose even 
though this may contradict the views or wishes of the child.  These responses mirror the 
requirements stated under the FLA, Guidelines for ICLs and Best Practice Guidelines.  This 
recognition that an ICL may at times present proposals that are not in direct alignment with a 
child’s view is further discussed below.  
 
4.9 Minority say it's the ICL's role to provide the child an opportunity to express 
their views  
 
The independence of the ICL as expressed in the Guidelines for ICLs (and in the responses 
detailed above) is paramount to fulfil the role of the ICL.  The best interest of the child model 
of representation was described by most respondents as the preferred method of practice as 
this permitted the child to have their views heard free from the influence of others.  The role 
of the ICL, according to the Guidelines for ICLs is to ‘seek to provide the child with the 
opportunity to express his or her views in circumstances that are free from the influence of 
others’.93  Children's views are one of a list of  best interest of the child factors94 that the 
courts must consider before determining parenting orders. 95  The Guidelines also describe 
																																								 																				
90 JN1.  
91 JQ1. 
92 JN2. 
93 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 4. 
94 FLA s 60CC(3)(a). 
95 Ibid s 60CD. 
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the responsibilities of the ICL.  However, when the respondents were asked what they saw as 
the role of the ICL, 11 out of 14 ICLs and four out of six Judges did not specifically state that 
it was the role of the ICL to ascertain the child's views.  That is, the majority of those 
interviewed did not state specifically in their responses that the ICL's role is to 'ensure that 
any views expressed by the child ... are fully put before the court'.96  
For those ICLs97 that specifically mentioned that it was the ICLs role to ascertain a child’s 
view ICLN4 said: 
  
 I'm really an advocate for the child and that’s how I position myself to be.  I think the first thing to do 
is to inform the court of the children’s wishes in relation to any matter in the proceedings.  Your role or 
function is to present the case for what the child wants.  The ICL in my opinion should be in there 
advocating just as hard for the child. 
 
ICLV5 said that it was the ICLs role to find out what children want and described this in the  
context of task related work:  
 
 The ICL role is to compile as much information as possible from all areas, from the children 
themselves if they’re age appropriate and all the different institutions and professionals involved in the 
family and to make sure that the information goes first to the report writer who will make a 
recommendation.   
 
ICLV1 mentioned the role of the ICL in ascertaining the child’s views in the context of that 
being one of the many factors that they have to explore and then communicate to the court.  
However, ICLV1 said that it was only part of the process of finding out the legal issues in the 
parenting dispute:  
 
The role of the ICL is to present what I believe to be what the child wants.  I don’t want to use the word 
wish or view.  And then also put to the court what I believe the child needs.  It is essential that the ICL 
can communicate with the child to ascertain their views however the ICL needs to be someone with 
significant legal background in family law so they can provide the court with useful information to 
determine what is in the child’s best interest. 
 
Judges98 that specifically mentioned that it was the role of the ICL to present the child’s 
views to the courts did so with the proviso that it should be done carefully and to always act 
																																								 																				
96 Ibid s 68LA(5)(b). 
97 ICLN4, ICLN5, ICLV1. 
98 JV2 and JN1. 
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in the child’s best interest.  JV2 said that the role of the ‘good ICL’ is to facilitate children’s 
views in as many channels as possible.  JV2 said that the problem that ICLs may encounter in 
their role is that the ICL is not qualified to give an opinion and if they speak to the child they 
need to carefully present that information to the court.   
 
JN1 said that one of the important roles of the ICL is to meet the children and to ‘get their 
instructions’ and it is important for the children to know that ‘they have a representative’ who 
will advise the courts of their views.  The comment about getting the child’s instructions is an 
interesting perspective.  Instructions denote in the legal context a client advocate relationship.  
The ICL however must be independent of the court and the parties to the proceedings.99  The 
ICL ‘does not take the instructions from the child but is required to ensure the court is fully 
informed of the child’s views, in an admissible form where possible’.100  
 
JV1 did not mention specifically that the role of the ICL was to advise the court of the child’s  
views however the Judge did say that the ICL should meet the child so they understand who  
they are representing.  JN2 also did not specifically mention the role of the ICL in presenting 
the child’s views but did provide commentary that the ICL should meet the children and 
represent their interests.  JQ2 and JV2 did not mention specifically the role of the ICL in 
ascertaining a child’s views.  
 
For the minority of ICLs and Judges who saw the role of the ICL as one of ascertaining a 
child's view, a cautionary note should be made.  There should be no inference drawn that 
'getting instructions' or 'advocating for what the child wants' compels the child to give his or 
her views as this is contrary to s 60CE FLA, which prohibits any person from requiring a 
child to express their views.101 A child can express their views if they choose to and the role 
of the ICL in presenting that to the court is of importance if a child is to have their voice 
heard. 
 
 
																																								 																				
99 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 2. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See also Peters & Ortona (No 2) [2016] FamCA 189 (30 March 2016) [30]; Malak & Mairie (No 2) [2016] FamCAFC 
120 (6 July 2016) [52], [55], [59], [60]; Hart & Sellwood [2016] FamCAFC 254 [11]. 
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4.10 Part B conclusions 
 
The role of the ICL was described in terms of the tasks that they are required to do and 
personal qualities necessary to effectively undertake these tasks.  The job-related tasks 
identified by the respondents mirror the requirements stated under the FLA, Guidelines for 
ICLs and Best Practice Guidelines.  However, recognition of qualities such empathy, good 
judgement and commons sense are factors not mentioned as a formal statement of the role of 
the ICL.  Further, the model role that best represents children was considered to be that of the 
best interest advocate.  Whilst this qualitative study is not representative of the practice of all 
ICLs it does illuminate that a subjective view may exist concerning whether it is really the 
role of the ICL to ascertain a child’s view.  This does not mean that the ICL should compel 
the child to express a view (contrary to the FLA) nor does it indicate that the role of the ICL 
disregards obtaining the views of children but rather may demonstrate that the role of the ICL 
is one where they determine what is best for children notwithstanding a child’s view.  
Further, it was considered equally important for the role of the ICL to consider the evidence 
of the social scientist and not to rely upon it and for the ICL to review the reports and make 
their own assessment of what they consider is best for children.  Chapter 4, Part C will 
develop further the discussion of the role of the ICL and the practices of ICLs and Judges in 
relation to speaking to children direct.  
 
Part C – Speaking to children 
 
The 2006 FLA amendments detailed in Division 10 provided a descriptive role of the ICL 
which in essence codified the practices articulated in Re K.102  The FLA detailed that the 
views of the child should be ascertained by an ICL or those persons required to write a 
report.103  The ICL was to ensure that the child’s views were ‘fully put before the court’.104 
The national Guidelines for ICLs105 set out an expectation that the ICLs would meet a child 
and as stated in the FLA, the ICL was to ensure that the child’s view were fully presented to 
the court.106  Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers doing family law work107 explained the 
																																								 																				
102 Re K (1994) 117 FLR 63. 
103 FLA s 60CD(2)(a). 
104 Ibid s 60CD(2)(b), s 68LA(5)(b). 
105 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36. 
106 Ibid 2. 
107 Family Law Council and Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia, Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers 
doing family law work (2nd ed) October 2010. 
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role of the ICL and that a child’s view could be obtained through a family report or evidence 
presented by the ICL.108  The FLA permits the ICLs to speak to children however research 
suggests that the practice of whether an ICL speaks to children varies between states.109  
 
The 2006 amendments to the FLA introduced Division 12A which permitted Judges to case 
manage child related proceedings.  At the time of these amendments the Family Court of 
Australia issued Practice Direction 2 of 2006 (‘PD’) which referred to Division 12A FLA 
child-related proceedings. The PD at 9.2 provided that the Judge may interview a child if 
appropriate and in the presence of other persons such as an expert or an ICL.  On 1 March 
2009, the PD 2 of 2006 was revoked and in August 2010 the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) 
('FLR') were amended and the rule relating to Judges talking to children110 was deleted.111  
The way views were expressed to the court continued to remain through the forum of a 
family report112 or through the child’s interest being represented by an ICL113 or ... 'by such 
other means as the court thinks appropriate’.114  However, despite the deletion of this rule, 
there remains no restrictions placed on Judges to speak with children.115  
 
Part C presents a discussion of the views of ICLs and Judges regarding speaking to children.  
 
4.11 Overview of speaking to children 
 
This section reports on whether ICLs and Judges directly speak with children.  The 
respondents were asked the question: 'Do you speak to a child direct?'  There was no 
definition of what 'speaking to a child direct' meant.  The intent of this open-ended question 
was to allow the respondents to give their own interpretation of what was meant by ‘speaking 
to children’.   
 
Respondents provided broad interpretations of what it meant to speak to children.  Some 
respondents stated that speaking to a child can mean not speaking with the child but just 
																																								 																				
108 Ibid 46-47. 
109 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 42, xi – xiii. 
110 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 15.03. 
111 Family Law Amendment Rules 2010 (Cth). Deleted r 15.03.  No rule replaced the ‘judicial interviewing a child’ provision. 
The explanatory statement said the removal was to ‘reflect that a Judge interviewing a child subject to proceedings is most 
unusual’. 
112 FLA s 60CD(2)(a). 
113 Ibid s 60CD(2)(b). 
114 Ibid s 60CD(2)(c). 
115 N and N [2000] FamCA 1350 (10 August 2000). 
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meeting a child; and, meeting with a child can also be varied in meaning from a simple 
introduction or an in-depth discussion.  Speaking to a child was also described as talking with 
a child with or without someone else present.  Another description of speaking to a child was 
interviewing a child or just having a general discussion with a child.  The significance of the 
responses was that there was no universal definition of what Judges and ICL meant by 
speaking to children.  The responses also showed variations in practices across state 
boundaries and geographical locations. 
 
ICLs and Judges are bound by the same legislation yet there are different interpretations of 
and practices with regards to speaking direct with children.  Some respondents suggested the 
differences in practices were due to the lack of skills to speak to children, cultural practices, 
or different court practices between states.  Other respondents said that the reason to speak to 
children was lack of funding for reports, or financial constraints on the practice due to 
geographical locality.  These factors will be further explored in Chapter 4, Part D.  (See also 
Chapter 1 at 1.4.5 for a discussion on the FLR). 
 
Regardless of differences in respondents’ interpretations of what it meant to speak to a child 
direct, or the different practices, one theme that was predominant across the interviews was 
the opinion that Judges should not speak to children.  The themes extracted from the 
interviews are detailed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  
 
 
Speaking to children  
 
Themes 
 
• Speaking to children direct is interpreted differently 
• Different practices between ICLs and Judges regarding speaking to children exist 
• The majority of ICLs and Judges believe that Judges should not speak to children  
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4.12 ICLs – speaking to children 
 
ICL responses to what was meant by speaking to a child have been grouped as follows.  An 
ICL would: (a) never meet with a child; (b) just meet that is, introduce themselves to the 
child; (c) meet with a child for more than an introduction; (d) talk with the child; and (e) 
interview a child.   
 
The ICL responses varied after further questioning, due in part to what the ICL thought their 
role was and how they engaged with children during the litigation process and in part to their 
geographical location and thus the engagement of the family consultant.  From the responses 
the differences in practice of ICLs can be divided according to predominantly state based 
lines.  The following provides an overview of what Queensland ICL responses were to the 
question of whether they speak to the child direct. 
 
4.12.1 Queensland ICLs – meeting children may be acceptable otherwise it is 
'systems abuse'116 
 
Four out of five Queensland ICLs initial response was that they would never speak to a child. 
Then three out of those four ICLs117 provided further clarification about what they did in 
practice and then said that they would only meet with a child.  ICLQ3 and ICLQ5 further 
clarified their practice by saying that they would meet with a child for the purpose of 
introducing themselves to the child and to provide them with information about the role of 
the ICL but nothing more than that.  They described their role in terms of their job or task 
oriented duties.  ICLQ1’s practice was different to the four other Qld ICLs in that ICL1 
would meet with a child and has regularly done so, but the meeting with the child was more 
than an introduction.  
 
With the responses given from the five Queensland ICLs there was no standardised definition 
in their responses about what it meant to speak to children direct.  ICLQ3 however did draw 
the distinction of what speaking to children meant saying: ‘The differentiation is that I 
																																								 																				
116 The definition of systems abuse is discussed further in 4.12.1. Systems abuse is defined in the National Legal Aid (2013) 
Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 17. 
117 ICLQ1, ICLQ3, ICLQ5. 
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generally tend to meet children rather than interview children’.118  ICLQ5 also touched on the 
point that as an ICL they would meet the child, but it was not their job to interview the child. 
 
The interpretation of just meeting a child rather than speaking to a child, as stated by ICLQ3 
and ICLQ5, can be contrasted with ICLQ1 who said that they did meet with children in about 
a quarter of the cases and did this as it was a ‘good opportunity just to see if the child appears 
to be functioning normally and can engage in a normal happy manner.’  ICLQ1 did not have 
any concerns about the role of an ICL in meeting with children.  ICLQ1 said: ‘I am a [parent] 
and I know how children present ... But I don’t think there’s any magic to it’.  ICLQ1 also 
said that in all the matters that they met with a child, there was a benefit to that child and the 
process.  ICLQ1 did not consider that meeting a child was interviewing the child nor did they 
use the term that they talked to the child or spoke to a child.  However ICLQ1 did 
acknowledge that their practice of meeting with children is more than an introduction (as 
reported by ICLQ3 and ICLQ5).  ICLQ1 did express an understanding of the reluctance of 
ICLs in Queensland to practice in the same way.  ICLQ1 believes that ICLs would be ‘fearful 
that they would have to give evidence about what the child told them ... and ... historically 
that’s not our role [to speak to children].’119  
ICLQ5 also expressed concern about ‘over the state border practices’ and the consequences 
of those practices if followed in Queensland:  
 
If you did that in Queensland [speak to children] you’d be in the witness box and down south they do 
that because they don’t have any other way of getting the information and the judicial officers expect 
them to have interviewed the children … a New South Wales Judge was up here and I happened to 
appear before him and one of his first questions to me was have you interviewed the children?  And my 
response was no … and the expectation was clearly that I would have already met them to find out 
what they wanted and tell the court that.  I have difficulty with that because I think that’s giving 
evidence from the bar table and I can find myself in the witness box up here in Queensland.120 
 
One reason for variation in practices is different court practices adopted between different 
court registries throughout Australia.  ICLQ5 said the different registry practices between 
states do not facilitate the information of the child’s view being presented to the court in any 
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119 ICLQ1.  
120 ICLQ5.  
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other way other than by an ICL.  Two other Queensland ICLs121 said the ordering of family 
reports in Queensland appeared to happen sooner in the litigation process than in other states.  
This practice therefore did not require Queensland ICLs to speak to children like their 
interstate counterparts and was reportedly more beneficial to children in that professionals 
trained in speaking to children, such as a family consultant did so.  ICLQ5 said: 
 
 One thing particularly down south is that they don’t have the benefit of getting a family consultant 
involved as quickly as we do.  We have a very different attitude up here about early intervention and 
the courts and the practitioners and Legal Aid Queensland have always taken the view that we need to 
engage appropriate people early on. 
 
The different court practices and the consequences of ICL involvement in speaking to 
children did concern ICLQ3 who was concerned about the possible danger of children being 
interviewed by an inexperienced person: 
 
 In Queensland there’s a strong view held that ICLs as a matter of right shouldn’t specifically interview 
children directly unless there are some compelling reason to do that.  We’re very conscious of the fact 
that there’s an issue in terms of systems abuse.122 
 
Systems abuse is a term that describes when a child is ‘further traumatised by the system 
(courts, child protection or other State Welfare Authority) which he/she encounters or which 
are appointed to make decisions about the child.’123  Therefore some Queensland ICLs do 
hold a strong view that if they interview the child in addition to other professionals along the 
litigation process, this can be of detriment to the child.  The FLA requires that the best 
interests of the child is the paramount consideration, therefore avoiding systems abuse should 
be at the forefront of any practices regarding speaking to a child direct. 
 
Funding for ICLs and family reports was raised as something that impacts on the way ICLs 
practice.124  ICLQ5 said that the model of funding at Legal Aid Queensland was that a family 
report was obtained at the start of the appointment of the ICL.125  The significance of this 
practice is that ICLs did not have to speak to children as it was done by a family consultant. 
																																								 																				
121 ICLQ3 and ICLQ4. 
122 ICLQ3. 
123 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36, 17. 
124 Funding issues and the impact in practice will be discussed further in Chapter 4, Part D. 
125 ICLQ5. 
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The differences in practices were also explained by some Queensland ICLs as the practice 
they had been accustomed to and ICLQ5 described it as part of the ‘culture of practice’:  
 
I think that’s part of the culture that’s grown up in the various areas ... it’s a bit like when in Rome, 
that’s the process and this is what happens… I think practices developed so differently ...  as things 
[court matters involving ICLs] were increasing around the country we all adopted different methods 
and worked out what would be best for us.  So New South Wales have a culture of taking instruction.  
So even if they could get an early report I don’t know that their practice would change.126 
 
Another reason for the variation can be explained by the individual approach taken by the 
ICL in their practice.  ICLQ4 said that they do not speak to children at all however ICLQ4 
did acknowledge that a literal reading of the Guidelines127 may mandate that.  ICLQ4 said:  
  
At the very least in the presence of a qualified person, the ICL ... meets the child,  
explains their role, explains some of the process ... I have a strong view about this and   
it might be unique to me.   
 
ICLQ4 said that they thought meeting with children was ‘potentially counterproductive’ and 
that ‘someone with a fresh pair of eyes can help identify some of the broader issues.’128   
 
Although most Queensland ICLs interviewed said they would only meet children, one 
Queensland ICL upon reflection said they could see the benefits to children by having an ICL 
speak to them.  ICLQ2 said that although they had not done this in practice they did see that it 
was important for an ICL to come to their own conclusion about how children were coping 
and it may be of benefit to hear from the child first hand rather than from a third person.  
ICLQ2 used the following analogy to describe this:  
 
If you don’t watch a football match and you only hear about it, how can you possibly proffer your best 
view?  So go to the football match, learn the rules ... and you’re probably some degree qualified to 
comment.  But to listen to someone else who’s qualified and then proffer your views, it’s limiting you 
somewhat. 
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Although this qualitative study is not indicative of all Queensland ICL practices the responses 
indicated that ICLs in Queensland generally just meet a child for an introduction.  Further 
family reports were according to the respondents, ordered early in the litigation process and 
family consultants spoke to children direct to ascertain the child's views.  
 
4.12.2 New South Wales ICLs divided in responses: City and country practices 
differ  
	
New South Wales ICL practitioners were divided in their responses.  Two out of the four 
New South Wales ICLs said they would just meet with children and the remaining two New 
South Wales ICLs, both working in regional centres, said that they interviewed children.   
 
ICLN2 and ICLN3 were two practitioners that disclosed that it was not part of their job-
related duties nor were they trained to interview children.  They further said that interviewing 
a child may subject the child to a risk of systems abuse.  ICLN3 explained that they would 
just meet the child as they were ‘very unskilled at interviewing kids and that’s not what I do’. 
ICLN3 said that when they only meet the child so the child knew what they looked like: ‘I 
want to know what’s interesting in their life.  I’m not going to ask them any questions about 
what mum says, or dad says.’ 
 
ICLN2 and ICLN3 held similar views to their Queensland counterparts in that they would 
only meet with the children for the purpose of explaining who they were and what their role 
was.  However, ICLN2 said that it was beneficial for the child to know that someone was 
representing their interest:  
 
 Children should never be placed in the role of the decision maker and this is one of my 
concerns....some children really want the responsibility to be taken off them and placed elsewhere so a 
lot of them are quiet relieved when you have that conversation with them ... but I think it is contingent 
upon the child ...otherwise ...that is systems abuse.129 
 
In contrast to this ICLN1 and ICLN4 responses were that they would meet with children and  
interview them.  Neither ICL1 nor ICLN4 said that any person was present with them when  
they interviewed children.  ICLN1 acknowledged that their practice is a rarity amongst ICLs 
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in that they meet children regularly.  ICLN1 said:  
 
 I just think it’s fanciful to not even have a face to put, you know you’re representing these people and 
their interests, and most - in my experience and before I was appointed an ICL - most people would not 
go and meet children. 
 
ICLN1 explained that they had a teaching background and a good rapport with children and 
would go to the homes of the children if required to speak to them.  ICLN1 acknowledged 
that most lawyers have no skills in communicating with children, but some ‘can’t 
communicate with people at the best of times’.  ICLN1 also believes that an ICL not speaking 
to a child is circumventing them having to do any work and just relying on a family report.  
ICLN1 said that children benefit from meeting the ICL and those that were prepared to meet 
with children should be appointed to the role of an ICL.   
 
ICLN1 acknowledged that funding was a problem and believes that ICLs do not bother 
speaking to children for that reason.  ICLN1, ICLN2 and ICLN3 also commented on the 
funding resources affecting the ordering of family reports and the availability of social 
workers to speak with children as an issue.130  However ICLN3 said that for some ICL 
practitioners doing that job was all about the money rather than the importance that the ICL 
plays in the proceedings.131 
 
Another issue raised by a New South Wales ICL related to how a geographical location 
impacted on the way ICLs practiced and how they had to speak with children.  ICLN1 said: 
 
 I think if you are a country practitioner, someone who is living in the country ... you have more 
understanding of the reality of long travel and what resources are available in a country town. 
 
ICLN4 practices were similar to ICLN1 practices.  ICLN4 said that they had spoken to 
children and explained:  
 
																																								 																				
130 This will be further explored in Chapter 4, Part D. 
131 ICLN3. 
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 The best way [to speak to a child] ... is usually as an informal chat and the child is simply asked in the 
same way as most family report writers have asked children, is what seems to happen.  Nothing more, 
nothing less.132   
 
ICLN4 acknowledged that they have seen problems with this approach when the ‘ICL starts 
to take on the role of what they think should happen’. 
 
New South Wales ICL practitioners interviewed were based in city and regional areas.  
Interesting patterns of responses emerged along city and regional geographical boundaries 
from those New South Wales practitioners.  The Queensland responses were from city based 
practitioners but were similar to the city based practitioners of New South Wales.  These 
qualitative findings cannot be generalised; however, there may be a correlation with the 
differences in practices due to regional versus city based practices.  Further investigation is 
warranted. 
 
4.12.3 Victorian ICLs meet and interview children: Personal attributes play a 
role 
 
Analysis of Victorian ICLs responses to the practice of speaking to children found that one 
ICL would meet with a child, one ICL said that they talked to children and three out of five 
ICLs said that they interviewed a child.  
 
To explain the various practices further, ICLV4 said they met with children but not in all 
cases and always in the presence of an assistant (secretary).  ICLV4 said that they did not 
meet with a child if a family report had been ordered at the same time as the court appointed 
an ICL.  The reason for this was that if a report was ordered ICLV4 viewed that it was their 
role to work with the family consultant.  ICLV4 said: 
 
I don’t think kids really need to be dragged in, they don’t need to meet with multiple people ... in more 
complex cases.  I tend not to get myself involved in meeting them personally. 
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ICLV4’s view was similar to the responses of ICLQ3, ICLQ5, ICLN2 and ICLN3 regarding 
ICLs being cautious about speaking to children due to the risk of systems abuse.  ICLV1, 
ICLV2, ICLV3 and ICLV5 responses, in contrast, reflected a more direct involvement in 
speaking to children. 
 
ICLV5 said that they would talk to children if it was age appropriate and that they would not 
speak to children if they were younger than 4 years old.  ICLV5 said that if they did speak to 
a child, they would explain to them who they were, their role and with the older child they 
kept them much more informed.  ICLV5 felt that they could talk to children because of their 
personal attributes:  
 
I think it’s useful if you’re a parent because you have had to learn how to speak with children.  We’re 
not social scientists ... but there’s a difference ... between chatting to a child to get information out of 
them and analysing them and counselling them. 
 
This response is similar to ICLQ1 who acknowledged that being a parent helped in being able 
to speak to children.  The response is also similar to the personal experiences of being a 
teacher in a previous profession that assisted ICLN2 in speaking to children. 
 
ICLV1 also spoke to children.  ICLV1 said that they speak to all children if the child had 
sufficient maturity, although ICLV1 said that they would not generally talk to a child under 7 
years of age.  ICLV1 stated that they would speak to most children before the family report as 
the family report 'comes pretty close to final hearing'.  ICLV1 said funding was scarce and 
would therefore require someone to engage appropriately to get information.  ICLV1 
explained that they interviewed the child to find out more about the child and how they were 
coping.  This is similar to the approach adopted by ICLQ1 although funding was not 
mentioned by ICLQ1 as the reason for speaking to a child.  ICLV1 said that the information 
they get from the child is as follows: 
 
I start off by asking them about their school and their friends ...interests ... and work on from there. 
And I try not … to directly ask them where they want to be ... I just see if I can get them to come out 
and say those sorts of things themselves. 
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As with New South Wales ICLs, the Victorian ICL approaches to practice also seemed 
divided according to regional and city based practices.  ICLV3 said the geographical 
distances present challenges in country areas as family report writers from the city have to 
travel over 200 kilometres to see children and that ‘clients don’t have money to travel to the 
city and did not want to travel due to costs.’133  ICLV3 said this then was why they 
interviewed children.  ICLV3 said that their preferred approach was to go and visit children at 
their home or some venue other than the office.  ICLV3 acknowledges that they have been 
criticised by other ICLs (not by the courts) as having ‘done something that is improper or not 
being independent’ however ICLV3 questions the understanding of city ICLs about the 
problems faced by country people.  ICLV3 reported that speaking to children is not systems 
abuse as ‘all the children I’ve ever spoken to have known what’s been going on in their 
families’.  ICLV3 said that they will talk to children even if they have a report, however if the 
children have been ‘hawked around ...then I might be more reluctant to directly ask them 
their views.’  ICLV3 tells the children that they can call the office reverse charge and then 
provides the child with their business card.   
 
ICLV3 said that to talk to children an ICL requires good communication and interpersonal 
skills.  ICLV3 believes that their life experience, living in a rural area and the fact that they 
are a parent provides an understanding of a child’s interests and needs and that is why ICLV3 
speaks to children direct. 
 
ICLV2 also interviews children and believes that this is an important part of the ICL role.  
ICLV2 explained that there are some precautions to ensure the integrity of the interview: 
  
Never alone do I interview [a child] for my own protection.  I always have a trainee or a member of 
staff or somebody present and whenever possible I visit the schools on a date and time unknown to 
either parent to dispel any allegation of coaching.  
 
ICLV2 criticised those ICLs that did not speak to children and regarded that an ICL would be 
breaching the Guidelines and amendments to the FLA if he or she did not speak to children.  
ICLV2 did however acknowledge that an ICL has a huge discretion in how they practice and 
the ‘ICL needs to make the call as they see fit’.  ICLV2 was also critical of the funding for 
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ICLs to do their role effectively.  ICLV2 said that Victorian Legal Aid had set a quota for 
funding reports and this lack of funding only allows for a report when the matter is set down 
for final hearing.  ICLV2 stated that this impacts on how an ICL practices and may require 
the ICL to get information from the child direct before the next court hearing.  The ICL 
practice reported in Victoria is in contrast to that expressed by Queensland ICLs in terms of 
the timing of the family report in the litigation process.  This may be indicative of the reason 
for the variations in practice, however would require further exploration and is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
4.13 Summary of ICL practices regarding speaking to children 
	
The differences in ICL practices predominantly follow state based lines.  Cultural practices, 
personal attributes or differences in the interpretation of the national Guidelines may explain 
some of the differences.  Funding and court practices regarding the ordering of family reports 
in the litigation process were also given as reasons for variations in practice.  The other issue 
raised by ICLs that creates an interesting paradigm is the impact of practice in regional versus 
city practices and how this affects those families with regards to access to family report 
writers.  Although the qualitative study is not indicative of the overall practices adopted by all 
ICLs, it does illuminate a subjective view that practices are influenced by external factors 
rather than legislative guidelines.  Table E is a summary of the responses from ICLs. 
	
Table E 
 
ICL responses to 'do you speak to children direct'. 
 
	
Question: Do you speak to children direct? Qld 
ICL 
NSW 
ICL 
Vic 
ICL 
Meet or introduce self to child 3 2 1 
Meet but more than an introduction 1 0 0 
Talk to a child 1 0 1 
Interview child 0 2 3 
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4.14 Judges views on ICLs speaking to children  
 
Judges were asked: 'Should ICLs speak to a child direct?'  There was no definition of what 
'speaking to a child direct' meant.  The intent of this open-ended question was to allow the 
Judges to give their own interpretation. 
 
Judges were generally receptive to the practice of ICLs speaking to children with three out of 
six Judges stating that ICLs should speak with children, two Judges were open to suggestions 
about ICLs speaking to children and one had mixed feelings about ICLs speaking to children.  
 
Queensland Judges acknowledged the differences between states regarding the practice of 
ICLs speaking to children.  JQ1 said that they did not think it was a bad thing for an ICL to 
speak to a child and acknowledged a massive cultural divide about this practice.  JQ1 said an 
ICL should meet with the child and tell them they are the child’s lawyer, but it should always 
be in the presence of a family report writer.  JQ1 said that this was the most appropriate way 
for the ICL to practice and JQ1 said the best way for a child’s view to be presented to the 
courts was to have an ICL and family report writer in every case. 
 
JQ2 acknowledged that it was not the general practice for an ICL to speak to a child in 
Queensland but recounted that in one matter the ICL advised they had spoken to the child.  
JQ2 said:  
 
 The ICL conveyed to me directly from the bar table what it is that the child had said to him, and I 
didn’t see any problem with that in the circumstances and it was even a more direct way of getting the 
child’s wishes or views before the court then doing it through a family report.  And personally, I am not 
averse to the nature of this in appropriate cases, and at the discretion of the ICL … I probably have 
noticed a change in that over the years. I think that I would say it was more common in the past for 
ICL’s to actually talk to children than it seems to be currently.  And I don’t think there’s a problem 
with that myself, in appropriate cases.134 
 
Queensland Judges’ responses concur with the views expressed by the majority of ICLs in 
Queensland, however the responses of both Queensland Judges contrast to those of their New 
South Wales counterparts.  
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Both New South Wales Judges expressed stronger opinions with regards to the role of the 
ICL in speaking to children.  JN1 said the ICL should see every child; ‘even if the child is 
one month old or seventeen and three hundred and sixty-four days’.  JN1 said that an ICL 
would be sent away if they had not spoken to the child.’  JN1 also said: 
 
First of all they should understand that they are acting for a human being.  They’re not acting for a 
name and a date of birth, I think that’s important in understanding what their role is. 
  
JN1 was adamant that the ICL should speak to the child and said:  
The ICL isn’t interviewing the child.  The ICL is informing the child of his or her role.  All of the 
evidence of the child will come from the social scientist.  
	
JN2 said that the ICL has a very important role and ‘does meet face to face with children’ and 
that it would be ‘contrary to their role’ if they did not speak to children.  JN2 said: 
 
There are a number of important aspects about meeting with the children.  Apart from getting their 
instructions for instance, that’s what I would have thought the ICL is required to do.  One of the very 
important roles is for the children to know that they have a representative and to know what that 
representative is doing and what that representative’s role is and that should be explained first hand, I 
would have thought, by the ICL to the children.  
 
New South Wales Judges expect ICLs to have more interactive involvement with the child, 
which is in contrast to the views of the Queensland Judges. 
 
The two Victorian Judges interviewed reported divergent views on the role of the ICL in 
speaking to children.  JV1 said it was important that the ICL meet with children.  JV1 
explained that the ICL meeting with the child was more than a discussion and it was 
important for the ICL to have some context in understanding whose interests they were 
representing.  JV1 said in one matter they were hearing the ICL was asked: 
 
 As the ICL, have you met the children?  And she said no I didn’t think there was much point, I can’t 
tell them anything.  And I said well that’s probably right you can’t tell them anything but I want you to 
leave court understanding what their faces look like.  So when you pick up the file you actually know 
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who you’re referring to.  I don't think they’ll get a whole lot out of meeting you directly but if you’ve 
got an image of them in your mind I think indirectly they will ultimately benefit from it. 
 
In contrast to JV1, JV2 struggled with ICLs speaking with children as the ICL is a lawyer.   
JV2 did say the role of the ICL was important and the ICL should facilitate the child’s view 
being put before the court: 
 
 The really good ICLs ... facilitate children’s views being made known to the court through as many 
channels as possible ... one of the problems that I have with all of that is that ICLs are not qualified to 
give opinions.  If the ICL happens to speak to a child then that can be put before the court in the right 
circumstances.  But what that means is not something within the ICLs expert knowledge and shouldn’t 
be expected to be. That’s not their role, they’re lawyers.135 
 
JV2 also explained that if an ICL talks to children it should just be that: 
 
I use the word talking rather than interview quite deliberately.  They need to be able to talk to the child 
in appropriate language and about appropriate topics and all of those sort of things. 
 
The variations in views of Judges concerning ICL practices of speaking to children were not 
as distinct as those expressed by the ICLs.  New South Wales Judges were the most liberal in 
their views of ICLs speaking to children.  These views were similar to two of the New South 
Wales ICLs.  The Queensland Judges’ views basically mirrored the views of Queensland 
ICLs although they were open to considering the benefits of ICLs speaking to children in 
limited circumstances but emphasised caution in this approach.  One Victorian Judge held 
similar views to their New South Wales Judge counterparts and two New South Wales ICLs, 
yet the other Judge was more closely aligned with the views expressed by the Queensland 
ICLs.  
 
Table F below depicts the responses from Judges regarding the question of whether ICLs 
should speak to children. 
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Table F 
 
Judge responses to whether an ICL should speak to children direct. 
	
Question: Should ICLs speak to children direct? Qld 
Judges 
NSW 
Judges 
Vic 
Judges 
ICLs should speak to children 1 2 1 
Open to the suggestion of ICLs speaking to children 1 0 0 
ICLs should not speak to children 0 0 1 
 
Although the qualitative study is not indicative of the overall opinions adopted by all Judges 
in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria it does illuminate a subjective view that the 
practices of the ICL may be dictated to by external factors rather than legislative guidelines.  
Further research needs to be conducted to ascertain if the different state based court practices 
and geographical location provide an explanation of the different approaches adopted by 
ICLs. 
 
4.15 ICLs’ views on Judges speaking to children direct 
 
ICLs were asked if Judges should speak to children direct.  Responses from ICLs can be 
broadly grouped as follows (a) Judges should never speak to children; (b) ICLs were open to 
the suggestion of Judges speaking to children; and (c) ICLs think it is a good idea for Judges 
to speak to children.  
 
Seven of the 14 ICLs (three from Queensland, three from Victoria and one from New South 
Wales) said that Judges should never speak to children. Five ICLs (two from New South 
Wales, one from Queensland and two from Victoria) were open to considering a Judge 
speaking to a child so long as it was strictly controlled or in the presence of an appropriate 
expert and in appropriate cases.  Two ICLs (one from Queensland and one from New South 
Wales) thought that a Judge speaking to a child was a good idea.   
 
Table G depicts the responses from ICLs to the question of whether Judges should speak to 
children. 
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Table G 
 
ICL responses to whether Judges should speak to children direct. 
 
	
Question: Should Judges speak to children direct? Qld 
ICL 
NSW 
ICL 
Vic 
ICL 
Judges should NOT speak to children 3 1 3 
Judges speaking to children could be good 1 1 0 
Judges speaking to children ok if strictly controlled 1 2 2 
 
4.15.1 ICLs say Judges are not trained to speak to children.  It can result in 
'spectacular failures'136 and 'could border on systems abuse'137  
 
ICLs that were opposed to the practice of Judges speaking to children generally believed that 
Judges are not trained to do so;138 or it is not the Judge’s role to speak to children;139 it could 
put pressure on children140 and 'could border on systems abuse'.141  A Victorian ICL who, in 
their practice speaks to children did not think it appropriate for Judges to do so.  ICLV5 said: 
 
 Well from what I’ve seen, the kids aren’t as relaxed as what they would be with an ICL.  I think it’s 
really quite frightening for them and I don’t think the Judges have the right experience to be speaking 
to children.  I'm not trying to cast aspersions they’re very clever people, but that’s not what their 
experience is in.  
 
One ICL was suspicious of the practice of a Judge speaking to children.142  Another said that 
there has been some ‘spectacular failures’ when that has occurred.143  Other ICLs were 
concerned about how the evidence of what the child said to the Judge would be put before the 
court and it could also potentially lead to an appealable error in the matter.144  ICLQ4 and 
ICLQ5 felt these were the same issues faced by ICLs who spoke to children direct.  
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Even the ICLs who were potentially open to the idea of a Judge speaking to children, had 
some grave reservations about it.  ICLV3 said that it would depend on the Judge and if the 
Judge was able to communicate with the children.  ICLQ3145 who only met with children 
said: 
 
 I think there’s a place for it [Judges speaking to children] but it’s a very vexed question where there 
would have to be a lot of considerations... I’ve been in a couple of cases where kids have been 
absolutely desperate to speak to the Judge and [the request] was declined ... at times it might very well 
be that it would be appropriate for Judges to interview kids but the concern is how is that done … is it 
something ... like a star chamber, or whether for instance it’s recorded and then everyone’s got the 
opportunity then to sort of deal with that information and what is the effect of that. 
  
ICLN1 said that Judges could speak to children but should be assisted by a family report  
writer and the ICL should be present, otherwise ‘you may as well just be the person at the bar  
table’.  
 
ICLN1 said that Judges should be able to ask some questions in court and at the same time 
the family reporter asks questions.  ICLN1 explained their involvement in the Less 
Adversarial Trial process (LAT) and said that the Judge should be able to ask children 
questions in LAT.  ICLN1 felt that LAT was a good process, however training for Judges was 
needed as ‘there was a bit of hoo-ha about some of the Judges who have no skills and just 
take a view that girls should be with girls and boys should be with boys’.  
4.15.2 There is a place in the system for Judges to speak to children 
 
ICLs that were open to Judges speaking to children felt that in their experience children have 
desperately wanted to speak to Judges and therefore the discretion to do so should be  
exercised by the Judge.146  ICLN3 questioned why there was this debate and questioned the 
critics: 
 
How is it less appropriate [for Judges to speak to children] as these kids get a very skewed view of 
what the system is about, what’s happening and what’s gone on at court from their parents?  
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ICLN3 said that as an ICL they never thought that Judges speaking to children was 
appropriate, but due to changes in their work requirements now believes there is a place for 
that.147  ICLN3 said the inspiration for Judges to speak to children came from the New 
Zealand Chief Justice.  ICLN3 said that when a case is finished they ask older children to 
come into the court and they then get the family consultant to explain the orders to the 
children.   
 
Half of the ICLs interviewed said Judges should not speak to children, whilst the remaining  
half of respondents were open to Judges speaking to children if safeguards were in  
place.  Of those ICLs against Judges speaking to children, the majority were Queensland  
ICLs.  The majority of Queensland ICLs also thought that ICLs should not speak to children.   
New South Wales and Victorian ICLs were divided on their support for Judges speaking to  
children, however the flexibility in their approach may be indicative of their own ICL 
practices of speaking to children.   
 
4.16 Judges’ views on Judges speaking to children  
 
Judges were asked if they should speak to children direct.  Judges interpreted speaking to  
children as communicating directly with a child, although one Judge did explain the meaning 
by saying he would meet with a child, but never interview the child.148 
 
The responses to the question regarding whether Judges should speak to children are that four 
out of six Judges said that they would never speak to a child direct.  These Judges were from 
Queensland and Victoria.  One of the Victorian Judges stated that they had met with a child 
in the past but would never again speak to a child.  The remaining two Judges (both from 
New South Wales) have met with children in the presence of a family consultant and found it 
to be a valuable experience.   
 
Table H depicts the responses to what Judges think of Judges speaking direct to children. 
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Table H 
 
Judge responses to Judges speaking to children direct. 
	
Question: Should Judges speak to children direct? Qld 
Judges 
NSW 
Judges 
Vic 
Judges 
Judge never speaks to child 2 0 1 
Judge meets child 0 0 0 
Judge speaks to child with someone present 0 2 0 
Judge interviews child 0 0 0 
Judge spoke to child in the past but would never speak to a child 
again 
0 0 1 
 
4.16.1 Judges are not trained to speak to children.  ‘The thought of it makes my 
flesh crawl’ or ‘gives me the creeps’149  
 
The Queensland and Victorian Judges interviewed were of the view that Judges were not 
trained to speak to children.  JQ1 said:  
 
I think it’s hard enough for highly trained, highly experienced social scientists to discern why children 
are saying what they are saying.  However, the Judges are appallingly badly trained to do it. 
 
JQ2 said that they had never seen a circumstance where it was appropriate for a Judge to 
speak with a child and preferred to ‘rely on people who are proficiently and expertly trained.’  
JQ2 also said that they would be surprised if any Judge would speak to a child.  JV2 said that 
the thought of speaking to a child ‘makes my flesh crawl’ and that: 
  
 I don't have confidence that I could put out of my mind or give only appropriate weight to what I take 
from an interview as opposed to what a family consultant might... I mean what about the profound 
feelings of guilt and responsibility that a child would feel about anything that they say to a Judge?  
That’s one of the things that disturbs me the most.150 
 
JV1 also compared the practice of overseas Judges speaking to children to that of the 
common law countries such as Australia.  JV1 described the personal characteristics of the 
Judges in code countries as being different to that of the Australian Judges: 
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 Common law countries Judges are old and scary and it costs a phenomenal amount of money to get to 
court so they know the Judges are old and scary and someone to be frightened of.  In code countries 
Judges are Judges from almost out of university so younger and their decisions are perhaps less 
significant for children because they have societal values that take families along right without the need 
for courts to intervene much.  So the idea of this woman in Germany talking to children in the way that 
she described to me doesn’t bother me.  But the idea of most Judges in Australia talking to children 
gives me the creeps.151 
 
In addition to the concerns that Judges were not trained to speak to children JV2 was 
concerned about the rights of the litigants in the process.  JV2 said that natural justice and 
procedural fairness of the litigants were important factors to consider and that the litigants are 
‘entitled to know everything in the Judge’s mind.’  JV2 recalled the one circumstance where 
they did speak to a child and the child said certain things.  JV2 said: 
 
That was at four o’clock on that day and the court didn’t sit again.  We sat again the following morning 
and counsel obviously looked very perplexed, they’d obviously spoken to each other because each of 
them had different instructions from their clients as to what the girl had said to each of her respective 
parents overnight.  And each of their versions was different to mine.  So we had three different versions 
of this and it confirmed the impression that the girl was being extremely manipulative.  She was in a 
power situation and what I had done by allowing her to speak directly to me was to assert power over 
her parents and me in a way which was unacceptable.  That was the last time I did that. 
 
JV2 said that although other colleagues did speak to children and they were highly respected, 
JV2 had grave misgiving about Judges speaking to children. 
 
4.16.2 'Children can benefit from a Judge speaking to them.  Children are more 
savvy now' 
 
The New South Wales Judges interviewed were open to the idea of Judges speaking with 
children in appropriate circumstances more so than their Queensland and Victorian 
colleagues.  JN1 is particularly passionate about speaking to children:  
 
I don’t know that it’s a scary step because we do it all the time.  Teachers do it, doctors do it, everyone 
does it.  None of us are afraid to talk to children in one form or another.  
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When JN1 speaks to children it is always with the consent of all parties and in the presence of 
a social scientist and independent children’s lawyer (if one is appointed).  The session with 
the child is also recorded.  JN1 acknowledged that at first there was an audible gasp from 
practitioners when they requested to speak to the children.  JN1 explained the process that 
they follow when speaking to children who are ‘old and mature enough’: 
 
 I don’t interview children. I sit down, I introduce myself. ...I say you don’t have to be here ... I'm the 
decision maker. I'm not getting you here to make a decision, that’s my job, that’s what I'm paid for ...   
I tell them there are no secrets...the parents ... will know about it, I think I make that clear to the kids. If 
there’s more than one I see them in a group at first and pass that information onto them but I’ll see 
them one at a time.  I generally let the family consultant or the psychologist ask them some questions 
and occasionally I’ll ask questions but it’ll be questions normally raised with the parties or with the 
independent children’s lawyer, and or the psychologist in advance. 
 
JN1 said that there is a transcript of the discussion typed and placed on the court file and the  
expert that is present steps into the witness box to tell the parties what happened.  JN1 
believes that this practice is transparent and does not give rise to a star chamber perception  
and is of great assistance in the decision-making process. 
 
JN2 also speaks to children with the consent of all parties and says that children want to 
speak to Judges:  
 
 More and more as children are more sophisticated and aware that they are able to speak to the Judge, 
they’re asking to speak to Judges.  I’ve had the phenomenon recently of interviewing a 13-year-old girl 
who then got access to my associate’s email and I had a stream of emails from her … telling me what’s 
happening and what she wants.  Kids are technically savvy and we publish our email addresses to the 
parties.  So documents [from the parties] are sent to me via my associate so everyone is aware of it and 
now the kids are getting hold of it. 
 
The comments of JN2 also flag an interesting insight into the potential of how new 
technologies may change the nature and extent of participation for children in custody cases.  
This may warrant further research into the impact that technology could have on listening to 
the voice of a child in litigated parenting disputes.  
 
When questioned about the differences from New South Wales Judges' practices to those of 
Queensland and Victorian Judges, JN1 said that a reluctance to speak to children was due to 
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the perception that Judges were not trained to do so.  JN2 said clearer legislative provisions 
may assist in the acceptance of how and when Judges should speak to children.  The 
Guidelines to Judicial Meetings with Children, recommended by Fernando (and discussed in 
Chapter 1, 1.4 Literature Review) represents a sound practice for assisting Judges meeting 
with children. 
 
4.17 Part C conclusions 
 
The purpose of this qualitative study to meet the objectives of the thesis was to explore the  
opinions and practices of ICLs and Judges to capture insights in relation to: (a) whether they  
thought views were different from a wish in meaning and practice; (b) what the role of the  
ICL and the role of the Judge was in relation to ascertaining a child’s views; and (c) whether  
in custody cases the ICL and the Judge should speak directly to children.  In Part C, the  
responses from Judges and ICLs indicate there is no consistent interpretation of the meaning  
of speaking to children.  Speaking to children can mean meeting a child, talking with a child  
or interviewing children.  Although the scale of interpretation of the meaning was broad there 
was some consistency in the responses from the majority of ICLs and Judges, that is, Judges  
should not speak to children.  The practices of whether ICLs speak to children vary between  
the states.  Responses from participants provided some indication that the differences in  
practice may be due to external factors.  Chapter 4, Part D will discuss challenges in practice  
and consider those external factors.  
	
Part D - Challenges faced by ICLs and Judges in listening to children. The effects 
on practice 
 
4.18 Overview 
 
Chapter 4, Part A detailed that in the opinion of most ICLs and Judges the change in 
terminology did not render a view different from a wish and the practices of the majority of 
respondents did not change whether what the child had to say was described as a wish or a 
view. Chapter 4 Part B discussed the role of the ICL in relation to ascertaining a child’s view 
and found that most Judges and ICLs described the role of the ICL in the context of their job-
related tasks or personal traits.  Few respondents mentioned the national Guidelines for 
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ICLs152 as a reference point for guidance in practice for ICLs.  Chapter 4, Part C discussed 
the practices with respect to ICLs and Judges speaking to children.  As detailed in those 
sections, significant variations exist in the expectations placed on the role of the ICL in 
relation to whether they speak to children and how they found out the child’s views.  ICL 
opinions varied across states and also varied between those that identified as being from 
regional areas as opposed to city practitioners.  Judges from all states were more favourable 
to the practice of ICLs speaking to children direct.  However, with ICLs and Judges, there 
were different interpretations of what they meant by speaking to children.  The expectations 
of whether Judges should speak to children were that most ICLs and Judges agreed that 
Judges should not speak to children.  
 
The differences in the practices of ICLs and Judges raises the question of what are the factors 
that influence them or challenge them.  Part D will provide an overview of the challenges 
described as: (a) different registry practices, (b) funding issues; and (c) geographical 
locations.  This section will also discuss the impact in practice of the Division 12A, including 
the Less Adversarial Trial (LAT).  
 
Table 4 provides the factors impacting on listening to children's views.  
 
Table 4 
Division 12A, LAT, Guidelines, funding, geographical location.  
The effects on practices 
• Differences in judicial approaches between different court registries influence 
practice 
• The geographic location (that is country based ICLs versus city based ICLs) may 
impact on ICL practices 
• Lack of funding influences ICL practices 
• A more integrated approach between family and child protection practices is needed 
• The LAT process did not enhance the way a child's view was heard  
																																								 																				
152 National Legal Aid (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 36 and its predecessor National Legal 
Aid (2007) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers. (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian and Federal 
Magistrate’s Court of Australia), Hobart. The Guidelines is published by the Legal Aid Commissions and endorsed by the 
Family Law Courts. 
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4.19 The challenges for child-focused practices 
 
The 2006 FLA Division 12A amendments detailed five guiding principles for child-focused 
practices for courts conducting child related proceedings.  These principles detail that the 
courts must consider the needs of the child;153 encourage child-focused parenting;154Judges 
can actively direct and manage the proceedings155 with little formality as possible;156and the 
courts are to be mindful of safeguarding children from being subjected to family violence or 
abuse.157  These principles, along with other provisions in the FLA provide the legislative 
framework for family law professionals and child-focused practices.  Further, the Best 
Practice Guidelines for lawyers doing family law work,158 ‘set out the principles of best 
practice that all family lawyers should aim to follow in family law proceedings’.159   
 
In this study, of the 14 ICLs and six Judges interviewed, three Queensland ICLs and one 
Queensland Judge; one Victorian ICL and one Victorian Judge and one New South Wales 
ICL and two New South Wales Judges commented on child-focused practices.  The responses 
from the ICLs and Judges was that there was the need for fewer interviews of children 
ensuring the elimination of systems abuse and therefore considering the needs of the child; 
greater education of parents to encourage cooperative parenting; early family assessments; 
and the importance of experts (family consultants) in advising the court about what is best for 
children.  However, there were challenges also identified such as the lack of legislative 
powers, lack of willingness to accept legislative change, lack of willingness to work with a 
multi-disciplinary system and a lack of an integrated system between the family law and state 
law systems to address the needs of the child in custody cases. 
 
The ‘child friendly’ Division 12A FLA provisions in the 2006 amendments were positively 
received by Judges as a step to assist those in practice.  JN1 said the best outcome for child-
focused practices had been the inclusion of Division 12A in the FLA: 
																																								 																				
153 FLA s 69ZN(3) Principle 1. 
154 Ibid s 69ZN(6) Principle 4. 
155 Ibid s 69ZN(4) Principle 2. 
156 Ibid s 69ZN(7) Principle 5. 
157 Ibid s 69ZN(5) Principle 3. Principle 4 s 69ZN(6) requires the court to encourage cooperative and child-focused 
parenting. 
158 Best Practice Guidelines for lawyers doing family law work above n 36. 
159 Ibid vii. 
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It enables Judges to deal with matters according to clearly understood judicial principals but 
disentangle themselves from the arcane and wasteful arguments often as to the form.  I can...under 
Division 12A ... say to my independent children's lawyer or the party, get a letter from the teacher 
telling us what’s happening in the life of this child … it gives great flexibility to Judges in getting 
material before them.  As long as you’re concerned about two things, one it is relevant and two it has 
some probative value. 
 
JN2 said that the system allows better outcomes for children and that ‘it is not just a legal 
exercise and I would hope that is the case for all the other Judges.’  ICLN3 also agreed that 
the Division 12A FLA amendments were of great benefit to practitioners and Judges.  ICLN3 
said to achieve 'real feedback in relation to ascertaining a child's view' less adversarial 
processes should be embraced along with the involvement and support of a family consultant.  
ICLN3 said since the 2006 amendments, the role of the ICL had moved from being ‘purely 
forensic, to having a role to play in combination with the family consultant ... to investigate at 
least the possibilities of therapeutic interventions.’  ICLN3 said that the amendments helped 
move the focus from the shortcomings of the parents to looking at greater options to assist 
parents improve their parenting skills.  
 
Although the changes were received positively some respondents felt that the amendments 
could have been broader to find out more from children.  A New South Wales Judge, JN2 
commented:  
 
 I think it would be helpful to have clearer legislative provisions for how a judge speaks with children 
and discretion on the judge as to the information which is then provided to parties about the interview 
with the children ... more and more children are more sophisticated and they’re asking to speak to 
judges.160  
 
A Queensland Judge, JQ1 also said that governments should look at broader powers to assist 
Judges with providing better outcomes for children:  
 
 In all jurisdictions … but more particularly in family law, courts are about inter-party disputes and the 
provision of remedies… if you come to the [family law] court with an inter-parties parenting dispute, 
the only remedies that these courts can provide are remedies as between parents ... But if we had 
																																								 																				
160 JN2. 
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available to us, a wide range of orders that ... are now only available under state legislation, for 
example, supervision orders, temporary protection orders, all those sorts of orders, then we might do a 
better job of protecting children. 
 
Difference in practices reported by respondents also provided insight into how different 
Judges and ICLs dealt with and interpreted the FLA child-focused provisions.  ICLQ5 said 
that different practices were adopted by the different court registries in ordering family 
reports.  ICLQ5 reported that some Judges ordered a family report at the final hearing of the 
custody case, whereas other Judges ordered a family report early in the life of the 
proceedings.  ICLQ5 said to avoid systems abuse of the child, the Queensland practice of 
having a family report early in the proceedings was a child-focused practice not undertaken 
by interstate court registries.   
 
Another area of concern for a Queensland ICL was the lack of information sharing between 
agencies concerning children witnessing or being subjected to family violence.  Despite the 
FLA changes concerning family violence, ICLQ3 said more could be done to assist children 
in custody proceedings:  
 
 I think that one of the most important things would be to have a central repository of information which 
is seen to be like the minimum standard which is a common understanding of things.  So for instance in 
relation to domestic violence … how a child who’s witnessed violence might react, all of those sorts of 
things. So it should be a central repository or common knowledge that lawyers, judges, family 
consultants all have.161 
 
Another ICL also identified the need for a multi-disciplinary approach.  ICLN3 said that the  
2006 FLA amendments allowed practitioners to approach children’s matters, in a multi- 
disciplinary way to get the best outcome for children.  ICLN3 said:  
 
It’s not about trying to turn this jurisdiction into less law and more social work but recognising that in 
fact both have a value.  The rule of law has a real importance to protect children’s rights ... they [ICLs] 
need to be able to respond to people’s needs which aren’t always legal, and that’s now in our Act.  We  
can’t interpret this social science but there’s some real challenges in the 2006 amendments for all 
lawyers and for the court to raise the standard and to say well you need to work multi-disciplinary with  
all these other people and not just approach it as a legal issue because it’s not, it’s a relationship issue 
																																								 																				
161 ICLQ3. 
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that has a legal framework. 162 
 
The family law system in Australia was described by ICLN3 as ‘quite unique in that courts  
appoint a lawyer to represent the child's interest.’  ICLN3 said this impacts on speaking to  
children too:  
 
 I think what’s good about Division 12A, is the ability to work more closely but regrettably very few 
ICL’s choose to work with community people, family councillors etcetera and with social scientists, 
whether it’s report writers or otherwise, to really explore that.  Because the one thing lawyers are 
particularly bad at and get no training at, at all is interviewing kids.  
 
ICLN3 also saw the FLA changes as being a challenge in practice and said that ICLs have a: 
 
 Reluctance to change.  I think lawyers tend to have a real hesitance about interacting with what are 
perceived as lower disciplines.  Social scientists aren’t lawyers so why do we need to be working with 
them? Why are we going back out into the community to deal with stuff, we’re at court.  Let’s just get 
on with it.163   
 
ICLQ1 saw that the problems with the family law system and how practitioners practice is 
more about the law and how it ‘is constantly changing and the system is different in the 
Family Court and Federal Circuit Court'.  However, this view differed to ICLQ2, who 
reasoned that it was not the changes that were the problem but the practitioners who were 
reluctant to embrace the 2006 amendments:  
 
 Luddite approach in terms of I don’t like change and I don’t want change.  It seems to be an 
indoctrinated system here that everything should be adversarial as a consequence to which nobody is 
welcoming these legislative amendments or changes ... an inquisitorial systems gets a more balanced 
perspective from a child’s perspective as to what he or she wants in their life and what their hopes and 
aspirations are.164  
 
ICLN2 and ICLN3 also commented that the court system needs to be less adversarial and 
more inquisitorial.  An inquisitorial approach was not defined by those respondents.  It was 
however explained with reference to the processes they engaged in.  The adversarial and 
																																								 																				
162 ICLN3. 
163 ICLN3. 
164 ICLQ2. 
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inquisitorial approaches can be distinguished by their approaches in the court hearings.  The 
inquisitorial procedure is where 'the judge initiates all necessary investigations and summons 
and examines witnesses and in which a trial is an inquiry by the court'.165  The adversarial 
approach differs in that the conduct of the litigation is left to the parties and the evidence at 
the trial is called by the parties and 'the judge [is] generally forbidden to call witnesses or to 
examine them otherwise than for the purpose of clarifying their evidence...'.166   
ICLQ1 believed the FLA and Rules167 are the best we are going to get and it is the parents, as 
opposed to the practitioners that need educating:  
 
 If we’re looking for an ideal solution we’ve never really found it to date.  We acknowledge that the 
system is not perfect but it’s the best we’ve got and we have to work within it.  The biggest stumbling 
point there is, is that parents usually are at loggerheads and aren’t willing necessarily to see the other 
parent’s view and [they] aren’t really willing to necessarily accede to what the children might be 
saying.168   
 
Some respondents commented that the family law system would be better placed as an  
integrated system between state and federal jurisdictions.  JQ1 said that:  
 
 If we were fair dinkum about protecting children as a society the first thing we would do is have an 
integrated system whereby one agency, whether it’s the state courts or the family court or whatever but 
one agency that has overall responsibility for family intervention if you can put it like that. 
 
JQ1 further believed that to overcome challenges in practice and to have more child-focused 
practices: 
 
 State welfare laws and parenting orders, and parts of the FLA should all be administered by the same 
court … so your ‘best interest’ in a welfare jurisdiction should all be dealt with by the same judicial 
officers.  Frankly I’ve been in a number of cases where the best order would have been to be able to put 
the child into the care of the director general.169 
 
																																								 																				
165 Mick Woodley (ed) Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed, 2005), 221. 
166 Kevin S. Prose and Malcolm D. H. Smith, Cases and Materials on the Legal Process (The Law Book Company Ltd, 3rd 
ed, 1979), 75. 
167 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) and Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), formerly Federal Magistrate Court Rules 
2001 (Cth). 
168 ICLQ1. 
169 JQ1. 
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Similarly, ICLN2 referred to the need for a less adversarial approach and compared the 
approach adopted in child protection matters.  ICLN2 said that the approach adopted in the 
care jurisdiction170 has the right balance and would provide better outcomes for families to 
have a federal system of tribunals, rather than one court federally dealing with family law 
matters and state courts governing child protection matters. 
 
JQ2 also saw the benefit of an integrated system to overcome the challenges in practice: 
 
I’d like to see the legislation amended so that we could join the state welfare department … all we can 
do under our legislation is request that they [the Director-General of the child safety department] 
intervene.  They don’t have to [intervene]… and they can ignore our request … yet the legislation gives 
the Director General the right to intervene … if the Director General wants to.  It’s a one-way street, 
the Director General can intervene if he or she wants and we can’t stop them but we can’t make them 
intervene if they don’t want to.171  
 
ICLV3 also saw the benefits of an integrated state child welfare system and Commonwealth  
family law system: 
 
 There shouldn’t be state legislation and federal legislation, it should be all through the same process.  
Often the same child will be involved in family law proceedings and DHS [child safety] proceedings. 
DHS rarely gets involved.  The court can make those orders [and] occasionally you get those orders 
made and then we just don’t hear from DHS.172 
 
The responses of the Judges and ICLs provide the message that the adversarial nature  
of practice and the different ways that practitioners interpret the law and engage in practice  
presents challenges to child-focused practices.  Further, allowing the family law courts to  
provide similar remedies available in state law and giving Judges broader powers to deal with  
children's matters may assist with providing better outcomes for children.  A multi- 
disciplinary approach in custody cases and a legal system that integrates the family law and  
child welfare law systems can provide better outcomes for children. 
4.19.1 Less Adversarial Trial ('LAT') process overview 
 
																																								 																				
170 Care jurisdictions are child protection matters pursuant to state legislation. 
171 JQ2. 
172 ICLV3. 
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The 2006 FLA amendments included the implementation of the less adversarial trial process 
(LAT) which was adopted by the Family Courts to provide a less adversarial approach to 
resolving parenting ‘conducted under strong judicial management’.173  The respondents were 
asked what they thought of LAT and how it assisted children's views being heard.  Of all the 
respondents interviewed, five Queensland ICLs, three New South Wales ICLs and five 
Victoria ICLs along with all six Judges provided responses regarding the LAT.  Overall 
Judges were very positive about the 2006 FLA changes in child related hearing procedures. 
The general feeling of the ICL responses was that the system although not ‘brilliant was not 
bad ... even with it faults.’174  
4.19.2 What ICLs think of LAT 
 
Of the fourteen ICLs interviewed, two ICLs 175 specifically stated that although there were 
presumed benefits of LAT in theory they did not like the LAT process.  ICLQ2 was the only 
ICL that said they liked LAT.  ICLN2 and ICLV3 had never been involved in LAT or did not 
wish to provide any comments about the LAT.  Half of the ICLs (two from New South 
Wales,176 two from Queensland,177 and three from Victoria178) said LAT was ‘okay’ but the 
success of LAT depended upon on the Judge and the parents’ willingness to participate in the 
process.  One Queensland ICL179 commented specifically that they thought that the 
personality of the parents made a difference in LAT.  That is, the less dysfunctional the 
parents were, the better the outcome for children.  In addition to the participation of the 
Judges and parents and the personality of the parents, five ICLs (two from New South 
Wales,180 one from Queensland181 and one from Victoria)182 said that the success of LAT 
depended on the personality and enthusiasm of the Judge conducting the LAT.  Only two 
ICLs183 thought the LAT process enabled children to be listened to whereas four ICLs said 
the LAT did not assist children in expressing their views.184  ICLN2 stated that LAT is a good 
																																								 																				
173 Jennifer McIntosh, 'The Less Adversarial Approach and Children's Best Interests' in Family Court of Australia, Less 
Adversarial Trial Handbook: A Companion to the Less Adversarial Trial (Parenting Cases) DVD (2009), 17. 
174 ICLQ1. 
175 ICLQ1, ICLQ5. 
176 ICLN1, ICLN3. 
177 ICLQ3, ICLQ4. 
178 ICLV1, ICLV2, ICLV4. 
179 ICLQ3. 
180 ICLN1, ICLN3. 
181 ICLQ4. 
182 ICLV1. 
183 ICLQ2, ICLV3. 
184 ICLQ1, ICLQ5, ICLN1, ICLV5. 
188 
	
child-focused process and ICLV3 said that LAT ‘certainly makes it easier that kids’ views 
can be expressed.' However, the caveat was ‘particularly if you’ve got a good trial judge’. 185  
A Victorian ICL’s186 focus was on who the appointed Judge was and how the Judge was 
critical for the LAT to be successful. ICLV4 said:  
 
 Every Judge has their own different ways of doing things.  You rock up for a first day of LAT and 
honestly it’ll depend entirely on the personality of the Judge who you’re before. 
 
ICLQ4 was also concerned about the involvement of the Judge and thought that the LAT 
process was just about Judges ‘delivering homilies’ and that it ‘looked good statistically  
if the trial settled on the first day’.187   
 
A Queensland ICL188 commented on the successful accomplishments of LAT being attributed 
not to the practitioner but rather to the involvement of the parents.  ICLQ4 questioned 
whether some parents involved in LAT were genuine about considering what was best for 
their children.  ICLQ4 said: 
 
 Do these parents have the capacity to be child focussed ... do they have the ability to distinguish 
between a child’s needs and their own needs ... [the] parents that are so entrenched and so focussed on 
themselves then [LAT is] never going to work.  Then a less adversarial trial process could make things 
worse for this child rather than better. 189 
 
The biggest complaint of ICLs190 regarding LAT was that there were too many court events 
and time delays throughout the process and some ICLs191 expressed this as a major cause for 
concern in practice.  ICLQ1 said ‘it’s an absolute mess and when they brought it in it was 
under the guise of ... being more streamlined, it’s had the opposite effect’.  Another ICL192 
said:  
 
 I think it can be good but the way it’s operated is so tedious, I mean I'm old fashioned enough to think 
a fast game is a good game, we should get on with getting these cases dealt with as quickly as possible. 
																																								 																				
185 ICLV3. 
186 ICLV4. 
187 ICLQ4. 
188 ICLQ4. 
189 ICLQ4. 
190 ICLQ1 ,ICLQ4,ICLQ5, ICLN1, ICLV1. 
191 ICLV1, ICLV2, ICLN1, ICLQ5, ICLQ4, ICLQ1. 
192 ICLV1. 
189 
	
 
ICLs note the benefit of LAT was that LAT ‘enhances the ability of everybody to focus the 
people who are in dispute on what the kids have been saying and why.’193  However, some 
ICLs said that the success of LAT also required the practitioners to be open to the system and 
embrace the change.194  ICLN3 said that the 2006 amendments assisted Judges and 
practitioners by not being the ‘linear conveyor belt that moves from filing to conclusion ... 
LAT was really designed to dig down that extra layer’. 
4.19.3 What Judges think of LAT 
 
Judges were asked the same semi-structured questions as the ICLS on their views of the LAT 
process.  Only one Judge (JV1) out of the six Judges said they did not like LAT.  One Judge 
from Queensland, JQ1 and one Judge from Victoria, JV2 said that the LAT was ‘okay’ in 
theory but in practice success depended upon the personality of the Judge and the Judge’s  
enthusiasm.  JQ1 and JV2 felt that although LAT was good in theory the timing of LAT was 
too late in the litigation process; and there were too many multiple court events prior to LAT 
and a duplication of resources.  JV1 did not like LAT and said that by the time the families 
come to the court they may have been in the system for three years.  JV1 said the parents 
become ‘bitter and twisted and emotionally and financially exhausted.’  JV1 said that ‘the 
matter would be better dealt with in the FMC as that court had more streamlined child-
focused methods to deal with matters more expeditiously’.  
 
Similar to the ICLQ1’s comments regarding parents not being child focused, JQ1 said that 
LAT worked well for those families that were not dysfunctional: 
 
 The LAT process is terrific and plainly the way that we should go.  But there are families for whom it’s 
a joke.  We just need to make those sorts of distinctions.  We can’t do it publically of course; you can’t 
say you’re crap parents therefore you’re not going into the child responsive.  
 
JV1 said that ‘aspirationally it’s [LAT] a terrific system but it doesn’t fit with high conflict 
families.’195  JN2 although positive about LAT said the challenges in practice still remain in 
that it is still too adversarial:  
																																								 																				
193 ICLQ5. 
194 ICLQ1, ICLN2 and ICLN3. 
195 JV1. 
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 So there are a whole lot of ingredients about why it works.  But in my view we’ve still got a long way 
to go … it’s supposed to be less adversarial, but it still looks very much like a traditional trial in an 
adversarial court ... there’s a tension between allowing parties to litigate their grievances ... but being 
able to draw that line between how much information is enough ... and we haven’t, I think, progressed 
that to a point which is really advanced.196  
 
In terms of whether LAT helped the court listen to a child's view both New South Wales 
Judges thought that LAT was an excellent child-focused practice and believed that the LAT 
facilitated listening to children’s views.  JQ1 said the focus in LAT was on the parents and  
not on the child's views.  JQ2 had not been involved in LAT and did not comment on whether  
the LAT assisted in listening to a child's view.  Both Victorian Judges did not think that LAT  
changed the way children's views were listened to. 
 
The responses from ICLs and Judges concerning LAT was grouped into three sets of data and 
displayed as firstly the participant's views on LAT, secondly LAT's impact on listening to a 
child's views and thirdly what factors influence or impact on the success of LAT.   
 
Table I and Table J depict the responses from ICLs and Judges respectively regarding their 
opinions of LAT. Comments in these tables were grouped into 'like LAT', 'do not like LAT', 
'LAT is okay' and if the respondent did not participate or did not provide a comment on the 
LAT, that was recorded as a nil response. 
 
 
																																								 																				
196 JN2. 
Table I 
 
ICL responses to whether they like LAT 
 
	
 Qld 
ICL 
NSW 
ICL 
Vic 
ICL 
Do not like LAT 2 0 0 
Like LAT 1 0 0 
LAT is okay 2 3 3 
Nil said or never in LAT 0 1 2 
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The respondents were asked if LAT helped listen to a child's view. Tables K and L detail the 
ICL and Judge responses. The responses were grouped into the affirmative (it did help), the 
negative (it did not help) or a neutral response which indicated they did not know or they  
could not comment.  
 
 
 
Table J 
 
Judges responses to whether they like LAT 
 
	
 Qld 
Judges 
NSW 
Judges 
Vic 
Judges 
Do not like LAT 0 0 1 
Like LAT 0 2 0 
LAT is okay 1 0 1 
Judge never involved in LAT 1 0 0 
Table K 
 
ICL responses to whether they think LAT helps listen to a child's view 
 
	
 Qld 
ICL 
NSW 
ICL 
Vic 
ICL 
LAT helps listen to a child's view 0 0 2 
LAT does not help listen to a child's view 3 1 1 
Nil said or not sure if LAT helps listen to child's view 1 3 2 
Table L 
 
Judges responses to whether they think LAT helps listen to a child's view 
 
	
 Qld 
Judges 
NSW 
Judges 
Vic 
Judges 
LAT helps listen to a child's view 0 2 0 
LAT does not help listen to a child's view 1 0 2 
Nil said or not sure if LAT helps listen to child's view 1 0 0 
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Tables M and N detail the responses from ICLs and Judges respectively on the issues that 
impact on the success of LAT.  The responses were grouped and recorded as 'Judge traits', 
'parent traits' and 'LAT has too many time delays and court events.' 
 
	
4.19.4 Summary of what ICLs and Judges think of LAT 
 
The LAT was considered a way to provide a less adversarial approach to child related 
proceedings, however, just under half of the ICL respondents and a third of the Judges 
thought that the success depended upon the personality of the Judges.  Further almost half of 
the ICLs and Judges thought that there were too many time delays and court events in the 
LAT process which impacted on its effectiveness.  
 
Whether the LAT process aided in listening to children's views, of those that provided a 
response a minority of Judges (two from News South Wales) and ICLs (two from Victoria) 
thought LAT facilitated a way to listen to a child's view.  However, from those that 
Table M 
 
ICL responses to what impacts on the success of LAT 
 
 
 Qld 
ICL 
NSW 
ICL 
Vic 
ICL 
LAT depends on Judges traits 1 2 2 
LAT depends on parents’ traits 1 0 0 
Time delay & too many court events 3 1 2 
Nil comments on what impacts the success of LAT 0 1 1 
Table N 
 
Judge responses to what impacts on the success of LAT 
 
 
 Qld 
Judges 
NSW 
Judges 
Vic 
Judges 
LAT depends on Judges traits 0 0 1 
LAT depends on parents traits 1 0 1 
Time delay & too many court events 1 0 2 
Nil comments on what impacts the success of LAT 0 2 0 
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responded to that question, the majority (five ICLs and three Judges) indicated that LAT did 
not help in listening a child's view. 
 
4.20 Guidelines for ICLs, but no uniformity in practice 
 
The 2006 FLA amendments provided in section 68L(2) the circumstances when an ICL  
should be appointed.  The 2006 FLA amendments also described the role of the ICL pursuant  
to section 68LA of the FLA.  In terms of the mechanics of appointment, each Legal Aid  
Commission is responsible for the appointment of ICLs.  The training course required  
for practitioners to become ICLs is conducted by the Family Law Section of the Law Council  
of Australia in conjunction with National Legal Aid.197  An important part of the training  
materials are the Guidelines to ICLs. Guidelines for ICLs198 were first issued by the Family  
Court in 2003 and then formalised by the different state legal aid commissions under the  
umbrella of National Legal Aid.  The national Guidelines for ICLs were issued under  
National Legal Aid with the approval of the Family Law Courts in 2007 and then revised in  
2013.  One Queensland ICL described how the Guidelines for ICLs were initially formulated,  
taking into account local practices not national uniformity: 
 
 The Guidelines for ICLs are very wide and when we put them together each of the Legal Aid 
Commissions took account of the different practices in each state because there was no point in making 
a guideline that was just not going to work in any particular state, as that would defeat the purpose.199 
 
The Guidelines for ICLs200 describe the professional expectations of the ICL and state that 
ICLs are to ensure that the child’s view is fully presented to the court.201  The views202 of the 
child are one of the best interests of the child factors203 that Judges need to take into account.   
In addition to the Guidelines, the Queensland and New South Wales Legal Aid Commissions 
produced further publications for ICLs which run parallel to the national Guidelines.  
																																								 																				
197 Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Delabuiere, J., and Horsfall, B. (2013) Independent Children’s Lawyers 
Study: Final report (1st ed.). Canberra: Attorney-General’s Department, 103, 
<www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/Families/FamilyLawSystem/Pages/Familylawpublications.aspx>  
198 Family Court of Australia, Practice Direction No 2 of 2003 - Guidelines for children’s representatives (11 July 2003); 
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However, the New South Wales Legal Aid additional guidelines and Legal Aid Queensland 
additional guidelines do not mirror each other’s guidelines.   
When Judges and ICLs were questioned about the role of the ICL and about how they 
ascertained a child’s view and whether they spoke to a child; differences in practice were 
expressed.  In relation to ICL practices only two ICLs204 out of fourteen interviewed and one 
Judge205 out of six Judges interviewed specifically referred to the Guidelines for ICLs in their 
responses.  ICLQ5 who explained how the Guidelines for ICLs came into existence explained 
the differences in practice as, ‘the Guidelines are the same [for ICLs]; it is how they are put 
into practice’.206  ICLN3 mentioned the Guidelines by stating that the reason why an ICL 
may speak to a child was so they were not in breach of the Guidelines.  JN2 who referred 
briefly to those Guidelines when asked a question regarding whether an ICL should speak to 
children said that it was a breach of the Guidelines if the ICL did not speak to a child.  Only 
JN2 commented that the Guidelines for ICLs set out to provide guidance to ICLs in practice 
and an overview of the expectation of them in their role.  No ICLs mentioned this as a factor. 
 
The differences in ICL practices recognised in this research were also expressed in the data 
collated by the Australian Institute of Family Studies207 and published in 2014, concerning 
ICLs efficacy (the ICL Study). In the ICL study the report stated: 
  
 [W]hile the Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers and statutory framework operate across the 
 states and territories, there are often substantial differences in the policies of each legal aid 
 commission.208 
 
The lack of reference by the respondents to the Guidelines coupled with ICLQ5’s statement 
that the Guidelines were broad enough to be flexible to account for local legal aid policies, 
raises the issue of whether the ICL's core values in practice are governed by the Guidelines 
for ICLs or by local customary practices.  While it is acknowledged that the responses here 
are not indicative of all ICLs, the Guidelines and legislative framework do not result in 
																																								 																				
204 ICLQ5 and ICLN3. 
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uniformity in practice.  These findings concur with the ICL study.209  Other themes (discussed 
below) emerged as reasons for the way the ICL practiced.   
 
4.21 ‘Deplorable funding’210 influences how ICLs and Judges practice 
 
Thirteen out of 14 ICLs and five out of six Judges described the lack of funding for children’s 
matters as factors influencing how an ICL or Judge perform their roles.  Lack of funding was 
identified by the respondents in terms of the appointment of ICLs, the lack of ongoing 
funding of an ICL during the life of the litigation and the funding of family reports early in 
the case versus later in the proceedings. 
 
Being poorly remunerated for ICL work undertaken was a common concern for ICLs.  The 
grant of legal aid only covered a small amount of the tasks required of an ICL.211  ICLQ1 said 
there were funding concerns for all ICLs, especially those in private practices, where the 
grants of legal aid to perform the work ‘were not fantastic’.  ICLQ2 said that ‘the 
consideration of the court is really in relation to what financial resources are available’ and 
this affects how Judges manage the matter and causes variations in practices.  ICLQ3 said a 
‘bucket load of funding’ is needed if ICLs have to talk to children.  ICL4 considered that the 
funding was critical ‘to find out a child’s view from an expert, not a lawyer (or ICL)’.  
ICLN1 also agreed with the views of Queensland ICLs in that funding affected the ability of 
the ICL to speak with a child.  ICLN1 said that children would benefit from seeing an ICL 
however it depended on the funding of the lawyer: 
 
We need to have more funding to do that [meet with children].  Which I think is why ICLs don’t bother 
[to meet with children].  I think we get about a $1000 in New South Wales from the time we are 
appointed to the time of hearing.  
 
ICLN4 complained that the funding for children’s matters was 'deplorable': 
  
You do not get paid for preparation and there is an expectation that somehow you have to present a 
case without reading it.  Consequently more and more people are moving away from doing ICL work. 
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ICLV1 also said ‘we only get funding for appearances at a hearing as an ICL and not 
instructing in a trial’.  ICLV1 said that this affects the time that an ICL can devote to 
adequately dealing with the children’s issues.  ICLV3 also identified funding cuts of ICLs in 
Victoria: 
  
If you get an order for an ICL appointed early in the month, then the order might be implemented but if 
it’s later in the month then there won’t be an ICL appointed.  Legal Aid have used up the number of 
appointments if they’re allocating. 
 
ICLV3 said the reduction of ICL funding impacts on their ability to listen to children: 
  
It’s a disaster.  I act as an ICL and also handle other matters on behalf of private clients where orders 
are made for the appointment of an ICL and the order is not implemented and the children are just not 
heard in that situation. 
 
A Victorian ICL212 stated that the lack of funding has caused more experienced practitioners 
to decline ICL work.  ICLV4 said ‘there’s been a drastic reduction in the level of ICLs 
appointed because they’re just not funded.’  
  
JQ1 mirrored this view by expressing concern for the lack of the appointment of an ICL or an 
experienced ICL practitioner.  JQ1 said that restricted funding can make the decision-making 
process for Judges much harder.  
 
JQ2 said that they had noticed a change in the practice of funding ICLs and reports: 
 
I certainly don’t want to be too critical of the legal aid office knowing that their lack of resources is a 
problem for them.  They have to be selective if you grant legal aid.  But some cases recently I’ve been 
sort of left scratching my head and wondering how some people have got grants whereas to other cases 
I’ve had in which people haven’t got grants. 
 
JN1 said that economic circumstances had affected the way ICLs perform their job requiring 
them to do more tasks that would be traditionally left for a social scientist to perform.  JV2 
lamented the attitude of ‘career ICLs’ who thought their role was one of a 'profit making 
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enterprise’ rather than their duty as an ICL.  JV2 said:213  
 
ICLs should include senior practitioners who decide to do this work for next to nothing or for what 
legal aid pays them … a responsible law firm should budget to do maybe four, five or six ICL cases a 
year.  And they should put every amount of effort and resources into the cases as they would for a 
client who was paying them a lot of money.  It should not be an excuse because they’re not paid as 
much to not do the job.   
 
ICLN3 considered that the lack of funding affected the quality of the ICL work performed as 
some private practitioners viewed their practice according to the funding they received:  
 
Some private practitioners temper the amount of work they do to what they are paid … Others see it as 
a costing event so you’re really not there to do a great deal of work, you’re just there to collect a 
cheque. 
 
JV2 stated that funding 'had dried up and this is one of the worst outcomes for children'.  JV2 
further stated that lack of funding for an ICL to 'attend court with Counsel and to hear what’s 
going on and form views as to the trial and to the progress of the trial, is a deleterious move.’ 
 
The funding of reports in addition to the appointment of an ICL throughout the litigation 
process was expressed as important for placing the views of children before the court.   
ICLQ4 said that if the Legal Aid Commission214 fund reports early in the litigation process 
this helps identify the issues in dispute and was a good settlement tool.  ICL5 also agreed that 
funding a report early in the proceeding was essential and an appropriate amount of time and 
money should be allocated for an expert to speak to a child.  
 
ICLV1 stated that the Legal Aid Commission may fund reports however when it comes to 
funding ICLs, the courts will only appoint a limited amount of ICLs per month.  ICLV1 said 
that in Victoria, the family reports are not prepared early in the litigation process due to 
funding problems.  ICLV3 also said the funding of reports is problematic and if legal aid 
cannot pay for it or refuses to pay for it, then it has to be done privately and the parties in the 
matter cannot pay for it.  ICLV3 said sometimes it is done internally by the courts but it is 
difficult to get the parties to travel to the court or the report writer to travel to the regional 
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areas.  ICLV3 said the funding for state care and protection matters was better ‘whereas it’s 
hit and miss under the FLA. It simply needs more funding.’  Furthermore, ICLV3 said that 
the funding of ICLs and reports had become a numbers game and that people in the capital 
city ‘are in their ivory towers and the people that are affected, especially in the regional areas 
cannot afford to travel to the city for the reports or representation of a city based ICL’.   
 
ICLV2 said that despite the introduction of the statutory reforms and the clear recognition of 
an ICL in the 2006 FLA amendments, ‘the government has not backed it up with the 
resources and funding needed’.  JN1 was also concerned about the lack of funding for family 
reports and how it would impact on the role of the ICL to require them to interview children 
rather than receiving a report from the social scientist:  
 
I live in dread that the governments will say well we’re not going to fund reports but we’ll give you an 
ICL and they can go and have a yarn with the kid and tell you what they want.  I live in dread of this 
happening. 
 
Although this research is not indicative of all ICLs practices, it does illuminate a common 
concern that needs further exploration about the impact of funding on child-focused practices.  
The ICL study215 also confirmed the concerns raised by ICLs and Judges in that ‘considerable 
variation in funding of ICLs also emerged across each state and territory’.216 
 
JV2 saw that poor funding had a detrimental effect in practice for Judges and ICL: 
 
The problems for Judges at both levels … is that the pressures of the non-recognition of the importance 
of family law, the reduction in funding, the expectation of getting through more work with less 
resources and all of that has reduced judge’s thinking time very dangerously low … and I think a lot of 
what’s happening with the reduction in funding has compromised quality and I think that’s 
extraordinarily dangerous.217 
 
Concerns over the lack of funding expressed by majority of respondents was not only about 
the lack of remuneration, but also about costs to the practice, to the parties and to the ability 
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of listening to children.  The consequences of the lack of funding was highlighted in the ICL 
Study: 
 
 There is also recognition that current funding arrangements place constraints on the level of service that 
 ICLs can provide, with some private practitioners indicating that their ICL workload is extremely 
 under-funded, meaning much of this work is performed pro bono.  More narrowly, data from all 
 stakeholders indicates that the performance of some ICL practitioners falls short of the required 
 standard, primarily in terms of acting independently, impartially and with professional rigour.218 
 
The respondents in this study, (and concurring with the ICL Study) indicated that the lack of 
funding impacted on the court appointing ICLs and the obtaining of family reports.  The 
funding also impacted on the time an ICL allocated to the case managing of the custody 
matter.  However, in the responses, the lack of funding and resources available to ICLs in city 
practices were contrasted to the experience of those ICLs in country or regional practices.  
 
4.22 Country ICLs versus city ICLs – the impact on practices 
 
The ICLs interviewed were male and female practitioners from private practice or in-house 
legal aid.  The variation in the length of ICL practice ranged from less than five years to over 
25 plus years of practice.  All Queensland ICLs were practitioners based in a city location or 
suburban city practices, but not regional Queensland.  New South Wales ICLs were a mix of 
city and country practices.  Victorian ICLs were a mixture of city and country practices.   
 
No previous research was identified that reported differences between country ICL 
practitioners and city based ICL practitioners and the research questions, when formulated, 
did not take into account differences between ICL practitioners based on their geographical 
location.  The discussion of city versus country practices emerged only from the discussions 
of the impact of funding and the differences in practices of speaking to and ascertaining a 
child's view. 
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ICLN1 explained the problems faced in the country due to limited access to resources:  
 
 I just so often hear [city] ICL’s say, when I’m acting for parents, we need to have this child 
paediatrically assessed so we can find out exactly what’s going on.  You’re like, you’re living in la la 
land. We’re in [country location], there is not a chance of getting anyone in to see these people … so 
sitting in down town [city location] and making declarations as to what will happen, it’s just 
silliness.”219  
 
ICLN1 also expressed a concern for families located in the country areas of New South 
Wales where the lack of resources allocated to them was due to their locality: 
 
 In country areas the children are living just too far out to be included in a Magellan list.220  That seems 
absolutely ridiculous … If there’s a Magellan list created for a reason then it’s a very good reason in 
cases where there’s sexual abuse allegations being made.  That shouldn’t be limited by where the child 
is living geographically.221 
 
Another regional practitioner, located in country Victoria expressed concern about the 
appointment of in-house legal aid ICLs based in the city and the expectations of those ICLs 
for families to travel to the city for matters to be heard.  Funding was the reason for the 
appointment of in-house ICLs and according to ICLV3: 
 
Victorian Legal Aid, when they appoint them internally, the ICL operates in Melbourne.  The 
expectation is that the family will travel to Melbourne to see the ICL down there. 
 
ICLV3 said that if the matter is allocated to a regional (country) practitioner, it would take 
four months for the matter to be first considered in the court: 
  
 If you go into Melbourne you can have it dealt with urgently, but Melbourne is three hundred K’s 
away, clients don’t have a lot of money, they are not used to going to Melbourne, they don’t want to go 
to Melbourne ... But they're VLA [Victorian Legal Aid], in their ivory tower in Melbourne and I'm just 
not sure that they’re in there for the children’s interest.222 
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ICLV3 said that the FCC has helped matters to be heard more quickly as they are ‘the 
travelling court’.  ICLV3 said that if matters go to this court rather than the Family Court then 
the matter is heard more quickly and this is of assistance to regional practitioners and country 
parties. 
 
ICLV5 is located in a regional country area, but says their court has circuits that travel every 
couple of months to their location and it is two hours away from the Melbourne court.  
ICLV5 said the locality did dictate how they practiced as an ICL and how they found out 
children’s views: 
 
 The only difficulty we face is the distance.  I have to sometimes travel to see the children.  I don’t like 
to make them drive an hour and a half so I tend to drive to them rather than have them come here.223 
 
ICLV5 said that along with the tyranny of distance in that part of regional Victoria they do 
not have access to immediate mediation for children’s matters and this affected the timing of 
court applications and the impact on children seeing a parent.  ICLV5 said: 
 
 So the parties here have to quite often travel to lengthy distances ... now that can put a real delay in the 
children, seeing a non-residential parent. So that’s causing quite significant problems here … so I think 
that’s really bad for the children. 224 
 
It is outside the scope of this research to explore the impact of geographical location on child 
custody case practices.  However, further research is warranted to ascertain if geographical 
locality affects how an ICL practices and if this is a factor which may affect how children's 
views are heard. 
Part E Conclusions for Chapter 4 
 
Part E provides a conclusion to the qualitative study undertaken and contextualises those 
findings with the legal synthesis and legal analysis findings.  The first part of the conclusions 
provides: a brief overview of the previous research undertaken; details how it situates this 
qualitative study; and how this thesis findings is distinguished from previous studies. 
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4.23 Previous research provides context to this qualitative study 
 
A literature review (detailed in Chapter 1) described the research previously conducted. The 
previous research situates the context of this qualitative study.  Fernando's225 research 
concerned judicial meetings with children, Parkinson and Cashmore's research226 described 
the perceptions of family law professionals regarding a child's voice in custody proceedings 
and the ICL study227 conducted by Kaspiew et al., described how the role of the ICL affects 
the outcome for children in litigated parenting disputes.  
 
In Fernando's research she concluded that Judges can speak to children directly to ascertain 
their views,228 however this practice is not common, nor is it encouraged.229  Fernando 
proposed that the way to support judicial meetings with children in Australian custody cases 
was to adopt a Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children.230  The findings of the 
qualitative study in this thesis concurs with Fernando's research in that the opinions of the 
majority of respondents do not consider that it is the role of the Judge to speak to children 
direct.  However, this thesis is distinguished from Fernando's research, in that this research 
considered whether the 2006 FLA amendments rendered the consideration of a child’s view 
different from a wish, in law and in the opinion and practice of ICLs and Judges. 
 
Parkinson and Cashmore research231explored the perception of lawyers (including child 
representatives), Judges, parents, children and family consultants concerning the child’s 
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involvement in post separation child custody arrangements.232  The interviews with the 
Judges were conducted between February 2005 and July 2006 and the lawyers in 2004 and 
the findings 233 were published in various articles and also published in a book in 2008.234  
The lawyers interviewed were asked how they communicated with children to establish the 
child’s views and child’s best interest and how they perceived the importance of children’s 
views in determining satisfactory custody orders.  Further the lawyers were asked if children 
should have a say in custody and contact orders.235  Parkinson and Cashmore found that of 
the lawyers interviewed, most lawyers thought that what the child had to say may be more 
about what they think their parents want to hear and factors such as age and maturity were 
important considerations for determining the weight to be given to what the child had to 
say.236  The overall responses of lawyers indicated a ‘voice rather than choice’ was the key 
issue in litigated matters.237  Of the Judges Parkinson and Cashmore interviewed, most 
Judges held similar views to the lawyers and stated that what a child has to say must be 
considered in light of the evidence and the age and maturity of the child.238  Further, most 
Judges had reservations about conducting interviews with children on the basis of ‘risks to 
the quality of decision-making' and natural justice and fairness.239   
 
Parkinson and Cashmore stated that with the 2006 FLA shared parenting amendments 'it was 
particularly important to listen to [children's] views'.240  The interviews for their research was 
conducted pre-2006 amendments but their research was published post-2006.  Parkinson and 
Cashmore however provided an analysis of why consideration of a child’s perspectives was a 
broader exploration to that of a considering a wish and that 'perspectives rather than wishes 
allows the child's voice to be heard at whatever age and stage they may have reached without 
worrying about their maturity.'  The Parkinson and Cashmore study provided information on 
the limiting nature of what consideration of the child's wishes meant and provided the context 
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to consider in this thesis, the depth of what "views" would mean if they were to 'capture a 
child's feelings and perceptions'.241  Parkinson and Cashmore's research also concluded that 
the lawyers and Judges thought that the child's age and maturity and parental influences were 
factors considered significant to considering the child's voice.  The findings in this qualitative 
study and the doctrinal analysis found that these remain relevant factors whether the child's 
voice is expressed as a wish or a view.  Therefore, the Parkinson and Cashmore's research 
provided an important source of data to situate the responses of ICLs and Judges in the post-
2006 qualitative research undertaken in this thesis.  The research conducted for this thesis 
extends the Parkinson and Cashmore findings by examining the impact of the 2006 FLA wish 
to views amendment to determine if a child's view is different from a child's wish in law, 
meaning and in practice.  The qualitative study conducted for this research concluded that a 
view is not different from a wish in the opinion of most ICLs and Judges or in the practice of 
most ICLs and Judges.   This is supported by the findings of the legal synthesis and analysis 
conducted in this thesis.  
 
The 2014 ICL study conducted by Kaspiew et al.,242 involved a mixed research methodology 
(qualitative and quantitative) with the purpose being to examine how the ICL’s involvement 
in parenting matters affected the outcomes for children in custody cases.243  ICLs and Judges 
were some of the respondents interviewed (along with family consultants, lawyers, parents 
and children).  The findings of the research was that the role of the ICL was to gather 
evidence, manage the process in litigation and that according to ICLs and Judges, ‘facilitating 
a child’s participation is of less significance than the evidence-gathering and litigation 
management function'.244  Findings of the ICL Study also showed difference between ICLs in 
the way they practised and in particular, whether the ICL would consult with children or 
whether they viewed that as the role of the family consultant.245  This was also a theme found 
in the research conducted for this thesis.  This thesis is distinguished from the ICL Study in 
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that the question of whether a view is different from a wish in meaning and practice was not 
explored in the ICL Study. 
 
4.24 Discussion of findings in the qualitative study for this thesis 
 
4.24.1 ICLs and Judges consider that views are no different to wishes 
 
ICLs and Judges practices which determine how to ascertain a child’s view in litigated 
parenting disputes are governed by the FLA, Rules, Guidelines for ICLs, Best Practice 
Guidelines and practice directions.  The 2006 amendments changed the best interest of the 
child factors and in particular the terminology from ascertaining a child’s wish to a child’s 
views.  The change in terminology was designed to be a broader investigation into all the 
circumstances of the child’s life rather than what the child wanted and was to provide the 
child the opportunity to genuinely have their voice heard.  The findings of the doctrinal 
research was that the pre-2006 child authoritative wish regime cases of Harrison and 
Woollard246 and R and R: Children’s Wishes.247 remain the authoritative cases for the post- 
2006 child views regime.  The question posed in the qualitative study to the ICLs and Judges 
was, is a view different from a wish?  The qualitative findings reflected the findings of the 
legal synthesis and analysis, in that in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs, a view 
was not different from a wish in meaning.  Some respondents saw the changes as 
'government claptrap' and others were 'not fussed' about the changes.  The majority opinion 
was that the consideration of a view did not amount to a broader investigation into the child's 
perceptions and feelings.  In contrast, the minority whose opinions saw a change said that 
considering a child's view could contextualise the circumstances of what was happening in 
the child's life. The minority's view does go to the heart of the symbolic changes intended in 
the legislation. 
 
In terms of the practices of the ICLs and Judges, most respondents said that the changes from 
ascertaining a child's view did not translate to any changes in the way they practiced and that 
a child's voice (whether the law expressed the word as a view or a wish) was considered in 
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accordance with the child's best interest and parental capacity.  The practices of the majority 
of ICLs and Judges did not reflect the changes that were intended by the legislature.   
 
4.24.2 Speaking to children direct means different things and involves different 
practices 
 
Ascertaining a child's view is, according to the FLA, through a family report, an ICL or by 
other means.248  The question posed to Judges and ICLs in this qualitative study was 'do they 
speak to children direct'.  From the responses, the meaning of speaking to children direct was 
interpreted differently.  There was no clear definition of what was meant by speaking to 
children and differences in practices were disclosed.  Speaking to children direct ranged from 
never meeting, just meeting, talking, introducing and interviewing children.  For those 
respondents that did not speak to children direct249 they said the court practices and the early 
intervention of family consultants in the court proceedings were the reason for not speaking 
to children in practice.  Others also said that speaking to children could amount to 
'spectacular failures' and systems abuse.  According to these respondents, the intervention by 
report writers permitted the child’s view to be heard from a social scientist instead of a 
lawyer.  Some of the ICL practitioners who did speak to children expressed that it was the 
role of the ICL to do so.  Other ICLs indicated that it was out of necessity due to funding 
constraints either through the lack of reports or lack of experts or lack of funds for the parties 
involved and the geographical limitations of access to courts and resources that affected the 
way they practiced.  Most Judges thought ICLs should speak to children.   
 
In the context of whether Judges should speak to children, most respondents said that it was 
not the role of the Judges to meet with children.  Some Judges held strong views about 
judicial meetings with children saying that it 'gives them the creeps' and 'makes their flesh 
crawl'.  The main reason expressed for Judges not speaking to children was that Judges were 
not trained to do so.  The minority of respondents that said that Judges can speak to children, 
disagreed with the perception of lack of training and said subject to strict controls and with 
the consent of all parties and in the presence of a social scientist or ICL this could occur.  In 
the context of judicial meetings with children, the responses given in this qualitative study 
																																								 																				
248 FLA s 60CD(2)(a)-(c). 
249 The respondents were predominantly from Queensland. 
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mirror the research findings of Fernando.250  It is advocated that the implementation of 
Fernando's Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children would be an important step in 
providing a child an opportunity to have their voice heard.251  
 
Further, in the research findings one Judge252mentioned the emails received by the Judge's 
Associate from a child wanting to express their views to the Judge.  This presents an 
interesting question of the potential for technology to facilitate or increase or perhaps change 
the nature and extent of participation for children in litigated parenting disputes.  This 
question however is outside the scope of this thesis and is a suggestion for further research. 
 
In terms of speaking to children direct the qualitative study undertaken in this thesis, although 
not indicative of all ICLs and Judges in practice, indicates that for the majority of ICLs and 
Judges in practice the post-2006 practices of listening to a child's view are similar to the pre-
2006 regime practice of ascertaining a child's wish.   
 
4.24.3 An ICL's role in ascertaining a child's view has not changed from the pre-
2006 regime 
 
In the qualitative study for this thesis the role of the ICL was described by respondents in the 
context of the job-related tasks or the ‘lawyers’ work that they perform.  However, few 
respondents mentioned that it was the role of the ICL to ascertain the child’s view and in any 
event advocating for a child’s view was inconsequential to that of the overall consideration of 
the welfare or best interests of the child.  Some respondents regarded that the personal 
attributes such as empathy, common sense and good judgement, in addition to their work-
related skills defined the role of the ICL.  However, these personal attributes are not 
mentioned in any Guidelines for ICLs and would be difficult to define in a job description.  
The personal attributes may be nurtured through training but this is speculation and outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
 
																																								 																				
250 Fernando, 'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' above n 225; Fernando, 'Children's 
direct participation and the views of Australian judges' above n 225. See also Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in 
Australian Family Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices, above n 225. 
251 Fernando, 'What do Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' above n 225, 51-52. See also 
Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices, above n 225. 
252 JN2. 
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The findings in this thesis regarding the task oriented nature of ICL work and the ICL's role 
to determine the child's best interests mirror the findings of the ICL Study253 and the 
Parkinson and Cashmore study.254  The majority of respondents in the qualitative study said 
that the best outcome for children was considered possible only through the best interest 
model of representation not child advocate representation.   
 
4.24.4 Challenges faced in child-focused practices 
 
Respondents in this qualitative study provided explanations of the challenges that affected the 
way they practiced.  Some respondents said the adversarial nature of practice and the 
different ways that practitioners interpreted the law impacted on being child focused in 
practice.  Dissimilar laws and remedies for children's matters in state and federal jurisdictions 
also affected child-focused outcomes in family law.  Further research should be conducted in 
this area to ascertain how Commonwealth and State laws could be more integrated to provide 
better outcomes for children in custody cases.  Some respondents expressed that the change 
to the FLA itself provided the challenges.  The 2006 amendments did provide new child-
focused practices pursuant to Division 12A FLA and included in that, the LAT process.  
Division 12A permitted the Judges to utilise a multi-disciplinary approach in court 
proceedings to enable a greater platform to listen to children.  LAT however, although seen 
as a positive process, did not suit dysfunctional families and did not include children in LAT.  
The success of the LAT according to the respondents was due to the personality of the Judges 
and parents.  Further, the majority of respondents said that the LAT did not assist children in 
having their views heard but it did allow the Judge to consider the needs of the child by 
allowing flexibility in case managing the litigation process. 
 
Variations in the way ICLs and Judges practice was explained by some as dictated by 
external factors such as the culture of practice in different states, lack of funding, geographic 
boundaries or court practices.  Although this qualitative study is not indicative of practice, 
this study concurs with the ICL Study255 concerning the variations in practice, the concerns 
regarding the lack of funding and the impact of this on the practices of ICLs and Judges.   
																																								 																				
253 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 42. 
254 Parkinson and Cashmore, The Voice of a Child above n 27. 
255 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 42. 
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One of the themes emerging from this thesis saw the variations in practices between city and 
country based ICL practitioners.  The interview participants for this thesis included a blend of 
in-house legal aid ICLs and private practitioner ICLs.  Interesting responses from ICLs 
emerged about how their practice was affected due to geographical factors which impacted 
on the access to services for the ICLs themselves and the families that were the subject of the 
custody dispute.  This finding however may not be indicative of the variations in practice, but 
nonetheless is worthy of further research to ascertain if geographical differences in ICL 
practices affect the way a child's voice is heard.  
 
Building on the previous research undertaken on listening to the voice of children in custody 
disputes has provided a place to position the qualitative study undertaken in this thesis.  This 
qualitative study has found that in the opinion of most Judges and ICLs, there was no 
conceptual difference in the meaning of the term view to that of a wish.  Further, most Judges 
and ICLs said in practice the way they ascertained a child's voice did not change as a result of 
the 2006 FLA amendments.  The legal synthesis and analysis found that the legislative 
intention of the wish to view amendment did anticipate a change in meaning, however most 
judicial decisions post-2006 showed that the consideration of a child's view was not 
conceptually different from the previous framework of consideration of a child's wish.  This 
concurs with the findings detailed in the qualitative study.  Both separately and in 
combination the qualitative study and doctrinal research has achieved the objectives outlined 
in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 The problem explored by this thesis 
5.2 The key gap in research that this study fills 
5.3 What the thesis did – legal synthesis, legal analysis and qualitative study of Judges 
and ICLs 
5.4 Limitations of research and further research required 
5.5 What could be done next to improve the practice of ascertaining a child’s view? 
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5.1 The problem explored by this thesis 
 
This thesis conducted a tripartite inquiry into the impact of the 2006 FLA amendments which 
required the courts to consider a child’s view, as opposed to their wishes.  The research was 
conducted from an outcomes perspective, that is did the legislative intention of the child's 
wish to a child's view amendment translate to achieving the outcomes proposed by the 
legislature.   The child's voice amendments therefore produced several important questions 
for practice given that consideration of a child's view was to provide a broader investigation 
taking account of the child’s “perceptions and feelings” and a more consultative approach 
with the child,1 rather than the consideration of what a child wished for.  The three objectives 
of the thesis were (1) to consider whether the FLASPRA amendment to the FLA section 
60CC(3)(a) rendered the consideration of a child’s view different from a wish; (2) to explore 
the opinions of ICLs and Judges about what they consider their respective role is in 
ascertaining a child’s view; and (3) to explore the practices of ICLs and Judges in speaking to 
a child in the context of ascertaining a child’s view.  That is, what they do and why it is they 
practice the way they do. 
 
5.2 The key gap in research that this study fills 
 
This thesis identified that no previous research had been conducted on whether the FLASPRA 
amendment to the FLA section 60CC(3)(a) rendered the consideration of a child’s view 
different from a wish.  This thesis determined through legal synthesis and legal analysis that 
the legislative intention of the wish to view amendment did anticipate a change in meaning 
and that a view was meant to be different from a wish.  However most post-2006 judicial 
determinations did not recognise or incorporate the change and the pre-2006 child wish case 
authorities of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children’s Wishes 
(2000) 25 Fam LR 712 remain the current authorities post-2006 reforms.   
 
This thesis also generated the first qualitative research of Judges and ICL opinions about their 
role in ascertaining the child's view as opposed to a child's wish; and generated the first 
qualitative research of ICL and Judge practices within the framework of whether a child's 
view is different from a wish.  The qualitative findings reflected the findings of the legal 
																																								 																				
1 See Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [174]. 
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synthesis and legal analysis, in that, in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs, a view 
was not different from a wish in meaning and that the consideration of a view did not amount 
to a broader investigation into the child's perceptions and feelings.  Further, the practices of 
most Judges and ICLs did not change as a result of the amendments and therefore their 
practices did not reflect the changes that were intended by the legislature.   
 
The qualitative research and the legal doctrinal research, both separately and in combination 
has ensured the originality of the thesis.  This thesis contributes to knowledge by analysing 
the meaning of the Family Law Act provision about obtaining a child’s views compared to a 
child’s wishes and its interpretation by the courts.  It also contributes to professional 
knowledge and practice by an innovative qualitative study which has yielded rich insights 
into professionals’ opinions and actual practice in relation to this important Family Law 
provision.  The research therefore fulfils the requirements of the SJD by making a notable 
contribution to professional knowledge and practice in family law. 
 
5.3 What the thesis did - legal synthesis, legal analysis and a qualitative study of 
Judges and ICLs 
 
To achieve objective one of this thesis, a legal synthesis and analysis of the nature and effect 
of the FLA child view provision was undertaken.2  The research critically explored the nature 
and effect of the change in terminology of considering a child’s view3 instead of a child’s 
wish by investigating the conceptual difference produced by the key legislative change and 
what the change in terminology was meant to produce in practice.  The research concentrated 
on the pre-2006 child wish regime and then the post-2006 child view regime.  
 
The pre-2006 regime considered the historical development of the courts listening to children 
in custody cases.  This situated the basis for the comparison of any changes in the post-2006 
regime.  In 1975, the FLA's enactment saw for the first time the legislative recognition of the 
consideration of a child's wish, albeit with a caveat of an age-specific notation.4  The courts 
highlighted that the maturity of the child was a factor of consideration, rather than just the 
																																								 																				
2 Doctrinal research is reported in Chapter 3. 
3 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC(3)(a) ('FLA'). 
4 Ibid s 64(1)(b). 
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child's age.5  Further amendments to the FLA followed in 1983 removing the age specific 
reference and incorporating the welfare principles.6  The child's reasoning abilities and 
maturity, (applying the Gillick competence test principles)7 were factors now applied to the 
weight given to the child's wishes.  
 
Over the next decade, the CROC8 was enacted and then Harrison and Woollard9 determined 
that the wishes of the children were important and 'proper and realistic weight should be 
attached to those wishes' with the overall arching consideration being the child's welfare.  
This case remains an authoritative decision post-2006 regime and is cited as an authority on 
how a child's view should be considered in custody cases.  
 
Further amendments to the FLA10 in 1995 saw the inclusion of best interest of the child 
factors replacing welfare principles and the child's wishes being the first mentioned best 
interest factor.11  A decision post 1995 FLA reform was the case of R and R: Children's 
wishes12 which determined that consideration of a child's wish was a process of 'intuitive 
synthesis' which weighed up all the evidence to determine an order that was in the child's best 
interest.13  This case (applying Harrison v Woollard14) remains an authoritative decision post-
2006 child views regime.  
 
The post-2006 regime analysis considered: the policy background for the FLA changes; a 
statutory interpretation analysis of the meaning of view; an analysis of the objects' 
provision;15 the parental responsibility presumptions;16 the time arrangement provisions;17 the 
approach adopted by the courts in interpreting FLA Part VII18 provisions,19and consideration 
																																								 																				
5 In the Marriage of Wotherspoon and Cooper (1980) 7 Fam LR 71, 76 ('Wotherspoon'). 
6 FLA s 64(1)(a)-(b). 
7Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. The Gillick competence test principles 
were applied in Australia, in Marion's Case; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB 
(1992) 175 CLR 218 ('Marion's Case'). 
8 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4 (entered into 
force, 2 September, 1990).  Ratified in Australia 16 January 1991. 
9 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 ('Harrison and Woollard') 
10 FLA ss 61C, 68F Children's wishes - s 68F(2)(a) as amended by Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
11 FLA s 68F(2)(a), as amended by Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
12 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. This case is also cited as R and R (2000) 25 Fam LR 712; R and R: Children’s Wishes (2000) FLC 
93-000 and R and R: Children's Wishes [2000] FamCA 43 (4 February 2000). 
13 R and R: Children's wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712, 724. 
14 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788. 
15 FLA s 60B. 
16 Ibid s 61DA. 
17 Ibid s 65DAA. 
18 Ibid ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA. 
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of the two-tiered best interest of the child provisions where views were listed as an additional 
consideration.20  Judicial consideration of post-2006 cases where the child's view was a factor 
were also analysed. 
 
The policy background leading to the 2006 FLA amendments found that the change from 
wishes to views was to ‘capture a child’s perceptions and feelings’21and was to be of 
significance.22  The 2006 FLA amendments were seen to 'create optimum conditions for 
improving family law for children'.23  However the legislative intention of whether a child’s 
view is less important if categorised as an additional consideration remains unresolved. 
 
Applying statutory interpretation principles24 the analysis found that the FLA and the objects 
provisions did not define view,25 however extrinsic materials26 such explanatory memoranda, 
committee reports of Government and the CROC27 indicated that there was an intention that 
views were to mean something more than a wish.28   
 
In the legal synthesis and analysis of post-2006 custody cases, Justice Carmody in Dylan & 
Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) said that considerations of views (rather than 
wishes) may emphasise a broader interpretation into hearing the child's voice.29  Carmody J 
considered the weight of the child's views was according to their maturity and reasoning 
abilities.30  In Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007), Bennett J 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
19 Goode v Goode (2006) FLC 93-286, Taylor & Barker [2007] 37 Fam LR 461, Heath & Hemming (No 2) [2011] FamCA 
749 (27 September 2011). 
20 FLA s 60CC(3)(a). 
21 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Schedule 1 - 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 - After Subdivision B of Division 1 of Part VII, 14, [55]. 
22 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm, Canberra, Attorney-
General’s Department, 139.  
23 Robyn Fitzgerald & Anne Graham,2011, 'The changing status of children within family law from vision to reality?' (2011) 
20 (2) Griffith Law Review, 421-448, 423. 
24 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA, ('AI Act'). The interpretation must be consistent and have regard to the purpose 
of the objects of the Act. See Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 2, 
[46]-[47]; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408.  
25 FLA 1975 (Cth), s 4. In 2011, the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 
(Cth) amended the FLA and inserted s4AB 'definition of family violence etc'. 
26 AI Act s 15AB. See Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1. 
27 See Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 182 CLR 273 ('Teoh's case') for the use of 
treaties in statutory interpretation. 
28 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth), Schedule 1 – 
Shared Parental Responsibility, Part 1, Item 9 Subdivision BA – Best interests of the child, 15, [56] -[57]; House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report on the Exposure 
Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility Bill 2005 (2005) 170 [6.22] citing the Explanatory 
Draft Statement. 
29 Dylan & Dylan [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007) [174]. 
30 Ibid [247]. 
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said that a view was different from a wish,31 and acknowledged that the weight given to the 
views, was based on the child's maturity and reasoning.32  Her Honour however said that the 
word wishes and view could be read interchangeably.33  In both Dylan34 and Mestronov,35 the 
authorities in Harrison and Woollard36 and R and R: Children's Wishes37 were applied and 
considered relevant.  In an analysis of cases heard in the Family Court of Australia, Federal 
Magistrates Court, Federal Circuit Court and the appeals courts the pre-2006 child 
authoritative child wish regime cases remain the authoritative cases38in the post-2006 child 
view regime. 
 
The three main conclusions of the legal synthesis and legal analysis which meets objective 
one are: (1) a child's voice has been recognised since the enactment of the FLA; (2) the 
legislative intention of the wish to view amendment did anticipate a change in meaning, 
however most judicial decisions post-2006 showed that the consideration of a child's view 
was not conceptually different from the previous framework of consideration of a child's 
wish.  Further, the pre-2006 child wish authorities of Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam 
LR 788 and R and R: Children's Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712 remain the authoritative 
cases for the post-2006 child views regime; and (3) the weight attached to what a child says 
has not differed from the pre-2006 consideration of a wish to that of the post-2006 
consideration of a child's view. 
 	
To meet objectives two and three of this thesis a small scale qualitative study was undertaken.  
Fourteen ICLs and six Judges from New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria were 
interviewed to explore their opinions and gain insight into what they thought views meant; 
whether they spoke to children direct; and if in practice, what they did to ascertain a child's 
view changed from that of ascertaining a child's wish.  A literature review of research 
conducted on the role of ICLs and Judges in ascertaining a child's voice situated the 
qualitative study undertaken in this thesis. 
 
																																								 																				
31 Mestronov & Mestronov [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007) [62]. 
32 Ibid [63] citing R v R (Children's wishes) (2002) FLC 93-000 (refers to the case in the judgement as R & R). 
33 Ibid [64]. See Bennett J in Coad & Coad [2011] FamCA 622, 80. 
34 [2007] FamCA 842 (21 August 2007). 
35 [2007] FamCA 1672 (10 October 2007). 
36 (1995) 18 Fam LR 788  
37 (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
38 Harrison and Woollard (1995) 18 Fam LR 788 and R and R: Children's Wishes (2000) 25 Fam LR 712. 
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Judicial interviews with children have been the subject of notable research,39 and in 
particular, Fernando has recommended Guidelines for Judicial Meetings with Children.40  
Case law authorities41 have recognised the courts reluctance for Judges to speak with 
children, although it is 'inherent in the discretion of the courts'.42   
 
In assisting the court with ascertaining the voice of the child, the role of the lawyer 
representing the child was enshrined in the 2006 FLA amendments and called the ICL.  The 
ICL's role was to advocate for the child’s interests whilst ‘simultaneously allowing the child’s 
voice to be heard’.43  The amendments codified the existing practices as articulated in Re K.44   
To assist in defining what an ICL does, national Guidelines for ICLs were developed45 and 
described the role of the ICL as one of a skilful, competent and impartial best interests 
advocate.46  The Guidelines also set out an expectation that the ICLs would meet with 
children.47  In addition to the FLA and the Guidelines, the Family Law Rules (2004) (Cth) 
('FLR') and the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth) ('FCCR') cover the procedural 
matters administered by the court.  These Rules are made pursuant to the FLA.  The FLR and 
FCCR do not mention the consideration of a child's view or describe the meaning of the term.  
The FLR and FCCR however do not provide any details on how the ICL is to ascertain the 
child's view and they do not prescribe that the ICL should speak to the child.  The inclusion 
in the FLR and FCCR of minimum best practice guidelines regarding the ascertaining of a 
																																								 																				
39 Michelle Fernando, 'Conversations between Judges and Children: an Argument in Favour of Judicial Conferences in 
Contested Children's Matters' (2009) 23 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law 48-70; Michelle Fernando, 'What do 
Australian family law judges think about meeting with children?' (2012) 26 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law 51-77; 
Michelle Fernando, 'Children's direct participation and the views of Australian judges' (2013) 92 Family Matters 41-47; 
Michelle Fernando, 'How can we best listen to Children in Family Law Proceedings?' (2013) 3 New Zealand Law Review 
387-407; Michelle Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' (2012) 2 (4) 
Family Law Review 213-224; Michelle Meilin Fernando, Judicial Meetings with Children in Australian Family Law 
Proceedings: Hearing Children’s Voices (PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2011); See also L. Young, E. Ryrstedt and A 
Nicholson, 'The Child and the Judge: Reflections on the Voice of the Child in Australia' (2012) 3 Journal of Family Law and 
Practice 19.  
40 Fernando, MM 2012, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' above n 39. 
41 ZN v YH and Children Representative (2002) 29 Fam LR 20; N and N [2000] FamCA 1350 (10 August 2000); SLD v 
RWD [2006] FamCA 745 (3 August 2006); Painter and Morley [2007] FamCA 283 (23 May 2007); See Fernando, 
'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' above n 39. 
42 Fernando, 'Proposed guidelines for judges meeting with children in family law proceedings' above n 39, citing KS v DS 
[1999] FLC 92-860; [1999] FamCA 1221, [35] (Nicholson CJ); Explanatory Statement, Family Law Amendment Rules 2010 
(Cth), Schedule 1, [16]. 
43 Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) Item 5, Division 
10, of Part VII, 135, [55]. 
44 Re K (1994) 17 Fam LR 537, 557. 
45 Family Court of Australia (2003) Guidelines for children’s representatives (Practice Direction No 2 of 2003). Canberra: 
FCoA; National Legal Aid. (2007) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of 
Australian and Federal Magistrate’s Court of Australia), Hobart; National Legal Aid. (2013) Guidelines for Independent 
Children’s Lawyers (Endorsed by the Family Court of Australian and Federal Circuit Court of Australia). 
46 National Legal Aid. (2013) Guidelines for Independent Children’s Lawyers above n 45, 2. 
47 Ibid 6, [6.2]. The exceptions to the ICL not meeting the child is when the child is under school age, or there is an ongoing 
investigation into sexual abuse, or there is a risk of system's abuse or in the case of geographical remoteness. 
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child's view by an ICL should be considered. 
 
Significant research was published in 2014 regarding the role of the ICL: Independent 
Children’s Lawyers Study (ICL Study).48  The main findings were that the context of what the 
ICL does ‘facilitating a child’s participation, is of less significance than the evidence-
gathering and litigation management function'.49  That research also found a key area of 
difference between ICLs was the way they practised and in particular, whether the ICL would 
consult with children or whether they viewed that as the role of the family consultant.50 
 
Social science research on hearing the voice of the child in family law matters also provided a 
place to situate the pre 200651 and post-2006 reforms.52  Children’s views remain an 
important consideration in one in seven matters that required a judicial determination.53  The 
social science research conducted has not however considered if a view is different from a 
wish in meaning or in practice.  The research for this thesis is therefore distinguished from 
the early research conducted.  
 
Chisholm in the Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm54 
acknowledged that the changes to the wording of wishes to views provided a holistic 
approach to understanding what children’s perceptions are and protects the child from family 
conflict.55  However Chisholm did recommend changes to the wording of section 60CC child 
view provision so as to emphasise the importance of the courts considering what children are 
																																								 																				
48 Kaspiew, R., Carson, R., Moore, S., De Maio, J., Deblaquiere J., and Horsfall B. (2014) Independent Children’s Lawyers 
Study, Final Report, (2nd ed) Canberra: Attorney General’s Department. 
49 Ibid xi. 
50 Ibid xi – xiii. 
51 Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Darlington, Yvonne, ‘Experience of Custody Evaluation Perspectives of Young Adults who were the Subject of Family 
Court Proceedings as Children’ (2006) 3(1) Journal of Child Custody 51-58, 51-2. 
52 Kaspiew, R., Gray, M., Weston R., Moloney, L., Hand, L., and Qu, L (2009), Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms, Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies; Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report 
by Professor Richard Chisholm, above n 22;  Cashmore, J., Parkinson, P., Weston, R., Patulny, R., Redmond, G., Qu, L., 
Baxter, J. Rajkovic, M. Sitek, T. and Katz, I. (2010) Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law 
Reforms: Report to the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Sydney; Social Policy Research Centre, 
University of New South Wales. 
53 See Kaspiew, R., Moloney, L., Dunstan, J., & De Maio, J. (2015). Family law court filings 2004-05 to 2012-13 (Research 
Report No. 30). Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies.  This research reviewed data provided by the Family 
Court of Australia (and Western Australia) and Federal Magistrates Court and Federal Circuit Court.  This research is an 
update of the 2009 Evaluation of the 2006 Family Law Reforms Summary Report, Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family 
Studies discussed in the thesis. See also Rhoades, H., Sheehan, G., & Dewar, J. Developing a consistent message about 
children's care needs across the family law system (2013) 27 (3) Australian Journal of Family Law 191-219. 
54 Chisholm, R (2009) Family Courts Violence Review: A Report by Professor Richard Chisholm above n 22. 
55 Ibid 139.  
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experiencing.  The changes are detailed in Chapter 1.  The writer agrees with Chisholm's 
recommendation.  
 
The qualitative research for this thesis was divided into four parts.  The central findings in 
Part A were: (a) wishes or views mean the same; (b) whether the FLA expresses the 
consideration of a child's voice as a wish (pre-2006 regime) or a view (post-2006 regime), the 
application of the consideration is similar in practice; and (c) the best interests of the child 
factors and parental capacity remain the paramount consideration whether what a child has to 
say is called a wish or a view. These findings concur with the legal principles found in the 
doctrinal research undertaken.  
 
The central findings in Part B were: (a) the ICL's role is described according to their job-
related activities, that is case management and evidence gathering roles; (b) the ICLs role is 
one of a best interest of the child advocate, (c) most ICLs did not mention ascertaining the 
child's view but rather it was their role to ascertain the child's best interest. The findings in (a) 
and (b) concur with the social sciences studies conducted on ICL practices.56  However, it is 
acknowledged that the theme extracted in (c) may be not indicative of practice, therefore not 
'statistically significant or [may be] due to chance'.57   
 
The central findings in Part C were: (a) the phrase 'speaking to children direct' is interpreted 
differently by the participants, that is some "meet", others "talk", some "interview" children; 
(b) different practices exist between ICLs and Judges on whether they would speak to 
children in custody cases; and (c) the majority of the respondent ICLs and Judges believe that 
Judges should not speak to children.  The findings in part (b) and (c) concurs with the social 
science research undertaken by Kaspiew et al.,58 and the findings of Fernando.59  The 
doctrinal legal synthesis and analysis undertaken in this thesis confirms the reluctance of 
judicial interviews with children. 
 
The central findings in Part D were (a) differences in judicial approaches between different 
court registries influence practice; (b) the geographic location (that is country based versus 
																																								 																				
56 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 48. 
57 Ochieng Pamela Atieno, 'Analysis of the Strengths and Limitations of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Paradigms' 
(2009) 13 Problems of Education in the 21st Century 13-18, 17. 
58 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 48. 
59 Fernando, above n 39. 
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city based) may impact on ICL practices; (c) lack of funding influences ICLs practices; (d) a 
more integrated approach between family and child protection practices is needed; and (e) the 
LAT process did not enhance the way a child's view was heard.  The findings in this study 
concur with the issues (a), (c) and (d) identified in the Kaspiew et al.,60 study.  Further 
research is needed to see how an integrated approach between Commonwealth and State laws 
can support positive outcomes for children in custody matters and if the geographic location 
does affect ICL practices. 
 
5.4 Limitations of research and further research required 
 
It is acknowledged that the limitations of the qualitative research undertaken in this thesis are 
that the findings may not be representative of all practitioners.  The findings do however 
provide an understanding of how Judges and ICLs 'interpret their experiences ... and what 
meaning they attribute to their experiences.'61  
 
The research participants for this thesis did not include children and although this was 
envisaged in the original research design, as the research progressed it was determined that 
including children in the study was itself worthy of a doctoral thesis.  Likewise family 
consultants were not part of the qualitative study.  The research ascertained that the family 
reports continue to remain the main method of the courts receiving information about the 
child's views.62  Therefore the question remains is there a difference in the way family 
consultants practice from the pre-2006 wish regime to that post-2006 view regime?  This 
question would in itself be worthy of a doctoral thesis. 
 
Themes emerging from the thesis also saw variations in practices between city and country 
based ICL practitioners.  The interview participants for this thesis included a blend of in-
house legal aid ICLs and private practitioner ICLs.  Interesting responses from ICLs emerged 
about how their practice was affected due to geographical factors which impacted on the 
																																								 																				
60 Kaspiew et al., Independent Children’s Lawyers Study, Final Report, above n 48. 
61 Sharan B Merriam, Qualitative Research, A Guide to Design and Implementation, (John Wiley & Sons, 3rd ed, 2009) 6. 
62 See RCB as litigation guardian of EKV, CEV, CIV and LRV v The Honourable Justice Colin James Forrest, as one of the 
judicial officers of the Family Court of Australia & Ors (2012) 247 CLR 304, 317, 27 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ).  Their Honours at 27: " In some (perhaps many) cases, obtaining the report of a family consultant would avoid 
the difficulties and limitations inherent in receiving evidence of the children's views from one or both of the disputing 
parents ... And in a case such as this, ... it may be expected that a family consultant's report would ordinarily be obtained". 
See Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority 
for Children in the Legal Process. Report no 84 (1997) [16.35].	
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access to services for the ICLs themselves and the families that were the subject of the 
custody dispute.  This is worthy of further research to ascertain if geographical differences in 
ICL practices affect the way a child's voice is heard.  
 
A comment by a Judge in the qualitative findings regarded how a child wanted to speak to the 
Judge and contacted the Judges' Associate by email.  This comment flagged an interesting 
insight into the potential of how technology may change the nature and extent of participation 
for children in custody cases.  This warrants further research into the impact that technology 
could have on listening to the voice of a child in litigated parenting disputes.  
 
5. 5 What could be done next to improve the practice of ascertaining a child's 
view 
 
The central question of this thesis was to ascertain if the changes to the FLA rendered the 
consideration of a view different from a wish.  The doctrinal research conclusions were that 
although the legislature intended that in meaning a view was different to a wish, the majority 
of judicial decisions post-2006 did not support this.  The qualitative study also concluded that 
in the opinion of the majority of Judges and ICLs a view was not different from a wish and 
the majority of Judges and ICLs did not change the way they practiced in ascertaining the 
child's voice, whether it was described as a wish or a view.   
 
Chapter 3 detailed that the wish to view legislative amendments were to mirror the wording 
of the CROC and was to broaden the investigation into capturing a child's voice.  The CROC 
in article 12 states that it is the right of the child to express their views freely and participate 
in matters that affect them. The FLA does not compel a child to express a view if they do not 
want to,63 however if a child chooses to express their view and to advance the recognition of 
that child's voice before a parenting order is made, it is advocated that (in addition to the 
proposals advanced by Chisholm and Fernando and discussed in Chapter 1), the FLA be 
amended.   
 
To achieve the outcomes intended by the legislature it is recommended that the FLA be 
amended are as follows: (a) inserting a definition of the word "view" in the interpretation 
																																								 																				
63 FLA s 60CE. 
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provisions of the FLA (section 4).  The definition should include that a view is a broader 
investigation into a child's perspective, it is to capture the child's perceptions, feelings and 
considerations that are important to the child and involve a more consultative approach with 
the child; (b) the insertion of consideration of the child's view should be included in the 
objects provision of FLA section 60B; (c) FLA section 61DA (the presumption) and section 
65DAA (time arrangement) provisions be amended to include a reference to consideration of 
the child’s view before a parenting order is made; and (d) the inclusion in the FLR and FCCR 
details of minimum best practice guidelines regarding the ascertaining of a child's view by an 
ICL.  
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Appendix A: Semi-structured Interview Guide - Judges. 
	
• How long Judge have you been in this position? 
• Can you tell me about the changes you have seen in your years on the bench regarding 
the process of ascertaining children’s views particularly pre- and post-2006 Family 
Law amendments? [Probe generally any specific changes they have experienced in 
the context of ascertaining a child’s view or wish]. 
• Do you think a ‘view’ as opposed to a ‘wish’ of a child has changed the listening to 
children in litigated matters? [Probe – generally the significance of 2006 
amendments]. 
• What is your understanding of best interest of child factors in the context of a child’s 
views? 
• Can you tell me how you listen to children? [Probe – directly dealing with children or 
indirectly through Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL), family consultants etc. 
Engage a response dealing with current or proposed child inclusive practices]. 
• Do you speak to a child direct? Is there ever a circumstance this is appropriate? 
[Probe experiences of a child speaking to the judge, a child giving evidence etc]. 
• Have you been involved in the Less Adversarial Trial (LAT)? [Explore LAT 
generally, thoughts on the process, how it involves children, the role the Judge, ICL 
and parties/children takes in LAT, benefits & weaknesses in the context of listening to 
children].  
• What do you see is the role of the ICL? What do you see is the role of the Judge? 
Should a child be involved in litigated parenting disputes [Probe – the ICL’s 
assistance in ascertaining child’s views, the role of the ICL itself; best interest of the 
child lawyer versus child advocate, should the judge be more proactive, should 
children give evidence, speak directly to ICL’s/judges, what does the Judge see as the 
function of a child in parenting disputes]. 
• Can you tell me about methods or processes you are aware of (in Australia or 
overseas) or you would like to see implemented which provide child inclusive 
principles which promote listening to children [Probe generally a discussion on what 
the Judge sees the best way to promote best interest of the child in the context of 
ascertaining a child’s view or wish. Is there a role for children, lawyers, judges, the 
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courts, social workers]?  
• What do you think is necessary to improve the experiences of children whose parents 
have to go to court to have their parenting arrangements decided by the court [Probe – 
children’s involvement – projects resourced, financial resources, training of judges, 
better education whether of family lawyers, counselling, mediation for children etc]? 
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Appendix B: Semi-structured Interview Guide - Independent Children’s 
Lawyers. 
	
 
• How long have you been in this position? 
• Can you tell me about the changes you have seen in your role as an ICL regarding the 
process of ascertaining children’s views particularly pre- and post-2006 Family Law 
amendments? [Probe generally any specific changes they have experienced in the 
context of ascertaining a child’s view or wish]. 
• Do you think a view as opposed to a wish of a child has changed the listening to 
children in litigated matters? [Probe – generally the significance of 2006 
amendments]. 
• What is your understanding of best interest of child factors in the context of a child’s 
views? 
• Can you tell me how you listen to children? [Probe – directly dealing with children or 
indirectly through Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL), family consultants etc. 
Engage a response dealing with current or proposed child inclusive practices]. 
• Do you speak to a child direct? Is there ever a circumstance this is appropriate? 
[Probe experiences of a child speaking directly to the ICL, to the judge, a child giving 
evidence] 
• Have you been involved in the Less Adversarial Trial (LAT)? [Explore LAT 
generally, thoughts on the process, how it involves children, the role the Judge, ICL 
and parties/children takes in LAT, benefits & weaknesses in the context of listening to 
children].  
• What do you see is the role of the ICL? What do you see is the role of the Judge? 
How should a child be involved in litigated parenting disputes [Probe – the ICL’s 
assistance in ascertaining child’s views, the role of the ICL itself; best interest of the 
child lawyer versus child advocate, should the judge be more proactive, should 
children give evidence, speak directly to ICL’s/judges, what does the participant see 
as the function of a child in parenting disputes]. 
• Can you tell me about methods or processes you are aware of (in Australia or 
overseas) or you would like to see implemented which provide child inclusive 
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principles which promote listening to children [Probe generally a discussion on what 
the ICL sees the best way to promote best interest of the child in the context of 
ascertaining a child’s view or wish. Is there a role for children, lawyers, judges, the 
courts, social workers etc]?  
• What do you think is necessary to improve the experiences of children whose parents 
have to go to court to have their parenting arrangements decided by the court [Probe – 
children’s involvement – projects resourced, financial resources, training of judges, 
better education whether of family lawyers, counselling, mediation for children etc]? 
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Appendix C: HREC 
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The image part with relationship ID rId17 was not found in the file.
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Appendix D: Ethics approval Family Court of Australia 
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